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To whom it may concern, 
 
I hope this letter finds you well. Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, I have been 
advised by the IMCEERES Consortium to outline any issues I believe have affected my 
ability to carry out research for this dissertation project.  
 
Firstly, due to recommendations imposed by the University of Glasgow following the 
outbreak, I have been unable to perform interviews with party spokesmen and academic 
experts as part of my work. Whilst this data would have allowed me to gain a deeper 
understanding of the subject matter, it was ultimately decided by the university ethics board 
that any form of interview (even online) should be avoided if not absolutely necessary at this 
time. This was due to the already stressful situations faced by interviewees during this 
difficult period. At the same time, following the completion of an ethics form, I was also 
personally advised by Dr. Ammon Cheskin of the university’s Central and East European 
Studies department, to focus on data already available to me on party websites and other 
online resources. This was due to an agreement that I could still pursue meaningful research 
using these resources whilst acknowledging its deficiencies in light of ongoing issues. For 
more information on these issues, please see the University of Glasgow’s guidelines 
regarding the effects of coronavirus on academic research: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/news/coronavirus/faqs/   
 
Secondly, I believe that my work has been somewhat restricted due to the closure of the 
University of Glasgow library. Whilst I have been able to engage with a great amount of 
resources online, I believe that my research would have benefited from direct access to more 
obscure works only available in physical form at the library. For this study, this is particularly 
true with regards to Russian language resources and esoteric geopolitical writings by figures 
such as Alexander Dugin. Certainly, whilst I was able to access these works as I began my 
research last year, it has proven difficult to continue to engage with these first-hand resources 
following my impromptu return from Krakow to my family home in Glasgow in March. As a 
result, engagement with this body of work following my return was often reliant on 
secondary sources online.  
 
Whilst it is clear that my work has been limited due to these unprecedented circumstances, I 
believe overall that I have still been able to pursue interesting and novel research. I hope you 
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Rising to prominence following the 2008 financial crisis, the European radical right has 
become a popular topic within both mainstream and academic debate. Now boasting a 
powerful presence in many European states, the political tradition has presented a myriad of 
existential threats to the continent’s liberal status quo. Among these new challenges is a 
widespread desire to reassess relations with Russia. Also eager to take advantage of Europe’s 
ongoing uncertainty, the Kremlin has shown great interest in engaging with radical right 
parties as part of its geopolitical resurgence. This relationship has drawn the attention of a 
fledgling body of literature, which has noted Russia’s willingness to fund and support these 
groups. Despite this, research has yet to investigate why exactly many radical right parties 
have been willing to engage with Moscow. This is all the more surprising given the 
literature’s discussion of a shared illiberalism, with studies continuing to focus solely on 
Russia’s export of such beliefs. As such, this study attempts to rectify this issue by directly 
engaging with Russia policies found in the literature of four radical right parties. Such 
information is subject to a methodology embracing both critical geopolitics and narrative 
analysis, with radical right theory lending itself to an explicitly ‘spatiotemporal’ 
understanding of international relations. The study finds that rather than embracing sheer 
opportunism, the parties have incorporated Russia into vivid narratives bound by desires to 
“revolt against the modern world”. Simultaneously, national circumstances ensure that this 
‘template’ has been manipulated according to subjective needs, with party narratives now 
helping to challenge the seemingly ‘inevitable’ nature of the radical right-Russia relationship. 
 
















































































































Described by Dan Dungaciu as a “perfect storm” of socio-economic factors, Europe’s 
ongoing political uncertainty has presented a persistent challenge to its liberal status-quo.1 
Originating in the 2008 financial downturn, these issues have been characterised by long-
term market troubles that have affected the economic opportunities of large sections of 
Europe’s populations to a worrying degree.2 Simultaneously, such lingering problems have 
been exacerbated by recent migration issues, with an influx of refugees and migrants, 
particularly from the Islamic world, challenging many nations’ societal cohesion.3 These 
issues have often been collectively discussed within academia through concepts such as the 
“crisis of neo-liberalism”.4 Now faced with growing dissatisfaction with the current 
continental system, many countries have witnessed a troubling rise in feelings of political 
alienation.5 This has resulted in events such as Brexit, which has now forced individuals to 
question the ‘inevitability’ of political norms.6 Due to this, it appears that the continent has 
now entered a new era of ‘reimagination’, reminiscent of the collapse of communism in 
Central and Eastern Europe.7 This has seen individuals and groups renegotiate their identities 
and beliefs within a vacuum of values, thereby producing a wide variety of novel political 
outlooks.8 Such ideals are often striking when compared with the troubled status-quo, with 
 
1 Dan Dungaciu, Perfect Storm in Europe: Towards a new way of understanding the European Crisis and its 
consequences in The Perfect Storm of the European Crisis eds. Dan Dungaciu & Ruxandra Iordache (Newcastle 
upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017), pp. 3-5 
2 Jon Erik Dølvik & Andrew Martin, European Social Models From Crisis to Crisis: Employment and 
Inequality in the Era of Monetary Integration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 1 
3 Andrey Makarychev, Bordering and Identity-Making in Europe after the 2015 Refugee Crisis, Geopolitics, 
Vol. 23, No. 4 (2018), pp. 747-748 
4 Alessandro Bonanno, The Legitimation Crisis and the Future of Neoliberalism: The State, Will Formation and 
Resistance (New York: Springer Press, 2017) p. 231 
David Featherstone et al., In, against and beyond neo-liberalism: The “crisis” and alternative political futures, 
Space and Polity, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2015), p. 5 
5 Philomena Murray & Michael Longo, The Crisis-Legitimacy Nexus in the European Union in The European 
Union in Crisis: Explorations in Representation and Democratic Legitimacy ed. Kyriakos N. Demetriou (New 
York: Springer Press, 2015), pp. 61-63 
6 Catherine Haddon, The Brexit Battle is fundamentally changing the constitution, Institute for Government, 2nd 
September 2019 - https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/brexit-battle-fundamentally-changing-
constitution [accessed 17th August 2020] 
Aside from a wider interest in Russian foreign policy, the 2016 referendum, as well as the 2014 vote on Scottish 
independence, also played a pivotal role in my decision to pursue research on the European radical right’s 
geopolitical narratives regarding Moscow. These personal experiences of the continent’s latest clashes of 
identity profoundly impacted my thinking regarding the durability of the political status-quo, with nationalist 
forces now seemingly challenging the very concept of ‘Europe’ itself. 
7 Alan Smith, The Return of Europe: The Reintegration of Eastern Europe into the European Economy 
(Houndmills: Palgrave, 2000), p. 2 
8 Ibid. 
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beliefs once relegated to the political fringe now the subject of popular debate. As Thomas 
Wright has argued, recent years have seen a rapid shift in the “Overton window” of European 
political thought.9  
 
Amongst these ideas, the resurgence of geopolitics is particularly noteworthy. Involving the 
study of the interactions between politics and physical and human geography, the discipline 
in Europe has been dominated by a Euro-Atlantic orthodoxy since the Cold War’s end.10 
Indeed, integration and cooperation in the European Union and NATO have often dominated 
state outlooks to the point that they are viewed as unquestionable.11 This ideal broadly 
resembles Fukuyama’s ambitious “end of history” thesis, with governments surprisingly 
eager to accept beliefs regarding the demise of great power military confrontation and the 
inevitable acceptance of liberal norms across Europe and the world.12 In light of 
aforementioned events, such ‘messianism’ is now receiving criticism from figures such as 
Walter Mead, who hail a “return of geopolitics”.13 This is exemplified by the myriad of new 
‘mental maps’ currently taking hold in the continent, with the seemingly complacent or 
‘hostile’ nature of the current geopolitical system and its elites, encouraging individuals to 
search for new norms.14 This has often resulted in discussion surrounding the world’s 
increasing ‘multipolarity’. For instance, it is interesting to consider China and Russia’s 
impressive rise, as well as their ability to offer alternatives to a troubled Western liberalism.15 
Whilst the former, however, retains an uncertain, yet growing, presence in European affairs, 
 
9 Thomas Wright, The Opening of Europe’s Overton Window, Brookings Institute, February 2019, pp. 1-2 - 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/FP_20190226_eu_democracy_wright.pdf [accessed 
22nd May 2019] 
10 Hal Brands & Eric Edelman, America and the Geopolitics of Upheaval, The National Interest, 21st June 2017 
- https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-the-geopolitics-upheaval-21258 [accessed 20th May 2019] 
11 Eamonn Butler, Assessing Accession: Power, Influence and Representation – Central and Eastern Europe in 
the EU, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 66, No. 3 (2014), p. 354 
12 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, The National Interest, No. 16 (1989), pp. 3-4 
13 Walter Russell Mead, The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers, Foreign Policy, 
May/June 2014 - https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-04-17/return-geopolitics [accessed 20th 
May 2019] 
14 Sam Brazys & Niamh Hardiman, The ‘PIIGS’ acronym had a clear negative impact on the response of 
financial markets to the ‘PIIGS countries’ during the crisis, London School of Economics – EUROPP, 12th 
December 2014 - https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/12/12/the-piigs-acronym-had-a-clear-negative-impact-
on-the-market-treatment-of-the-piigs-countries-during-the-crisis/ [accessed 21st May 2019] 
Andrea Székely & Balázs Kotosz, From fence to wall? Changes in the mental space of border zones in Eastern 
Europe, Regional Science and Policy Practice, Vol. 10 (2018), p. 270 
15 Dieter Dettke, Geopolitics in the Trump Era: The Dual Challenge of Russia and China for Europe and the 
Need for a New Containment Strategy, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 22nd February 
2019 - https://www.aicgs.org/2019/02/geopolitics-in-the-trump-era-the-dual-challenge-of-russia-and-china-for-
europe-and-the-need-for-a-new-containment-strategy/ [accessed 21st May 2019] 
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the latter has maintained an immediate and influential role within local geopolitical 
realities.16 
 
Certainly, Moscow’s eagerness to take advantage of the European order’s current uncertainty 
is striking. This is exemplified by the increasingly assertive rhetoric of Vladimir Putin. Once 
describing the fall of the Soviet Union as a “major geopolitical disaster of the twentieth 
century”, the Russian leader has seemingly embarked on a political project aimed at 
strengthening Moscow’s ‘great power’ status in a multipolar world.17 This has translated into 
an increasingly confrontational foreign policy, with predatory ventures in Georgia and 
Ukraine challenging the relative, decades-long peace across the continent.18 At the same time, 
these actions have been complemented by an extensive “information war” against Western 
interests.19 Ranging from supposed electoral interference, to the promotion of ‘fake news’, 
this troubling campaign has promoted scepticism regarding the supposed ideological gulf 
between liberal ideals and practice.20 As such, Moscow’s recent geopolitical actions now also 
aim to control hearts and minds, with the Kremlin’s burgeoning links with various radical 
political organisations also playing an essential role in this ‘offensive’.  
 
This often-unappreciated relationship with fringe groups follows a long history of 
interactions. This is evident with regard to the Cold War era, as Soviet authorities not only 
maintained fruitful relations with their Western European communist counterparts but also 
some fascist groups, who praised Moscow for its supposed traditionalism.21 This remarkable 
 
16 Łukasz Sarek, The “16+1” Initiative and Poland’s Disengagement from China, Jamestown Institute – China 
Brief, Vol. 19, Issue 4 - https://jamestown.org/program/the-161-initiative-and-polands-disengagement-from-
china/ [accessed 21st May 2019] 
17 Address by President of the Russian Federation, President of Russia, 18th March 2014 - 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 [accessed 21st May 2019] 
Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, President of Russia, 25th April 2005 - 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931 [accessed 21st May 2019] 
Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, President of Russia, 18th October 2018 - 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848 [accessed 21st May 2019] 
18 Eugene Rumer, Russia and the Security of Europe, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2016, 
pp. 1-2 
19 Marcel Van Herpen, Putin’s Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy (London: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), p. 9 
20 Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections, National Intelligence Council - 
Intelligence Community Assessment, 6th January 2017, pp. ii-iii 
Erik Brattberg & Tim Maurer, Russian Election Interference: Europe’s Counter to Fake News and Cyber 
Attacks, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23rd May 2018 - 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/23/russian-election-interference-europe-s-counter-to-fake-news-and-
cyber-attacks-pub-76435 [accessed 21st May 2019] 
21 Anton Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far-Right: Tango Noir (Oxford: Routledge, 2018), p. 2 
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ability to appeal to various radical viewpoints is largely due to Russia’s peripheral 
geopolitical position in Europe. Certainly, the state has often acted as a ‘blank slate’ for 
revolutionary imaginations.22 This phenomenon is true even today, as various groups have 
cast the country’s geopolitical role through their own personal lens. For instance, it is often 
forgotten that many far-left parties now quietly view Moscow as a key partner in challenging 
Western capitalism.23 Simultaneously, however, it should be noted that such interest is now 
dominated by Europe’s ascendant ‘radical right’, with the movement’s growing mainstream 
influence placing it at the forefront of modern pro-Russia discourse.24 
 
Emerging from various nationalist movements in the 1970s, as well as intellectual traditions 
such as the ‘Nouvelle Droite’, such groups have become the key beneficiary of Europe’s 
existential crisis.25 Characterised by a rejection of their fascist predecessors’ abstentionism, 
radical right movements now consistently enjoy widespread electoral success at both national 
and European levels.26 This surge in support is largely due to these parties’ modern, populist 
brand of ethno-nationalism. Certainly, it is impressive how successful radical right 
movements have been in presenting themselves as representatives of ‘silent national 
majorities’, whose socio-economic misfortune can be directly linked to an ‘unnatural’ state of 
affairs, defended by the status-quo.27 In contrast, these groups have promoted themselves as 
defenders of a historic ‘Golden Age’, demanding a ‘return’ to such ‘organic’ circumstances 
as part of their “revolt against the modern world”.28  
 
Due to this, it may seem clear why many of these parties now seek close relations with a 
resurgent Russia. This is exemplified by the substantial funding that Moscow now provides 
to such movements, with material assistance helping to bolster their ‘disruptive’ political 
 
22 Maxine David, Exploiting Marginality: The Case of Russia in The Geopolitics of Europe’s Identity: Centres, 
Boundaries and Margins ed. Noel Parker (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), pp. 67-69 
23 Lóránt Győri & Péter Krekó, Don’t Ignore the Left! Connections between Europe’s radical left and Russia, 
OpenDemocracy, 13th June 2016 - https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/don-t-ignore-left-connections-
between-europe-s-radical-left-and-ru/ [accessed 25th May 2019] 
24 Anton Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far-Right, pp. xxiii-xxv 
25 Ibid., p. xxiii 
26 Terry Givens, Voting Radical Right in Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 20 
27 Thomas Greven, The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and the United States: A Comparative 
Perspective, Friedrich Ebert Shiftung, May 2016, pp. 1-2 
28 Julius Evola, Revolt against the modern world: Politics, Religion and Social Order in the Kali Yuga 
(Rochester: Inner Traditions, 1995) 
Matt Golder, Far Right Parties in Europe, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 19 (2016), p. 481 
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power.29 However, it is unreasonable to believe that these links represent little more than a 
marriage of convenience. This is clear with regard to the strong ideological affinity both sides 
possess, with many radical right forces praising Putin’s ‘conservative revolution’.30 Involving 
the institutionalisation of traditional conceptions of family, religion and society, the 
Kremlin’s project has been viewed as a model by various nationalist movements.31 As a 
result, radical right groups now often view Russia as a key geopolitical partner in their 
struggle to ‘return to the past’.32 These parties have often developed such ideas in great detail, 
with their natural predisposition to geopolitics’ realist precepts encouraging the articulation 
of vivid alternative realities.33 Indeed, whilst the groups share a common ideological 
inheritance, the details of these beliefs are fundamentally shaped by national circumstances. 
This has seen radical right groups incorporate Moscow into a variety of geopolitical ‘stories’, 
with these populist outlooks united by a tendency towards a nationalist “collective 
narcissism”.34 Despite this, there remains little direct engagement with this phenomenon 
within literature, with this study hoping to shed light on an important, yet understudied 
political trend. 
 
Consequently, this study will investigate various European radical right groups’ perceptions 
of Russia, focusing specifically on the ‘geopolitical narratives’ constructed around the 
resurgent power. In keeping with the ideal of geopolitics as a “boundary-producing practice” 
that creates global politics’ space, ‘geopolitical narratives’ are conceptualised in this study as 
the subjective understanding of “imagined geographies” in relation to a nation’s envisioned 
past, present and future.35 Subsequently, the investigation will look at the ‘mental maps’ of 
various radical right parties who have profited immensely from the “crisis-driven present” 
 
29 Antonis Klapsis, An Unholy Alliance – The European Far-Right and Putin’s Russia, Wilfried Martens Centre 
for European Studies (2015), p. 59 
30 Ibid., p. 17 
31 Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, President of Russia, 19th September 2013 - 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243 [accessed 26th May 2019] 
Marlene Laruelle, Introduction in Eurasianism and the European Far-Right – Reshaping the Europe-Russia 
Relationship ed. Marlene Laruelle (London: Lexington Books, 2015), p. xii 
32 Ibid. 
33 Mark Bassin, Between Realism and the New Right: Geopolitics in Germany in the 1990s, Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2003), p. 350 
Ian Klinke, Geopolitics and the political right: Lessons from Germany, International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 3 
(2018), p. 498 
34 Antonis Klapsis, An Unholy Alliance, pp. 18-19 
Hakkı Taş, The chronopolitics of national populism, Identities – Global Studies in Culture and Power (2020), p. 
5 
35 Ian Klinke, Geopolitical Narratives on Belarus in Russia, Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2008), p. 113 
Gearóid Ó Tuathail & Simon Dalby, Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics – Towards a Critical Geopolitics in 
Rethinking Geopolitics eds. Gearóid Ó Tuathail & Simon Dalby (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 2-3 
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that emerged during 2008’s financial troubles.36 These movements are the French 
Rassemblement National, Alternative for Germany, Hungary’s Jobbik and Greece’s Golden 
Dawn. This newfound influence is measured by these parties’ impressive electoral 
performances, which have allowed for the expression of vivid, alternative foreign policies. 
Certainly, it seems sensible to understand parties as “the engine of foreign policy”, with these 
groups’ challenges to mainstream thought now making it all the more important to directly 
expose these surprisingly undervalued narratives.37 It can also be argued that these parties 
allow for the articulation of various continental realities, as the four groups find themselves 
cast across various European socio-economic divides, such as North-South and East-West.38 
This diverse approach has been advocated by scholars such as Mudde and Minkenberg. For 
example, whilst the former has noted the need to “move on” from simply analysing the same 
non-parliamentary groups in Western Europe, the latter has noted the distinct peculiarities of 
groups across specific parts of the continent such as Eastern Europe.39 Due to this, it ought to 
be said that the views of extra-parliamentary groups will not be discussed in this piece, as 
whilst they often possess a rich theoretical tradition, such groups retain a limited ability to 
directly influence their state’s international outlook.40 The study will consequently be based 
around the following research questions: 
 
1. What are the key geopolitical narratives constructed by these various radical right 
parties regarding Russia? 
 
2. How and why do these parties’ narratives coincide or contrast? 
 
This choice to examine political parties as foreign policy actors is also consistent with the 
tradition of ‘critical geopolitics’, which will play a key role in this investigation’s conceptual 
framework. Stressing a need to expand geopolitical knowledge beyond the state-centric logic 
 
36 Hakkı Taş, The chronopolitics of national populism, p. 14 
37 Akis Kalaitzidis, The Odd Duck: Why Greece’s Foreign Policy will not turn out to be a Swan! in Foreign 
Policy under Austerity: Greece’s Return to Normality? eds. Spyridon Litsas & Aristotle Tziampiris (London: 
Palgrave, 2017), p. 31 
38 Josef Janning, Crisis and Cohesion in the EU: A Ten-Year Review, European Council on Foreign Relations 
Policy Brief, February 2018 - https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR-_245_-_Crisis_and_Cohesion_-
_A_10_Year_Review_Janning_WEB.pdf [accessed 29th July 2019] 
39 Cas Mudde, The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: Towards a Fourth Wave, C-Rex Working Paper 
Series, No. 1 (2016), pp. 4-5 
Michael Minkenberg, The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti-modernity, Government 
and Opposition, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2000), p. 189 
40 Anton Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far-Right, p. xxv 
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of “wise men”, the theory advocates for investigating discourse among a diverse range of 
subjective ‘Selfs’.41 Simultaneously, this complementary focus on the geopolitics of a 
thoroughly ‘nostalgic’ political tradition has encouraged an engagement with 
‘chronopolitics’, which stresses the “temporality” of geopolitical discourse.42 As such, the 
investigation will expose these alternative national ‘Selfs’ through the use of a qualitative 
methodology based on Emery Roe’s “narrative policy analysis”.43 This approach emphasises 
the creation of overarching ‘metanarratives’ from raw data, with individual stories, 
“nonstories” and “counterstories” identified and compared in order to produce nuanced 
assumptions fit for policymaking.44 Such a process will be applied to a myriad of documents, 
manifestos, speeches and interviews produced by the study’s four parties. These narrative 
rich sources will constitute the study’s sole source of information, as ongoing issues 
surrounding the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic have made methods such as interviewing, 
difficult to perform.45  
 
Furthermore, discussion of the radical right’s Russia narratives will be also supported by a 
myriad of theoretical literature. This will incorporate a variety of subjects, with the work of 
geopolitical scholars, such as Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, complementing more 
directly related work. This includes Marlene Laruelle’s pivotal investigation into the 
popularity of ‘neo-Eurasianism’ among Europe’s radical right. Of course, it is important to 
note that this analysis will naturally be faced with various limitations, as researcher 
reflexivity remains a vital part of social science investigations.46 These issues include 
available time, word count, as well as the more specific issue of language, with the 
international nature of the study encouraging the use of translation services, when deemed 
necessary.    
 
This study will consist of two distinct sections, made up of a variety of chapters. The first 
part will introduce the thesis’ various methodological and theoretical underpinnings, thereby 
 
41 Gearóid Ó Tuathail & Simon Dalby, Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics, p. 3 
42 Ian Klinke, Chronopolitics: a conceptual matrix, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 37, No. 5 (2013), p. 
681 
43 Emery Roe, Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994) 
44 Ibid., pp. 3-4 
45 Adam Jowcett, Carrying out qualitative research under lockdown – Practical and ethical considerations, 
London School of Economics Blogs, 20th April 2020 - 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2020/04/20/carrying-out-qualitative-research-under-lockdown-
practical-and-ethical-considerations/ [accessed 21st June 2020] 
46 Jennifer Mason, Qualitative Researching (London: SAGE, 2002), pp. 78-80 
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placing the investigation within a wider social science context. This will begin with a 
thorough examination of the aforementioned literature connected to the topic, which will also 
include discussion related to the ways in which the piece hopes to build on this existing 
knowledge. Such analysis will be followed by an in-depth explanation of the study’s 
methodology and its application within the research field. Finally, a brief history of the 
European radical right’s relationship with Moscow will complete this section. This discussion 
will help to contextualise current circumstances within long-term historical trends.  
 
Having set the foundations of the investigation, the second section will largely consist of four 
extensive chapters, which will be devoted to the discussion of each party’s geopolitical 
narratives regarding Russia. These will be followed by a chapter discussing the similarities 
and differences of these parties’ stories and what this may reveal regarding the overall 
process that produces radical right narrative. A conclusion will then follow, where proposals 
will be made regarding the future of related research. Certainly, Europe’s ongoing existential 
troubles suggest that the radical right-Russia relationship is likely to endure, with this piece 
ultimately endeavouring to provide a detailed account of the beliefs powering an increasingly 






This uncertainty facing Europe’s status-quo is also mirrored within the debate regarding the 
very definition of its main challenger. Often used interchangeably with terms such as ‘far-
right’, the term ‘radical right’ and its associated political tradition remains a loosely defined 
phenomenon.1 Indeed, the concept has been used to describe organisations espousing beliefs 
ranging from right-wing populism to neo-Nazism, with this liberal understanding casting a 
distinct subjectivity over the topic.2 This amorphous nature is further complicated by various 
geographical and temporal divisions, as academic scrutiny of the ideology has produced a 
wealth of perspectives regarding the exact definition of the term.3 In light of this study’s 
focus, therefore, it seems pertinent to discuss such matters, with the radical right parties’ 
perspectives on Russia, viewed by researchers as intricately bound to decades-long internal 
debate on the movement’s purpose and desires.4 
 
Whilst this investigation focuses on Europe, it ought to be noted that the first academic 
discussions of the ‘radical right’ occurred in America. This is made clear by Cold War-era 
researchers, such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset, whose work characterised the 
tradition as a form of fringe political conservatism.5 This preliminary appraisal would soon 
be bolstered by investigations into specific movements, such as the John Birch Society.6 For 
example, Philip C. Wander’s study of the group’s discourse helped establish many of the 
radical right’s key traits, such as a spirited adherence to nationalism and traditionalism.7 
Simultaneously, these general characterisations were complemented by more US-centric 
definitions, with the fundamental importance of anti-communism exposing the divisions 
 
1 David Art, Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 10 
Jean-Yves Camus & Nicolas Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2017), pp. 1-2 
2 Tamir Bar-On, The Radical Right and Nationalism in The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right ed. Jens 
Rydgren (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 24 
3 Terry Givens, Voting Radical Right in Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 18 
4 Marlene Laruelle, Introduction in Eurasianism and the European Far-Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia 
Relationship ed. Marlene Laruelle (London: Lexington Books, 2015), p. xi 
5 Seymour Martin Lipset, The Sources of the Radical Right in The Radical Right ed. Daniel Bell (New York: 
Doubleday & Company, 1964) 
6 Alan F. Westin, The John Birch Society in The Radical Right ed. Daniel Bell 
Philip C. Wander, The John Birch and Martin Luther King, symbols in the radical right, Western Journal of 
Communication, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1971) 
7 Ibid., pp. 13-14 
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between radical right literature in the country and Europe.8 Whilst there is a general 
concensus regarding ideological precepts, it is important to remember Thomas Greven’s 
argument that these literatures remain focused on different subjects.9 This is exemplified by 
Charles Hawley’s recent study of the American ‘alt-right’, with its focus on revolutionary 
White nationalism, clashing with its European counterparts’ desire to work within state 
institutions.10 It seems, therefore, that, save for its historical contributions, this literature will 
likely remain of peripheral interest to this study. 
 
Certainly, this adherence to democratic norms was quickly established as a key tenet of 
‘second wave’ literature on Europe’s radical right. Moving on from descriptive ‘first wave’ 
works such as Dennis Eisenberg’s “The Re-Emergence of Fascism”, these publications 
would ultimately provide the foundations for the tradition’s ‘theoretical framework’ that 
exists today.11 This is clear with regards to various researchers, including Hans-Georg Betz 
and his pioneering 1994 investigation.12 Examining radical right ideology through the lens of 
modernisation theory, the author notes the movement’s relative moderation in comparison to 
its fascist predecessors, who supported revolutionary struggle against the liberal status-quo.13 
Certainly, whilst the radical right still embraced the need for a “revolt against modernity”, 
this metaphysical change would now occur by electoral means.14 This study would soon be 
complemented by Cas Mudde’s 1996 study into definitions of the radical right. Ultimately 
focusing on German developments, the investigation would note the tradition’s strengthening 
role as militant nationalist actors that remained respectful of a political present dominated by 
"the free democratic order".15 This willingness to work within Western European norms is 
also reflected in preliminary studies regarding these parties’ electoral appeal, with Jackman 
and Volpert noting a correlation between socio-economic depravation and radical right 
support.16 Despite these essential additions, however, it should be noted that these works 
 
8 Ibid., p. 8 
9 Thomas Greven, The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe and the United States: A Comparative 
Perspective, Friedrich Ebert Shiftung, May 2016, p. 1 
10 Charles Hawley, Making Sense of the Alt-Right (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), pp. 13-15 
Michael Minkenberg, The Renewal of the Radical Right: Between Modernity and Anti-modernity, Government 
and Opposition, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2000), pp. 174-175 
11 Dennis Eisenberg, The Re-Emergence of Fascism (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1968) 
12 Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (Houndmills: Palgrave, 1994) 
13 Ibid., p. 3 
14 Ibid., p. 23 
15 Cas Mudde, The War of Words: Defining the Extreme Right Party Family, West European Politics, Vol. 19, 
No. 2 (1996), pp. 230-231 
16 Robert W. Jackman & Karin Volpert, Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 26, No. 4 (1996), pp. 501-502 
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appear to remain hampered by broad generalisations, thereby reflecting the theoretical 
infancy of the discipline at this time.  
 
This lack of detail would soon be addressed by works belonging to the contemporary ‘third 
wave’, which began in the early 2000s. This new era of investigation would see the radical 
right become the subject of mainstream academic interest, with the literature evolving in 
theoretical rigour as parties gained popular support. Early pivotal works include Cas Mudde’s 
2000 investigation, which would discuss the evolution of radical right party ideology.17 
Certainly, a newfound popularity would see groups adopt fully-fledged electoral 
programmes, with ideals such as “law and order” and “welfare chauvinism” now integral to a 
xenophobic nationalism flourishing across Europe.18 This interest in the growth of the radical 
right as novel electoral actors would only increase with the 2008 economic crisis. For 
example, an investigation by Hernandez and Kriesi argued that a direct correlation existed 
between support for these new groups and the uncertainty brought by the crisis. This would 
see the researchers characterise radical right support as an “electoral punishment” aimed at a 
seemingly ineffective establishment.19  
 
In relation to this study, works such as this mark a critical juncture in the literature, with the 
radical right now increasingly understood in an international context. Indeed, whilst Givens 
and Art’s pieces discuss the effect of global immigration issues on these parties’ national, 
populist beliefs, Norris and Inglehart openly conceptualise radical right parties as actors in a 
wider struggle for “authoritarian populism”.20 Discussing pivotal events such as Brexit, the 
authors characterise the once-marginal movement as now representing the frontline of 
attempts to overturn the liberal “Silent Revolution”.21 Simultaneously, McDonnell and 
Werner’s 2019 investigation specifically notes the tradition’s growing tendency to engage in 
 
17 Cas Mudde, The Ideology of the Extreme Right (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) 
18 Ibid., p. 170 
19 Enrique Hernandez & Hanspeter Kriesi, The Electoral Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in 
Europe, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 55, Issue 2 (2016), p. 205 
Hanspeter Kriesi, The Political Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe: Electoral 
Punishment and Popular Protest, Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2012), p. 519 
20 Terry Givens, Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, p. 20 
David Art, Inside the Radical Right, p. 9 
Pippa Norris & Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019) 
21 Ibid., p. 87 
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“transnational” cooperation within the European Parliament.22 This existential ‘battle’ has left 
profound effects on research, with Camus and Lebourg arguing that continued confusion 
surrounding the radical right is directly encouraged by political opponents.23 In light of this, 
the authors discuss radical right self-understandings as ‘organic’ national movements, with 
their desire to ‘save’ their countries from a “liminal crisis” hinting at the tradition’s interest in 
narrative.24 Of course, this novel outlook plays an essential role in this study, with the 
tradition’s interest in ‘saviours’ and ‘Golden Ages’ suggesting that this approach is long 
overdue.25 Hakkı Taş’ 2020 study of populist ‘chronopolitics’ marks the first occasion that 
narrative has been directly used to understand radical right thought, with party conceptions of 
a “virtuous past” allowing these groups to influence national emotions across multiple 
temporalities.26  
 
This fledgling engagement with the politics of time within radical right studies seemingly 
complements debates within the tradition of geopolitics. Divided into ‘classical’ and ‘critical’ 
schools of thought, the field of study remains defined by debate surrounding the validity of 
Halford Mackinder’s belief that there exists a “formula” explaining the “geographic causation 
of history”.27 Certainly, whilst traditional thinkers such as Nicholas Spykman support this 
positivist thesis through discussions of terrain and resources, critical researchers have argued 
that these beliefs merely justify state officials’ changing priorities.28 This latter attitude is 
supported by modern thinkers such as Ó Tuathail and Dalby, who believe that the 
“geopolitical gaze” of the ‘Self’ attributes meaning to the spatial ‘Other’ according to 
subjective decision-making.29 Questions arise, therefore, as to why ‘time’ is ignored as an 
essential fixture of this constant renegotiation, with Ian Klinke arguing that an artificial 
divide exists between the concepts in associated literature.30  
 
22 Duncan McDonnell & Annika Werner, International Populism: The Radical Right in the European 
Parliament (New York: Hurst, 2019) 
23 Jean-Yves Camus & Nicolas Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe, pp. 1-2 
24 Ibid., p. 22 
25 Ibid. 
26 Hakkı Taş, The chronopolitics of national populism, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power (2020), 
pp. 6-7 
27 Halford Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1904), p. 
421 
28 Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Brace and Company, 1944) 
Gearóid Ó Tuathail et al., The Geopolitics Reader (London: Routledge, 1998) 
29 Ibid. 
Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 
19 
30 Ian Klinke, Chronopolitics: A Conceptual Matrix, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 37, No. 5 (2012) 
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As such, it seems useful to engage with the often overlooked ideal of “chronopolitics”, which 
advocates for a “narrative understanding of temporality” within the framework of critical 
geopolitics.31 This seems all the more crucial given the fact that the European radical right’s 
nostalgic political tradition actively engages with realist geopolitical literature in which 
Russia plays a crucial role, thereby suggesting that the country is likely understood through a 
narrative lens. For example, Klinke has also noted the radical right’s distinct interest in the 
core tenets of classical geopolitical thought, as parties readily engage with discourse 
describing inescapable ‘battles’ for “power” within European geographic ‘realities’.32 At the 
same time, this tradition commonly places Moscow at the centre of these inescapable 
struggles, with such writing reflecting the hegemonic tradition of Anglo-American strategy. 
This is exemplified by the continued influence of Halford Mackinder’s pioneering 
“Heartland” thesis from 1904. Ultimately focused on bolstering British maritime control over 
the continent from a critical perspective, the piece outlines Russia’s natural position as an 
‘eternal land enemy’ due to its ability to potentially organise vast resources against London.33 
This dichotomy has been built upon by other elite Anglo-American writers, with Zbigniew 
Brzezinski identifying control over post-Soviet Eurasia as vital to America’s post-Cold War 
struggle for global dominance.34 This trope is also evident in Samuel Huntington’s wider 
civilizational approach, with Russia’s position as the “core state” of a unique Orthodox world 
dividing most of Europe between it and a Western rival.35 Furthermore, it is interesting to 
note that this discourse has even affected thinking within Russia. This is exemplified by 
Alexander Dugin’s theory of neo-Eurasianism, which transforms this eternal ‘Otherness’ into 
a virtue through appeals to anti-Western traditionalism.36 As such, it appears that these 
temporal and spatial connections involving both European radical right ideology and Russia 
represent a vital, yet understudied, intersection of theory, with such factors only now hinted 
at within related literature.  
 
31 Ibid., p. 673 
32 Ian Klinke, Geopolitics and the Political Right: Lessons from Germany, International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 3 
(2018), pp. 498-501 
33 Halford Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, p. 435 
Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (London: Holt, 
1919), p. 150 
34 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New 
York: Perseus Books, 1997), pp. 6-9 
35 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: The Remaking of the World Order (New York: Touchstone, 
1996), pp. 45-46 
36 Alexander Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii [The Foundations of Geopolitics: 
The Geopolitical Future of Russia] (Moscow: Arctogaia, 1997), pp. 15-19 
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Certainly, discussions surrounding the political tradition’s relationship with Moscow are only 
now taking place within an established body of work. This is exemplified by the fact that the 
literature was until recently still dominated by brief studies conducted by various think-tanks. 
The appearance of such work appears to directly correspond with Russia’s resurgence on the 
global stage. For instance, the Political Capital Institute, led by Peter Kreko, was the first to 
examine the Eastern European radical right’s growing links with the Kremlin in 2009, 
following Moscow’s brief conflict with Georgia the previous year.37 Advocating that 
ideology, rather than sheer monetary gain, was the key motivator behind this emerging 
affinity, the piece noted the radical right’s growing understanding of Russia as an emerging 
geopolitical ally against a ‘failing’ Euro-Atlantic consensus.38 This theme was later revisited 
by the group in 2014, which noted the appearance of a sophisticated continent-wide network 
of cooperation between the radical right and the Kremlin, just as the latter looked set to 
embark on military action in Ukraine and Syria.39 Overall, such investigations have played a 
key role in mapping the emergence and practical purpose of this ever-strengthening 
relationship, which beforehand was largely the subject of sporadic journalistic interest. 
Antonis Klapsis’ 2015 report, seemingly the most detailed of these preliminary studies, 
would perhaps encapsulate the importance of these novel connections best, with the radical 
right now influencing European opinion regarding pivotal geopolitical events, such as 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea.40 
 
It would only be around this time, however, that this relationship would become the subject 
of traditional academic scrutiny, with pieces up to this point lacking any elaborate theoretical 
approach. This is clear with regards to Alina Polyakova’s research, which investigated the 
alliance through the lens of social movement theory.41 Arguing that radical right parties have 
recently ‘re-framed’ themselves as the champions of popular anti-EU sentiment, the 
researcher notes that this has naturally led to praise for Putin, whose populist illiberalism is 
 
37 Russia’s Far-Right Friends, Political Capital Institute, 3rd December 2009 - 
http://www.riskandforecast.com/post/in-depth-analysis/russia-s-far-right-friends_349.html [accessed 1st August 
2019] 
38 Ibid. 
39 The Russian Connection: The spread of pro-Russia policies on the European far-right, Political Capital 
Institute, 14th March 2014, pp. 6-9  
40 Antonis Klapsis, An Unholy Alliance: The European Far-Right and Putin’s Russia, Wilfried Martens Centre 
for European Studies (2015), pp. 38-46 
41 Alina Polyakova, Strange Bedfellows: Putin and Europe’s Far-Right, World Affairs, Vol. 177, No. 3 (2014) 
Alina Polyakova, Putinism and the European Far Right, Atlantic Council, 19th November 2015 
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viewed as the antithesis of Brussels.42 This belief that a shared traditionalism operates as the 
foundation of the radical right’s relationship with Moscow has now evolved into an essential 
element of the literature. Such an understanding is made particularly clear by Marlene 
Laruelle and her seminal 2015 work on the subject. Placing the aforementioned theory of 
neo-Eurasianism at the centre of this relationship, the piece was the first to directly identify 
links between the radical right and Anglo-American geopolitics that are so crucial to this 
study.43 At the same time, the work’s theoretical depth is matched by its breadth of cases, 
with discussions of the belief’s fortunes in countries as disparate as France and Turkey, 
strengthening the basis of this investigation’s international outlook. However, whilst the work 
provides a vital theoretical background for this study, its pioneering nature has left much to 
still be explored. For example, the study’s focus on Dugin himself at times appears to obscure 
the piece’s mainstream relevance, with the piece noting the fringe nature of his personal 
network.44 It is this investigation’s desire, therefore, to build on this study by examining how 
radical right parties actively use such ideals within their unique geopolitical outlooks.  
 
Finally, it is also worth discussing Anton Shekhovtsov’s important contribution to the 
literature in 2018, which also focuses on the relationship’s Russian side. Stressing the 
Kremlin’s leading role in relations, the piece offers an exemplary account of the ways in 
which Moscow has integrated the radical right into its resurgent foreign policy.45 Despite this, 
such a focus on Russian actions often tacitly casts the radical right as less than autonomous. 
For instance, the characterisation of such groups as “front organizations” plays into a “useful 
idiots” discourse that may often be subject to over-exaggeration.46 Of course, whilst the 
radical right’s junior status cannot be ignored, it now appears worthwhile to actively engage 
with these parties’ Russia policies in all their ideological detail. This will not only 
complement the extensive work done focusing on Moscow, but provide a more well-rounded 
 
42 Ibid., pp. 4-6 
43 Marlene Laruelle, Introduction, pp. xi-xiii 
44 Jean-Yves Camus, A Long-Lasting Friendship: Alexander Dugin and the French Radical Right in 
Eurasianism and the European Far-Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship ed. Marlene Laruelle, pp. 
90-92 
Nicolas Lebourg, Arriba Eurasia?: The Difficult Establishment of Neo-Eurasianism in Spain in Eurasianism 
and the European Far-Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship ed. Marlene Laruelle, p. 125 
45 Anton Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir (Oxford: Routledge, 2018), pp. 101-103 
46 Ibid., p. 162 
Alina Polyakova, Why Europe Is Right to Fear Putin’s Useful Idiots, Foreign Policy, 23rd February 2016 - 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/23/why-europe-is-right-to-fear-putins-useful-idiots/ [accessed 5th August 
2019] 
Dr. Andrew Foxall, Putin’s Useful Idiots: Britain’s Left, Right and Russia, The Henry Jackson Society - Russia 
Studies Centre, Policy Paper No. 10 (2016) 
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understanding of the relationship as a whole, with Russia seemingly incorporated into a 
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Certainly, these aforementioned gaps in the literature will play a key role in informing this 
study’s associated methodology. This is especially true with regards to the European radical 
right’s seeming interest in classical geopolitical thought, with Russia’s key role in these texts 
exposing a unique intersection of theory that is yet to be subject to full examination. 
Questions arise, therefore, as to how to properly engage with this practice of labelling 
geographic space, in order to understand radical right perceptions of the country. Indeed, 
Ladis Kristof has noted that the very concept of ‘geopolitics’ is hard to define, with the 
practice now divided into various aforementioned schools of thought.1 Of course, it may 
prove tempting to simply engage with this ‘classical’ form of the discipline. Stressing the 
objective, unchanging nature of physical geography and its effect on international relations, 
the outlook offers a unique perspective on realist understandings of world politics.2 This 
geographic determinism has traditionally allowed the geopolitical “intellectual” to adopt a 
position wholly detached from bias, with conclusions presented in an ‘indisputable’ manner 
similar to the positivism of the natural sciences.3 Such thinking is exemplified by Halford 
Mackinder’s all-encompassing claims as to the resource rich Eurasian “Heartland”. Arguing 
that control of this region would allow a state to command world affairs, the theory argues for 
a decidedly ‘natural’ international system that is supported by the ‘realities’ of the soil.4 Due 
to this, it may seem appropriate to apply such thinking to the thoughts of Europe’s radical 
right elites, whose ‘objective’ certainties regarding ‘the nation’ and its history, mirror that of 
the “closed” political environment that they supposedly inhabit.5  
 
 
1 Ladis Kristof, The Origins and Evolution of Geopolitics, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4, No. 1 
(1960), p. 33 
2 Gearóid Ó Tuathail & John Agnew, Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American 
Foreign Policy in The Geopolitics Reader eds. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby & Paul Routledge (London: 
Routledge, 1998), p. 79 
3 Anita Sengupta, Heartlands of Eurasia: The Geopolitics of Political Space (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), 
p. 6 
4 Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (London: Holt, 
1919), p. 150 
5 Anita Sengupta, Heartlands of Eurasia, p. 6 
Jean-Yves Camus & Nicolas Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2017), p. 22 
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Despite the potential utility of certain aspects of the outlook, however, this long-established 
method appears inadequate with regards to the goals of this research.6 This is due to its 
unwillingness to contemplate the potentially relativist role of human actors, who may colour 
their geopolitical outlooks in line with their unique circumstances and goals.7 As Ó Tuathail 
has bluntly stated, “Geography is about power”.8 At the same time, this concern seems all the 
more relevant due to the investigation’s focus on political parties, which by their very nature, 
compete to popularise their own unique worldviews.9 As a result, this investigation will 
assume the precepts of a school of thought described by Guzzini as the “interpretivist turn” in 
geopolitical studies.10 This is namely the aforementioned discipline of ‘critical geopolitics’. 
Criticising the “God’s eye” sanctity of political elites and their geopolitical theories, the 
approach has argued for the study’s conceptualisation as a myriad of discourses concerned 
with issues including sovereignty, space and location.11 Therefore, it may be said that the 
discipline has broadened the definition of ‘geography’ within geopolitics to include more 
than all-encompassing, state-centric characterisations of territory and/or conflict.12 As such, it 
argues for the acceptance of the “messiness of places in world affairs”, which contains a 
diverse range of multifaceted imagined geographies.13 Due to such subjectivity, the discipline 
suggests that geopolitical outlooks are ultimately constructed in order to address the 
connected and mutually reinforcing issues of spatial identity (The ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’) and 
foreign policy-making, within a social world.14 For example, George Bush’s 2002 “Axis of 
 
6 Simon Dalby, Geopolitics, Knowledge and Power at the End of the Century in The Geopolitics Reader, p. 305 
7 Egon Guba & Yvonna Lincoln, Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research in Handbook of Qualitative 
Research eds. Norman Denzin & Yvonna Lincoln (Los Angeles: SAGE, 1994), p. 110 
8 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 
1 
9 Bertie Kaal, Worldviews: Spatial Ground for Political Reasoning in Dutch Election Manifestos, Critical 
Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2012), pp. 1-2 
10 Stefano Guzzini, Which puzzle? An expected return of geopolitical thought in Europe in The Return of 
Geopolitics in Europe?: Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy ed. Stefano Guzzini (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), p. 14 
11 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Introduction in The Geopolitics Reader, p. 16 
Ian Klinke, Geopolitical Narratives on Belarus in Contemporary Russia, Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2008), p. 
112 
12 Gearóid Ó Tuathail & Simon Dalby, Rethinking geopolitics: towards a critical geopolitics in Rethinking 
Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 2-3  
13 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Russia’s Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War over South Ossetia, 
Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 49, No. 6 (2008), p. 672 
14 Ibid. 
Ian Klinke, Five minutes for critical geopolitics – A slightly provocative introduction, Exploring Geopolitics, 
January 2009 - 
https://exploringgeopolitics.org/publication_klinke_ian_five_minutes_for_critical_geopolitics_a_slightly_provo
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Evil” speech drew clear boundaries between a ‘heroic’ America and its ‘villainous’ 
adversaries.15 Overall, such ideas appear especially useful for this study, with its focus on the 
geopolitical visions of non-traditional groups matching desires to move beyond the rhetorical 
dominance of the ‘omnipotent state’. Simultaneously, the piece’s desire to uncover the 
specific visions of radical right parties is also supported by the tradition, with Ó Tuathail 
stating that “critical geopolitics is sensitive to the importance of localized context and agency 
in world affairs”.16 
 
In light of this focus on the constant renegotiation of knowledge between distinct identities 
and the forging of international outlooks within critical geopolitics, it must be emphasised 
that the discourse that is central to its studies ought to be viewed as a process of construction, 
rather than simply a justification for actions on the global stage.17 As Foucault has stated, 
discourse should be considered as “practices that systematically shape the objects of which 
they speak".18 Due to this, this piece will examine one of these ‘practices’ that has been used 
to great effect by a variety of geopolitical researchers, under similar assumptions, namely 
‘narrative’.19 This ‘practice’ has been specifically chosen for a variety of reasons. For 
instance, given the emphasis placed on subjective renegotiation within critical geopolitics, it 
ultimately proves difficult to ignore the integral role of ‘time’ in relation to this “spatial 
spectacle”.20 The aforementioned “Axis of Evil” exemplifies this ‘temporality’ in various 
ways, with a Western geopolitical mind labelling the ‘Other’ as “barbaric” in direct response 
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18 Ibid. 
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correspondence helped me greatly with my decision to analyse narrative in this study. 
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to the events of September 11th.21 As such, this study will engage with narrative through Ian 
Klinke’s understanding of “chronopolitics”. Arguing that the meaning behind spatial changes 
are ultimately derived from the time in which they occur, the outlook views narrative as the 
natural result of a moment deemed important by the geopolitical ‘Self’.22 Certainly, this 
‘critical moment’ naturally encourages the reorganisation of the actor’s pre-existing ideals, as 
well as its ultimate goal, thereby neatly dividing relations with the ‘Other’ into a storyline.23 
These presuppositions therefore appear appropriate for a subjective examination of Europe’s 
radical right. Enthused by historical ‘Golden Ages’, the tradition’s ongoing desire to overturn 
a “liminal crisis” (often associated with the legacies of the 2008 financial downturn) 
showcases a tendency to promote a “Detached perspective of history that divides it up into 
neat periods”.24 
 
Therefore, narratives appear to be useful in understanding these subjective geopolitical 
visions, with Ó Tuathail arguing that critical geopolitics ultimately aims to “emplot 
narratives” within discourse.25 Described by Czarniawska as containing elements that help 
form a wider ‘story’, narratives help explain an actor’s subjective visions of past, present and 
future events.26 This subjectivity naturally deviates from the purely chronological order of 
proceedings or “fabula” as discussed by Bal, with actors manipulating events to construct 
‘stories’ within text.27 This is often achieved through the identification of “problem 
statements”, which emphasise a causal relationship between issues akin to a plot.28 This 
systematic approach complements the overall ‘orderliness’ of geopolitical narratives, with 
“polarized” ideals of heroes and villains presenting a subjective narrative that is ultimately 
“geared towards action” and eventual completion.29 Simultaneously, these ‘characters’ may 
 
21 Douglas Kellner, Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the “War on Terror”, 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2007), p. 629 
22 Ian Klinke, Chronopolitics, p. 685 
23 Ibid., p. 679 
Jean-Yves Camus & Nicolas Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe, p. 22 
24 Ibid. 
Hanspeter Kriesi, The Political Consequences of the Financial and Economic Crisis in Europe: Electoral 
Punishment and Popular Protest, Swiss Political Science Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (2012), p. 519 
Ian Klinke, Chronopolitics, p. 675 
25 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Russia’s Kosovo, p. 673 
26 Barbara Czarniawska, Narratives in Social Science Research (London: SAGE, 2004), pp. 17-20 
Annick Wibben, Feminist Security Studies: A Narrative Approach (Oxford: Routledge, 2011), pp. 43-44 
27 Mieke Bal, Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1997), p. 83 
28 Emery Roe, Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 92 
29 Phillip L. Hammock, Exploring the Reproduction of Conflict Through Narrative: Israeli Youth Motivated to 
Participate in a Coexistence Program, Peace and Conflict, Vol. 15 (2009), p. 50 
Ian Klinke, Chronopolitics, p. 679 
 21 
reflect a specific nation or abstract concept, thereby reflecting Wertsch’s dual understanding 
of narrative.30 Advocating for the existence of “schematic narrative templates” that are often 
shared by actors’ “specific narratives”, this abstraction will play a key role in comparing and 
contrasting radical right outlooks.31 Of course, whilst the parties’ Russia narratives are likely 
coloured by their national circumstances, it is important to remember the abstract ideological 
ties that bind these groups. 
 
In order to uncover these narratives, therefore, this study will utilise the qualitative practice 
of “narrative policy analysis” as pioneered by Emery Roe.32 Focused on producing 
overarching ‘metanarratives’ from raw data, the approach ultimately aims to provide stable 
assumptions that are suitable for political policymaking.33 This is reliant on the discovery and 
refinement of what Yanow describes as “local knowledge”, with this study hoping to uncover 
what is truly meaningful to radical right groups when faced with the Russian ‘Other’.34 This 
process will begin by uncovering a myriad of individual ‘stories’, which detail a traditional 
tripartite plot as well as its ‘characters’.35 Due to political parties’ propensity for argument, it 
is useful to note that these stories may also take the form of “premises and conclusions”.36 
This will be accomplished by disaggregating a textual corpus related to the ‘party-
protagonists’ into its constituent parts.37 Given the noted importance of causality within 
geopolitical narratives, these core parts are understood as the aforementioned ‘problem 
statements’.38 These statements describe the parties’ individual issues raised in relation to 
Russia and their immediate consequences, which could be described as the potential 
metanarrative’s basic unit of causality.39 Following this, a thematic analysis of these singular 
statements will occur in order to identify ‘clusters’ of stories that discuss similar issues.40 At 
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the same time, what Roe calls “nonstories” and “counterstories” will also be analysed in 
order to add nuance to the weight of these ideas within party discourse. The researcher 
describes a “nonstory” as possessing “no beginning, middle, and end of its own” and a 
“counterstory” as a fully-fledged story that runs counter to emerging “dominant policy 
narratives”.41  
 
Having identified these competing ideas, it is anticipated that a refined ‘metanarrative’ will 
begin to emerge in relation to each party. This will be accomplished by identifying the 
temporal relationships between these aforementioned groups of stories according to the party-
protagonist’s subjective understandings. Such a process will subsequently reveal a larger 
“chain of problems” connecting these smaller series of events.42 This approach will naturally 
help overcome the specific focus of individual party texts, with Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno noting that “themes and patterns are rarely developed in a single story”.43 The four 
groups’ individual “policy narratives” regarding Russia will then be identified and presented 
within a traditional past, present and future format. This will help expose the underlying logic 
present within these groups’ foreign policy positions within a social world full of 
uncertainty.44 At the same time, it is important to remember the need to constantly engage 
with the corpus even after the initial creation of a rough metanarrative. This will be achieved 
by means of “narrative smoothing”, with the data’s “raw edges” refined in order to reveal an 
even more stable, dominant discourse that runs throughout wider party beliefs.45 Of course, 
this ongoing search for the metanarrative’s core beliefs will eventually result in data 
saturation, which will occur when the corpus reaches “informational redundancy” and no new 
‘problem statements’ can be derived from the literature.46  
 
As a result, it is also important to discuss the data that will be subject to such analysis. This 
data is ultimately associated with this study’s “purposive sampling” of four radical right 
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parties, whose nations’ geopolitical legacies differ in spite of their shared ideological 
inheritance. 47 As a result, the corpus will consist of textual reports issued by these 
movements, such as news articles, manifestos, speeches and other connected documents. The 
vast majority of these articles will be taken directly from these parties’ websites. This has 
been decided upon due to the tendency of these centralised sources to offer a unified and 
vetted ‘party line’, which may be distorted at times by individual members.48 This is evident 
with regards to the works of former Jobbik MEP and Russian agent Bela Kovacs, whose 
radical pro-Moscow tendencies could potentially misrepresent the party’s collective 
geopolitical ‘Self’.49 Simultaneously, preliminary examination of these sources suggests that 
they possess a wealth of information relevant to this investigation’s aims, with articles 
ultimately saved in an aforementioned corpus to avoid potential expiration. It is worth noting, 
however, that the exceptions to this focus on official websites will be external texts produced 
by Russian state bodies and radical right leaders. Whilst the former may provide vital insights 
into the Kremlin’s often friendly relationship with such groups, the latter’s “charismatic” role 
within party agenda-setting informs, rather than potentially dilutes, group positions.50  
 
At the same time, it is also important to note the investigation’s overall reflexibility. This 
seems especially pertinent due to the study’s belief in subjective reasoning, which thereby 
requires an acknowledgement of the researcher’s implicit effect on studies, through their own 
situation, thoughts and biases. As such, it seems important to highlight various deficiencies 
that may impact the rigour of this examination. Of course, practical issues, such as time, word 
count, aforementioned monetary restrictions and the ongoing pandemic will naturally 
influence this study in line with its primary function as a postgraduate thesis. At the same 
time, the tendency of critical geopolitical studies to simply describe and not practice 
subjectivity, as noted by Dalby, must also be acknowledged, with many investigations often 
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replicating a problematic ‘intellectual objectivism’, found in the classical tradition.51 Due to 
this, a memo system will be employed throughout the investigation, in order to encourage the 
researcher to reflect on their own role within a social world.  
 
Furthermore, the investigation’s international nature also suggests that issues surrounding 
language may impact the study. This is due to a reliance on English language documents 
released by Golden Dawn and Jobbik, as well as translation assistance with German-language 
AfD resources, which may result in the absence of certain themes and understandings.52 
Certainly, language issues have been discussed at length within academia, with Van Nes et al. 
stressing that ‘meaning’ in translation may be retained through a ‘side-by-side’ cooperative 
process, between researcher and translator.53 Simultaneously, Temple and Young have stated 
that such problems are inherently bound with the researcher’s own philosophical logic, with 
pieces professing objectivity ultimately hampered more by such problems.54 It is this study’s 
contention, therefore, that these issues can be realistically controlled, as its precepts fully 
acknowledge the inherent flaws of subjective research. Indeed, it could be argued that if such 
problems were not accepted, ideals akin to a strong ‘Whorfianism’ could constrain 
researchers’ very desire and ability to engage with foreign and international issues.55 In 
contrast, the aforementioned literature on which this piece relies stresses the need for 
widespread engagement, with various researchers employing the potentially troubling sources 
in their work.56 Overall, this international focus is expected to expose a wide array of 
similarities and differences within the Russia policies of the European radical right, with a 
focus on narrative likely to reveal the peculiarities of each group’s geopolitical ‘Self’, within 
a wider tradition. As Patterson and Monroe have stated,  
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Narrative is especially useful in revealing the speaker’s concept of self, for 
it is the self that is located at the center of the narrative, whether as active 
agent, passive experiencer, or tool of destiny.57 
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Moscow on the fringes: Russia and the 20th 
century European far-right 
 
In order to fully understand the European radical right’s contemporary visions of Russia, it is 
useful to discuss the unique roles bestowed on the country by its historical predecessors. 
Whilst the nation has undoubtedly become a topic of great intellectual interest for the 
tradition today, it ought to be remembered that this relationship is by no means a uniquely 
modern phenomenon. Certainly, groups and individuals across the centuries have also looked 
to Moscow as a fellow revisionist ally.1 Simultaneously, these ideals have often resulted in 
the opponents of such subversive forces characterising the nation in a hostile manner, thereby 
placing the country and its foreign policy at the centre of vivid political disputes across the 
continent.2 As aforementioned, this peculiar situation appears to have arisen as a result of 
Russia’s unique geopolitical position. For example, Maxine David has stated that the 
Kremlin’s position on the “margins of Europe”, both in physical and rhetorical terms, has 
seen the country attempt to exploit its peripheral status, in order to gain power within the 
continent’s traditional centres.3 Subsequently, this obscure position has seen the country 
viewed with great curiosity by insurgent voices, who have often incorporated the Kremlin 
into various grand and messianic political schemes.  
 
This can be seen as early as the seventeenth century, in the work of Croatian priest Juraj 
Križanić. Often regarded as the first “pan-Slavist”, the missionary’s desire to unite both 
Catholic and Orthodox churches eventually encouraged the creation of a vivid geopolitical 
narrative. This envisioned “Great Russia” leading a continental struggle against the religious 
and military ‘threats’ posed by Germany and the Ottomans.4 This belief in the country’s 
influence would also be expressed by the Greek nationalist organisation “Filiki Eteria”, 
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which viewed Moscow as the harbinger of national independence and a restored Byzantine 
culture.5 Such instrumental usage of Russian power has proven to be a common trope 
amongst many of Europe’s radical groups, as the country’s various identities allowed for the 
tying of local circumstances to wider global issues.6 Due to this, it could be argued that 
Moscow has remained a ‘tabula rasa’ for many of the continent’s upstart thinkers, with the 
communist period in particular witnessing a burgeoning of these understandings.  
 
This growth in discussion appears to be due to the official establishment of the “maskirovka” 
strategic doctrine. Assembled from various pre-Soviet practices during the communist era, 
the concept was originally restricted to discussions regarding the use of deception and 
unorthodox tactics during traditional military conflict.7 Despite this, ‘maskirovka’ would 
soon evolve into a wider doctrine, which, according to former KGB archivist Vasili 
Mitrokhin, quickly recognised the utility of raising Moscow’s profile amongst radical 
political groups.8 Of course, in light of the ideological underpinnings of the Soviet 
administration, it is only natural that this engagement was dominated by leftist organisations. 
Commonly casting the Kremlin as the Marxist world’s geopolitical centre, these groups often 
viewed the country as essential to their own operations. This is evident as early as Lenin’s 
rule, with Arthur MacManus, first chairman of the Communist Party of Great Britain, stating 
that the power of “Soviet Russia” would prove decisive to realising the group’s “hopes and 
ideals”.9 Furthermore, this close relationship would only grow in light of Cold War tensions. 
For instance, Eastern bloc communists, who were often thrust into power by Moscow 
following the Second World War, characterised Russia as the guarantor of European 
Marxism.10 As Romanian leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, argued, the Soviet military 
ultimately served “the interests of the common cause of the socialist camp”.11 Such 
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consensus displays Russia’s near omnipresent position within radical left thought during the 
twentieth century. Naturally, its status as the world’s first socialist state encouraged many 
European communists to view the Kremlin as an indispensable ally. 
 
Due to this enduring position as the ‘lodestar’ of communist thought, questions must be asked 
as to the historical origins of pro-Russia tendencies within the radical right. At first glance 
these sympathies clearly appear anathema to the ideological outlooks of the tradition’s 
predecessors, who naturally envisioned the Soviet Union as a hostile force.12 This is clear 
with regards to long-term trends amongst Europe’s fascists, whose desire for national 
rejuvenation clashed with Moscow’s rhetorical allegiance to proletarian internationalism.13 
Such a dichotomy would see tensions rise during the interwar period, with Norwegian fascist 
Vidkun Quisling ultimately describing the Kremlin’s geopolitical influence as “the main 
problem in world politics today”.14 This ideological animosity would only increase in spite of 
Nazi Germany’s demise, with French nationalist Jean-Marie Le Pen describing the Cold War 
as only an extension of “a war that communism has waged relentlessly against the world for 
fifty years”.15 Certainly, this sentiment exemplifies the seemingly irreconcilable position of 
European fascism with the Soviet Union. Essentially functioning as a ‘bête noire’ for the 
twentieth century far-right, Moscow was perpetually viewed as an existential threat to the 
much-lauded traditions of ‘European civilization’.16 Despite this, researcher Anton 
Shekhovtsov has noted the curious existence of a “minority faith” of pro-Soviet fascists 
during this time.17 Whilst the historical influence of this outlook should not be overstated, 
such sentiment appears essential for understanding the Russophile feelings of many modern 
radical right parties, with its historical adherents presenting an interesting synthesis of fringe 
ideas, now present within the mainstream.  
 
It is interesting to note that this seemingly paradoxical perspective, ultimately finds its origin 
within Europe’s Russian émigré communities, who came into contact with Germany’s 
ongoing ‘Conservative Revolution’ as they settled across the continent.18 This is particularly 
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evident within the works of the early ‘Eurasianists’, such as Petr Savitsky and Nikolai 
Trubetzkoy.19 Advocating for the existence of a traditionalist ‘Eurasian’ civilization centred 
upon Russia, the movement argued for an understanding of the country’s political events 
based on supposedly ‘fixed’ socio-economic characteristics, rather than the seemingly 
‘fleeting’ nature of ideology.20 This approach therefore allowed these thinkers to reconcile 
their own conservatism with the thoroughly revolutionary nature of the ongoing Bolshevik 
Revolution. For example, proponents of ‘Eurasianism’ would forecast that Marxism’s radical 
social ideas, ultimately the product of Western intellects, would prove incompatible with the 
natural predispositions of ‘Russia-Eurasia’.21 This would thereby lead to the creation of a 
state which was economically modernised, yet fully aligned with its traditionalist societal 
precepts.22 Such a unique vision would soon come to involve an active philosophical 
rejection of the Western world, which was perceived as incompatible with Eurasia’s inherent 
illiberalism.23 It seems natural, therefore, that these ideals may act as the source of the 
sympathetic stance of today’s radical right, with this civilizational dichotomy potentially 
urging European traditionalists to fight for a more Russo-centric world.  
 
Whilst these beliefs may be dismissed by critics as mere expressions of national 
exceptionalism, this unique combination of ideas would soon find support outside of the 
esoteric debates of Russia’s émigrés. This is particularly clear with regards to the tradition of 
‘National Bolshevism’, which appeared during the political chaos of Weimar-era Germany.24 
Combining spirited calls for a fascist-style national rebirth with Bolshevik revolutionary 
economics, the amorphous movement would soon attract many former leftists to its cause.25 
This included Heinrich Laufenberg and Ernst Niekisch, who came to view socialism as 
unable to provide solutions for a troubled Germany alone.26 Much like Eurasianism, 
therefore, National Bolshevism existed within a theoretical framework based heavily on 
‘organic’ national characteristics, with its émigré inheritance endowing Moscow with a 
particularly messianic role. For instance, adherents characterised Bolshevik Russia as 
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pursuing a version of class struggle wholly attuned to its ‘native circumstances’.27 As such, 
the revolutionary state was viewed as a vital partner of the German nation, which was bound 
in a simultaneous conflict with the Versailles Treaty and Western capitalism.28 This 
characterisation of Russia appears to be the first incidence of the country being portrayed as a 
radical vanguard by virtue of its ‘natural’ state, with traditionalists across the continent 
potentially able to match their own circumstances to this seemingly ‘eternal’ ally. 
 
This fringe sympathy for the Soviet Union amongst Europe’s far-right would face even more 
obscurity as the Cold War physically and ideologically divided the continent. Faced with an 
increasingly binary reality within international relations, the tradition’s unique synthesis of 
ideas would prove unable to compete with the era’s heated rhetoric.29 This would result in the 
outlook being largely relegated to small ephemeral groups and individual thinkers, who, due 
to the seemingly inescapable fact of superpower conflict, began to frame such positive 
understandings within pan-European perspectives. The first expression of this view would 
occur amongst various Austrian and German ‘neutralists’, who viewed Moscow as essential 
to ridding the continent of American influence, regardless of its internal politics.30 This 
continuing disregard for the Kremlin’s socialism amongst a minority of fascists would soon 
be justified by increasing reference to geopolitics inspired by early Eurasianism. Such an 
approach is clear within Belgian fascist Jean Thiriart’s work. Describing the Soviet Union as 
the geopolitical successor to Nazi Germany, the theorist viewed Europe’s nations and Russia 
as an ‘organic’ geographical unit.31 As a result, continental unity was seen as necessary to 
facilitate the expression of the area’s inherent traditionalism, in the face of US ‘aggression’.32 
It seems, then, that this flirtation with geopolitics appears to be the predecessor of more 
recent ideas surrounding Moscow’s unique position, with this status ‘naturally’ binding the 
country in an inescapable conflict with outside forces, beyond mere political dogma.     
 
Perhaps the most famous inheritor of these ideas is Alexander Dugin’s theory of ‘neo-
Eurasianism’, which fully embraced this supposedly ‘special relationship’ between Russia 
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and geopolitics.33 Developed during the 1990s as the country came to terms with the Soviet 
system’s collapse, the ideology claims to expose the underlying factors that brought about 
such events.34 Interestingly, the thinker makes extensive use of Western intellectual traditions 
to explain this history, with the theory as much influenced by European imaginations as their 
Russian counterparts. For example, alongside the aforementioned influence of Anglo-
American geopolitics, neo-Eurasianism also borrows heavily from the ‘New Right’ 
tradition.35 This outlook is subsequently married with the interwar Eurasianists’ belief that 
Russia-Eurasia’s ‘inherent’ traditionalism is not a product of society but rather the nature of 
the land.36 Due to this, the country is characterised as the epicentre of a conservative ‘land’ 
civilization, diametrically opposed to the Anglo-Saxon world’s ‘maritime’ liberalism.37 This 
esoteric understanding offers a vivid culmination of a century of fringe right-wing thought on 
Russia, with Europe’s modern radical right displaying great interest in these ideas. Indeed, 
Laruelle and Shekhovtsov have noted Dugin’s attempts to establish links with these parties 
since the 1990s, with subsequent interactions securing the ideology a permanent position 
within internal party discussions on Russia.38 
 
In conclusion, it seems that the radical right’s interest in Moscow appears to be motivated by 
more than simple opportunism. Rather, such sympathies appear to be the product of long-
term historical debate, with its understandings challenging established norms that have been 
used by other twentieth century radicals to explain the country. This is exemplified by the 
outlook’s unique embrace of ideas from across the political spectrum, with associated 
discussion displaying a notable interest in the country’s ‘natural’ characteristics. Due to this, 
Russia has been increasingly viewed as a non-changing entity, grounded in the traditions 
endowed to it by ‘organic circumstances’. This view has been fully entrenched through 
reference to geopolitical theory, which has discussed the presence of an omnipresent Western 
enemy, opposed to Russia’s ‘revolutionary traditionalism’. At the same time, these core 
 
33 Alexander Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii [The Foundations of Geopolitics: 
The Geopolitical Future of Russia] (Moscow: Arctogaia, 1997), pp. 11-14 
34 Dmitry Shlapentokh, Alexander Dugin’s Views of the Middle East, Space and Polity, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2008), 
pp. 251-254 
35 Alexander Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki, pp. 165-166 
Jean-Yves Camus, Alain de Benoist and the New Right in Key Thinkers of the Radical Right: Behind the New 
Threat to Liberal Democracy ed. Mark Sedgwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 73 
36 Alexander Dugin, Eurasian Mission, p. 19 
37 Alexander Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki, pp. 15-19 
38 Anton Shekhovtsov, Alexander Dugin and the West European New Right, 1989-1994 in Eurasianism and the 
European Far Right ed. Marlene Laruelle, p. 35 
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tenets have also been subject to instrumentalisation by various extreme right groups and 
individuals, with specific temporal and national interpretations of these ideas, building 
around the nation as a constant reference point. As such, it could be argued that Europe’s 
modern radical right has been gifted a large set of rhetoric tools by such historical debate. 
This is especially true regarding the doctrine of neo-Eurasianism, with the socio-economic 
uncertainty currently facing Europe perhaps encouraging the radical right to contemplate 












































A struggle for ‘Greater Europe’ – Rassemblement 
National narratives of Russia 
 
Due to this extensive ideological background, it seems appropriate to begin this study’s 
analysis section with the French Rassemblement National ((RN) previously the Front 
National). Intimately influenced by the France-centric Nouvelle Droite tradition, the party has 
remained at the forefront of theoretical trends that have shaped the modern radical right.1 
Certainly, the party was explicitly founded in 1972 by the far-right “New Order” movement 
as a means of obtaining electoral power.2 The group also exemplifies long-term radical right 
attempts to forge a more acceptable image, with the “less controversial” military and political 
veteran, Jean-Marie Le Pen, chosen as leader for this purpose.3 Despite this, the party’s 
original role as a nationalist union saw the group struggle with its ideological inheritance, as 
flirtations with neo-fascism and anti-Semitism persisted throughout its early years.4 Jean-
Marie has even faced court action for comments made concerning the Holocaust.5 
Subsequently, the party remained a fringe force until the 1980s, with fortunes only improving 
as fears regarding immigration and economic stability allowed the movement to become a 
vehicle for populist dissent.6 This period saw the party become a permanent fixture of French 
politics as a palatable nationalist alternative against what Bornschier describes as “system 
candidates”.7 The party’s popularity only grew throughout the 1990s and ultimately resulted 
 
1 Jean-Yves Camus, Le Front National et la Nouvelle Droite [The National Front and the Nouvelle Droite] in 
Les faux-semblants du Front National [The False Pretences of the National Front] eds. S. Crépon et al. (Paris: 
Sciences-Po, 2015), pp. 97-98 
2 Daniel Stockemer, The Front National in France: Continuity and Change under Jean-Marie Le Pen and 
Marine Le Pen (New York: Springer, 2017), pp. 10-11 
3 Renaud Thillaye & Claudia Chwalisz, The Front National: Old Rhetoric, New Practices, The Polish Quarterly 
of International Affairs, Vol. 24, Issue 2 (2015), p. 103 
4 Ibid. 
5 Craig R. Whitney, French Far-Right Leader Convicted of Slighting Holocaust, The New York Times, 27th 
December 1997 - https://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/27/world/french-far-right-leader-convicted-of-slighting-
holocaust.html [accessed 10th March 2020] 
Angelique Chrisafis, Jean-Marie Le Pen fined again for dismissing Holocaust as ‘detail’, The Guardian, 6th 
April 2016 - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/06/jean-marie-le-pen-fined-again-dismissing-
holocaust-detail [accessed 10th March 2020] 
6 Daniel Stockemer, The Front National in France, pp. 13-16 
7 Simon Bornschier, Unis contre la mondialisation? Une analyse de la convergence 
programmatique des partis populistes de droite européens [United against globalisation? An analysis of the 
ideological convergence of populist parties of the European right], Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée 
[International Review of Comparative Politics], Vol. 4, No. 12 (2005), p. 23 
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in Jean-Marie directly challenging presidential incumbent Jacques Chirac in the second round 
of elections in 2002.8  
 
Nevertheless, it would only be under the leadership of Jean-Marie’s daughter, Marine, that 
the party would become a thoroughly modern force. Assuming leadership in 2011, Marine 
immediately embarked on a process of “dédiabolisation”, in order to further improve the 
party’s image and broaden its appeal.9 This saw the removal of many controversial figures 
from the group, as well as a raft of new policies designed to broaden the group’s horizons 
beyond immigration.10 The party now possesses an extensive strategy regarding the finer 
points of state economics, with populist ideals of welfare chauvinism complementing more 
traditional policies such as counter-terrorism.11 This emphasis on representing ‘the French 
people’ is also evident in its new “Rassemblement” personality, which the party hopes will 
provide a clean break with the past.12 In relation to this study, these changes have also had 
profound effects on RN narratives concerning Russia. For example, Le Pen has openly met 
with Putin in order to campaign for “the restoration of cultural, economic and strategic ties 
between Russia and France”.13 The Kremlin, seeking European friends, has warmly 
welcomed these advances and has even offered funding.14 A recent US intelligence report 
estimated that Moscow provided $13 million to the party in 2014 alone.15 At the heart of this 
cooperation, however, lies a strong ideological affinity which this chapter will discuss.16 This 
 
8 Nonna Mayer, From Jean-Marie Le Pen to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right, Parliamentary 
Affairs, Vol. 66 (2013), p. 160 
9 Renaud Thillaye & Claudia Chwalisz, The Front National, p. 103 
10 Ibid. 
11 Gilles Ivadi, The Successful Welfare-Chauvinist Party? The Front National in the 2012 elections in France, 
ESA’s Research Network on Political Sociology (RN32) Mid-term conference, European Sociological 
Association (ESA) (November 2012), p. 10 
Rachel D. Huchins & Daphne Halikiopoulou, Enemies of liberty? Nationalism, immigration, and the framing of 
terrorism in the agenda of the Front National, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 26 (2020), pp. 78-79 
12 Sedrik Pocuch, Rassemblement National: Changes and Continuities Under Marine Le Pen, NATO 
Association of Canada, 23rd October 2019 - http://natoassociation.ca/rassemblement-national-changes-and-
continuities-under-marine-le-pen/ [accessed 11th March 2020] 
13 Anton Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir (Oxford: Routledge, 2018), pp. 87-88 
Meeting with Marine Le Pen, President of Russia, 24th March 2017 - 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54102 [accessed 11th March 2020] 
14 Ibid. 
Putin’s Asymmetrical Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security, 
Committee on Foreign Relations - United States Senate, 10th January 2018, p. 50 
15 Ibid. 
16 Marlene Laruelle, Dangerous Liaisons: Eurasianism, the European Far Right and Putin’s Russia in 
Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship ed. Marlene Laruelle 
(London: Lexington Books, 2015), p. 22 
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seems all the more pertinent as the party’s continued popularity influences the French 
‘Overton window’, with even Macron adopting much of the group’s rhetoric.17  
                               
A new ancien régime? – Gaullism and French identity 
                        
In order to understand the party’s underlying outlook, it is first useful to discuss the 
geopolitical ‘Self’ from which its potential narrative flows.18 As aforementioned, radical right 
parties and the RN in particular have been directly influenced by ‘New Right’ philosophy, 
whose focus on ontological “organicism” has demonised the ‘artificial’ influences of 
‘ideology’.19 This has naturally affected the party’s self-understanding, which rejects what De 
Benoist describes as the modern “ideology of sameness”.20 As such, the RN has forged a 
narrative ‘Self’ directly tied to the peculiarities of ‘natural’ French tradition, with a “glorious 
history of kings and royalty” deemed incompatible with potential ‘counterstories’ praising the 
1789 Revolution’s liberal, universalist legacy.21 The party’s overall discourse corresponds 
with this premise, with circular ‘nonstories’ praising tradition bolstered by a large number of 
accounts detailing France’s historical “politics of grandeur”.22 This is exemplified by Le 
Pen’s quotation of General De Gaulle in 2018, who described the country’s history as a 
constant battle to protect  
 
Old France, overwhelmed by history, bruised by wars and revolutions, 
coming and going relentlessly from grandeur to decline but straightened 
from century to century by the genius of renewal.23  
 
17 Liana Fix, To Macron or not to Macron?, New Eastern Europe, No. 1-2 (2020), pp. 31-33 
Lorenzo Vidino, Emmanuel Macron’s War on Islamism Is Europe’s Future, Foreign Policy, 24th February 2020 
- https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/24/emmanuel-macrons-war-on-islamism-is-europes-future/ [accessed 17th 
March 2020] 
18 Molly Patterson & Kristen Renwick Monroe, Narrative in Political Science, Annual Review of Political 
Science, Vol. 1 (1998), p. 316 
19 Jean-Yves Camus, Le Front National et la Nouvelle Droite, pp. 97-98 




22 Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 618 
23 Centenaire de la victoire de la 1ère guerre mondiale à Verdun: discours de Marine Le Pen [Centenary of the 
victory of the 1st World War in Verdun: speech by Marine Le Pen], Rassemblement National, 10th November 
2018 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/videos/centenaire-de-la-victoire-de-la-1ere-guerre-mondiale-a-verdun-
discours-de-marine-le-pen/ [accessed 20th March 2020] 
“vieille France, accablée d’histoire, meurtrie de guerres et de révolutions, allant et venant sans relâche de la 
grandeur au déclin, mais redressée de siècle en siècle par le génie du renouveau.” 
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Ultimately, this story’s rhetorical deployment represents more than simple opportunism, with 
the military leader’s ideals of “national independence” playing a key role in the party’s 
geopolitical self-understanding.24 Certainly, Thillaye and Chwalisz have argued that the 
group actively promotes “a Gaullist vision of the world”.25 This is reflected in the corpus’ 
themes, with the ‘nation-protagonist’ viewed as “a power of stability and balance”, able to 
make decisions in global affairs as a wholly sovereign actor.26 Such a position is 
subsequently said to be the fullest expression of Paris’ national circumstances, with this unity 
of nation and state responsible for great triumphs throughout “a thousand years of history in 
France”.27 
 
Russia, France and “a Europe whole and free”28 
 
Interestingly enough, party publications have often emphasised the presence of “a very old 
relationship” with Russia within this romantic vision of French history.29 These links take 
place within a wholly ‘organic’ understanding of ‘Europe’, which effectively acts as a ‘stage’ 
for the party’s Russia narrative. For instance, the party echoes De Gaulle’s appeal to a Europe 
“from the Atlantic to the Urals”, in which countries cooperate according to national need 
“from Brest to Vladivostok”.30 This natural, continental ‘forum’ is held as directly 
 
24 Alfred Grosser, General De Gaulle and the Foreign Policy of the Fifth Republic, International Affairs, Vol. 
39, No. 2 (1963), p. 212 
25 Renaud Thillaye & Claudia Chwalisz, The Front National, p. 105 
26 144 Engagements Présidentiels [144 Presidential Commitments], Rassemblement National (2017), p. 19 
“Engager la France au service d’un monde multipolaire fondé sur l’égalité en droit des nations, leur 
concertation permanente et le respect de leur indépendance. Fonder la politique internationale sur le principe 
de réalisme et rendre à la France son rôle de puissance de stabilité et d’équilibre.” 
27 60 ans de la Constitution: sauver les nations pour sauver l’Europe [60 years of the Constitution: save the 
nations in order to save Europe], Rassemblement National, 4th October 2018 - 
https://rassemblementnational.fr/tribunes-libres/60-ans-de-la-constitution-sauver-les-nations-pour-sauver-
leurope/ [accessed 21st March 2020] 
“De Gaulle et les rédacteurs de notre Constitution ont sacralisé ainsi un principe autant protecteur que 
fondateur, forgé par mille ans d’histoire de France.” 
28 A Europe Whole and Free - Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz. President George Bush. Rheingoldhalle. 
Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 1989., U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany, 31st May 1989 - 
https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm [accessed 15th July 2020] 
29 Embargo sur les navires Mistral, le RBM dit non! [Embargo on the Mistral ships, the RBM says no!], 
Rassemblement National, 17th September 2015 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/embargo-sur-
les-navires-mistral-le-rbm-dit-non/ [accessed 28th March 2020] 
Andrew Marr BBC Interview - Marine Le Pen, BBC News, 13th November 2016 - 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/000000.pdf [accessed 28th March 2020] 
30 Nicolas Lebourg, The French Far Right in Russia’s Orbit, Carnegie Council (2018), pp. 28-29 
Pierre Joannon, The Cathedral and the Dacha: De Gaulle's and Gorbachev's Visions of a Broader Europe, Irish 
Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1991), p. 51 
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responsible for a Franco-Russian “relationship based on friendship”, with both countries 
viewed as cooperating as sovereign nations against mutual threats throughout the centuries.31 
The RN subsequently subjects this relationship to temporal “periodization” during decisive 
moments in the national story.32 This is especially true of the two world wars, with Le Pen’s 
2018 speech on the anniversary of the 1916 Battle of Verdun praising Russia as a “faithful, 
unalterable ally of France who paid with the price of blood and 70 years of internal 
oppression for the freedom of Europe”.33 This acknowledgement of Soviet-era “oppression” 
also suggests that this overarching metanarrative transcends ideology. For example, the party 
leader last year lamented the absence of “Russia, which paid a heavy price”, during 
commemorations of the Normandy Landings.34 Moscow itself, therefore, is also understood 
in line with ‘objective’ geopolitical realities similar to Eurasianism, with the Russian nation 
remaining a reliable ally within a historical “Europe of Nations”.35 Of course, despite the 
seeming ‘certainty’ of grand geopolitics, this study’s focus on subjective narrative suggests 
that this “traditional Franco-Russian friendship” is likely a means of justifying more recent, 
material considerations.36 In order for this flattering understanding of the Russian ‘Other’ to 
therefore exist, it is necessary for a “liminal crisis” to have appeared in RN discourse.37 
 
 
1er mai 2016: discours de Marine Le Pen [May 1, 2016: speech by Marine Le Pen], Rassemblement National, 
3rd May 2016 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/discours/1er-mai-2016-discours-de-marine-le-pen/ [accessed 
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une politique digne de ce nom avec le Proche, le Moyen-Orient et l’Afrique qui corresponde à des solidarités 
historiques anciennes et non seulement à des mécanismes technocratiques ou uniquement « économiques ».” 
31 Andrew Marr BBC Interview - Marine Le Pen 
32 Ian Klinke, Chronopolitics: A Conceptual Matrix, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 37, No. 5 (2012), p. 
676 
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aux-commemorations_2082527.html [accessed 21st March 2020] 
Centenaire de la victoire de la 1ère guerre mondiale à Verdun 
“Honneur aux héros russes et à ce grand pays, la Sainte et chère Russie fidèle alliée indéfectible de la France 
qui paya avec le prix du sang, 70 ans d’oppression intérieure cet engagement pour la liberté de l’Europe.” 
34 D-Day: Le Pen juge "regrettable" que la Russie ne soit pas associée aux commemorations 
“Paris - Marine Le Pen a jugé jeudi "regrettable" que la Russie "ne soit pas associée" aux commémorations du 
75e anniversaire du Débarquement en Normandie alors que le pays a "payé un lourd tribut".” 
35 Jean-Yves Camus, A Long-Lasting Friendship: Alexander Dugin and the French Radical Right in 
Eurasianism and the European Far Right, p. 82  
36 Embargo sur les navires Mistral, le RBM dit non! 
“J’ai présenté et soutenu une motion de rejet préalable, afin de dénoncer un embargo inopportun et hostile à la 
traditionnelle amitié franco-russe.” 
37 Jean-Yves Camus & Nicolas Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2017), p. 22 
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Postmodern geopolitics and Europe’s new “Cold War”38 
 
This ‘crisis’ ultimately appears in the form of a “hawkish Euro-Atlanticist logic”, which 
dominates the corpus’ “problem statements”.39 Represented by the EU and NATO, these 
organisations’ “Manichaeism” has imposed rigid, liberal understandings of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ 
within a thoroughly “postmodern” geopolitical framework.40 This ideological ‘distortion’, 
therefore, is held responsible by the party for the suppression of the ‘natural circumstances’ 
historically enjoyed by Paris and Moscow. Indeed, in a 2016 interview Le Pen detailed the 
recent appearance of a “Brussels Wall”, which has caused great issues for both the French 
protagonist and its Russian ‘ally’.41 For example, the Gaullist ‘Self’ and its “non-aligned 
tradition” have been severely repressed by these circumstances, with a culture of Western 
“servility” now present in Paris.42 This sees French authorities accept normative rhetoric that 
simply justifies the “imperialism” of traditional rivals.43 These ‘antagonists’ bear a striking 
similarity to those of the Kremlin, with America leading France to great “human and 
 
38 Moscou: Marine Le Pen reçue par Alexeï Pouchkov, chef de la commission des Affaires étrangères à la 
Douma [Moscow: Marine Le Pen received by Alexei Pushkov, head of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the 
State Duma], Rassemblement National, 19th June 2013 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/annonces/moscou-
marine-le-pen-recue-par-alexei-pouchkov-chef-de-la-commission-des-affaires-etrangeres-a-la-douma/ [accessed 
25th March 2020] 
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quand même le sentiment que l’Union européenne mène une sorte de Guerre froide à la Russie.”” 
39 Vote accession Monténégro à l’OTAN: renforcement d’une logique euro-atlantiste belliciste [Montenegro's 
NATO accession vote: strengthening a hawkish Euro-Atlanticist logic], Rassemblement National, 2nd December 
2016 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/vote-accession-montenegro-a-lotan-renforcement-dune-
logique-euro-atlantiste-belliciste/ [accessed 21st March 2020] 
40 Ian Klinke, Postmodern Geopolitics?: The European Union Eyes Russia, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 64, No. 5 
(2012), pp. 929-930 
Communiqué de Marine Le Pen sur la tragédie du vol Malaysia Airlines en Ukraine [Press release from Marine 
Le Pen on the tragedy of the Malaysia Airlines flight in Ukraine], Rassemblement National, 18th July 2014 - 
https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/communique-de-marine-le-pen-sur-la-tragedie-du-vol-malaysia-
airlines-en-ukraine/ [accessed 21st March 2020] 
“Face aux drames, qui suscitent l’émotion jusqu’à brouiller la raison, le Front National n’a de cesse d’appeler 
au discernement, comme il refuse le manichéisme et la manipulation des opinions publiques.” 
41 Andrew Marr BBC Interview - Marine Le Pen 
42 Morlaix: derrière l’embargo russe, des années de crise [Morlaix: years of crisis behind the Russian embargo], 
Rassemblement National, 20th September 2014 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/morlaix-
derriere-lembargo-russe-des-annees-de-crise/ [accessed 22nd March 2020] 
Vote accession Monténégro à l’OTAN: renforcement d’une logique euro-atlantiste belliciste 
“Le déploiement de soldats de l’OTAN, la multiplication de ses bases et le renforcement de son système anti-
missile balistique entraine l’Europe dans une logique de choc entre blocs allant à l’encontre de la tradition 
non-alignée de la diplomatie française.” 
Embargo sur les navires Mistral, le RBM dit non! 
“J’ai voté contre la ratification d’un accord coûteux qui décrédibilise notre respect de la parole donnée, qui 
hypothéquera nos ventes futures de matériel de haute technologie et qui coûtera près de deux milliards d’euros 
au budget de la France; le tout pour marquer notre servilité vis-à-vis de l’OTAN.” 
43 Ian Klinke, Postmodern Geopolitics?, p. 935 
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financial costs” during its ‘ideological’ mission in Afghanistan.44 Simultaneously, Berlin’s 
presence at the heart of EU institutions has only encouraged a Franco-German “imbalance 
which history has taught us is malignant and even dangerous”.45 These narrative ‘villains’ are 
collectively referred to in party communiqués with phrases such as “American Euro-
globalism”, which appears to function as the RN’s greatest geopolitical ‘Other’.46  
 
Furthermore, Russia has also been affected by this liberal ‘counterstory’ that valorises the 
present over the past, with the country “cut off” from Europe behind this diplomatic 
“Wall”.47 This continental division has subsequently exacerbated many shared issues, which 
interestingly possess a notably French bent. For instance, a small but notable number of 
stories have emphasised Moscow’s role in counter-terrorism, with a 2018 press release 
arguing that “We must stop seeing Russia as an adversary and renew dialogue with an 
indispensable ally in the war against terrorism and the common enemy of the Islamic 
State”.48 This therefore endows the emerging geopolitical narrative with an especially 
existential nature, with the party viewing the nation’s very livelihood as in danger. However, 
this stark rhetoric is perhaps exemplified by discussions of Russian sanctions and their effect 
 
44 Communiqué de Marine Le Pen sur la tragédie du vol Malaysia Airlines en Ukraine  
Conférence de Presse Internationale de Marine Le Pen en présence d’Aymeric Chauprade, géopoliticien 
[International Press Conference of Marine Le Pen with Aymeric Chauprade, geopolitician], Rassemblement 
National, 22nd January 2014 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/conferences-de-presse/conference-de-presse-
internationale-de-marine-le-pen-en-presence-daymeric-chauprade-geopoliticien/ [accessed 25th March 2020] 
“La politique étrangère français actuelle est hélas fondée sur ce mensonge et c’est ce mensonge qui nous a 
conduit à accompagner les Américains dans la quasi-totalité de leurs guerres depuis l’écroulement de l’URSS, 
avec les coûts humain et financier que nous connaissons, en Afghanistan notamment.” 
45 1er mai 2019 à Metz: discours de Marine Le Pen [1st May 2019 in Metz: speech by Marine Le Pen], 
Rassemblement National, 3rd May 2019 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/videos/1er-mai-2019-a-metz-
discours-de-marine-le-pen/ [accessed 21st March 2020] 
“Et dans ce mouvement de domination collective sur les peuples, les européistes sans repère n’ont cessé 
d’avaliser un déséquilibre entre la France et l’Allemagne, déséquilibre dont l’histoire nous a appris la 
malignité et même la dangerosité.” 
46 Conférence de Presse Internationale de Marine Le Pen en présence d’Aymeric Chauprade, géopoliticien 
“Nous refusons les impérialismes d’où qu’ils viennent, euro-mondialisme américain ou islamisme, comme nous 
refusions hier le communisme soviétique.” 
47 Ian Klinke, Postmodern Geopolitics?, p. 929 
Semaine de l’Ukraine au Parlement européen: un peu de culture pour beaucoup d’imposture [Ukraine Week in 
the European Parliament: a little ceremony hides great deception], Rassemblement National, 2nd March 2016 - 
https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/semaine-de-lukraine-au-parlement-europeen-un-peu-de-culture-
pour-beaucoup-dimposture/ [accessed 3rd April 2020] 
“Après le marasme de l’année passée ayant conduit Bruxelles à se couper de la Russie, partenaire commercial 
et diplomatique stratégique – notamment dans le conflit syrien – on aurait pensé que l’UE s’assagirait et 
éviterait de nouvelles provocations à l’égard du géant russe.” 
48 Réélection de Vladimir Poutine [Re-election of Vladimir Putin], Rassemblement National, 19th March 2018 - 
https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/reelection-de-vladimir-poutine/ [accessed 28th March 2020] 
“Il faut cesser de voir la Russie comme un adversaire et renouer le dialogue avec un allié indispensable dans la 
guerre contre le terrorisme et l’ennemi commun de l’Etat islamique.” 
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on France’s powerful rural sector.49 Said to be “sacrificing our agriculture and the national 
interest on the altar of Atlanticist interests”, these government-supported restrictions are 
ultimately viewed as holding the country’s many farmers “hostage”.50 This conflation of ‘the 
farmer’ with sovereignty, thereby presents a highly romantic image of Russia’s importance in 
relation to the Gaullist ‘Self’. Though whilst radical right ideology is prone to such 
sentimentality, these stories’ focus on specifically French issues suggest that this rhetoric 
may, once again, legitimise more practical concerns. Of course, whilst scepticism of Western 
‘postmodernity’ remains the preserve of a French opposition party, it forms an integral part of 
a powerful Russian state’s foreign policy.51 This has seemingly led to a certain ‘messianism’ 
being attributed to the Kremlin within the corpus, with Cyrille Bret arguing that the RN 
views itself as the “national branch” of a shared geopolitical struggle centred on Moscow.52 
 
Russia as a modern-era “beacon of hope”53 
 
The movement’s understanding of this contemporary ‘fight’ begins with various stories 
focused on Russia’s style of governance. Embodying a thoroughly traditional, ‘national’ form 
of rule, the Putin administration is viewed as the victim of Western disinformation, which has 
labelled Moscow as “a kind of dictatorship”.54 In contrast to this, Le Pen has praised the 
Kremlin’s resistance to foreign pressure, stating during a 2013 visit to the State Duma that 
 
49 Rosemary Fennell, The Common Agricultural Policy: Continuity and Change (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), p. 14 
50 Adoption de la résolution sur la levée des sanctions européennes contre la Russie : l’Exécutif socialiste 
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levee-des-sanctions-europeennes-contre-la-russie-lexecutif-socialiste-contraint-de-renouer-avec-linteret-
national/ [accessed 3rd April 2020] 
“En soutenant les sanctions, le gouvernement socialiste sacrifie notre agriculture et l’intérêt national sur 
l’autel des intérêts atlantistes.” 
“Nos agriculteurs se trouvent pris en otage par l’assujettissement de la France à la politique extérieure des 
Etats-Unis” 
51 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1st 
December 2016, Section 2, Articles 4-5 - https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 [accessed 27th March 2020] 
52 Cyrille Bret, France-Russia, a love-hate history, New Eastern Europe, No. 1-2 (2020), pp. 28-30 
53 Anton Shekhovtsov, Marine Le Pen Is No Patriot of France, Anton Shekhovtsov’s Blog, 21st April 2017 - 
http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2017/04/marine-le-pen-is-no-patriot-of-france.html [accessed 28th 
March 2020] 
54 Réélection de Vladimir Poutine 
Moscou: Marine Le Pen reçue par Alexeï Pouchkov, chef de la commission des Affaires étrangères à la Douma  
“Elle a catégoriquement rejeté la désinformation véhiculée en France, comme quoi la Russie serait une sorte de 
dictature, un pays totalement fermé. Une diabolisation qui s’est accentuée avec l’arrivée au pouvoir à Moscou, 
derrière Vladimir V. Poutine, de dirigeants nouveaux, postcommunistes, et qui ont su relever leur pays tant 
politiquement, que diplomatiquement, économiquement, socialement et moralement.” 
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the Russian President and his inner circle had “raised their country politically, diplomatically, 
economically, socially and morally”.55 This theme of revival is directly connected to Russia’s 
Putinist “model” of governance, with the party leader describing it as “one of reasoned 
protectionism, looking after the interests of his own country, defending his identity”.56 
Subsequently, the leader has helped “restore pride and contentment to a great nation that had 
been humiliated and persecuted for 70 years”, thereby placing ‘the nation’ at the state’s 
heart.57 In relation to the RN’s own desires to “restore the State and give back to those who 
serve it”, this break from Western norms appears as an attractive ‘metanarrative’ for a nation 
rising “up off its knees”.58 This description of Putin’s rule bears a striking resemblance to 
Roger Griffin’s understanding of “ethnocratic liberalism”, which is widely supported in 
radical right circles.59 Advocating for the restriction of political participation to those 
belonging to ‘the nation’, the ideal views democracy as a mere tool for the protection and 
production of a strong ‘national will’.60 This theoretical sleight of hand therefore allows the 
RN to praise the “democratic anchoring of Russia”, with Putin’s 2018 re-election viewed as a 
triumph of the “will of the Russian people”.61 It appears, then, that the party effectively views 
Moscow and its revival of modern-era values as an inspiring example of a nation returning to 
its “due course”, with Le Pen eager to “defend this model in my own country”.62  
 
Of course, party understandings of Russia’s internal ‘victory’ is of great consequence to its 
subsequent role on the global stage. Whilst France’s Gaullist ‘Self’ remains restrained by 
Western “legal imperialism”, the Kremlin has transformed its national ‘strength’ into an 
 
55 Ibid. 
56 Andrew Marr BBC Interview - Marine Le Pen 
57 Le Pen: I admire 'cool head' Putin's resistance to West's new Cold War, Euronews, 1st December 2014 - 
https://www.euronews.com/2014/12/01/le-pen-i-admire-cool-head-putin-s-resistance-to-west-s-new-cold-war 
[accessed 26th March 2020] 
58 Discours de Marine Le Pen dans l’Orne [Speech by Marine Le Pen in Orne], Rassemblement National, 7th 
January 2018 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/discours/discours-de-marine-le-pen-dans-lorne/ [accessed 26th 
March 2020] 
“C’est restaurer l’Etat et redonner à ceux qui le servent les moyens de leurs missions” 
Anton Shekhovtsov, Russia and the Western Far Right, p. 89 
59 Roger Griffin, Interregnum or endgame? The radical right in the ‘post-fascist’ era, Journal of Political 
Ideologies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2000), p. 173 
60 Ibid. 
61 Réélection de Vladimir Poutine 
“Ce large succès électoral confirme la stabilité et l’ancrage démocratique de la Russie, il témoigne de la 
volonté du peuple russe de poursuivre sur la voie des réformes engagées par le président Poutine qui a permis 
notamment depuis plusieurs années le retour de cette puissance incontournable sur la scène internationale.” 
62 Hakkı Taş, The chronopolitics of national populism, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power (2020), 
p. 6 
Andrew Marr BBC Interview - Marine Le Pen 
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equally assertive status abroad.63 For example, the same RN publication that celebrated 
Putin’s 2018 success makes a direct causal link between his “reforms” and “the return of this 
essential power [Russia] on the global stage”.64 This transformation mirrors the party’s own 
temporal ambitions for Paris, with Le Pen last year stating that “Protecting our country is also 
leading it on the paths of greatness and power”.65 Though whilst both nations aspire to 
grandeur in line with a radical right “return” to a mythical past, the latter’s description as 
“essential” hints at its particularly special status within the geopolitical narrative.66 Certainly, 
this rhetoric alludes to Moscow’s almost ‘eternal’ power akin to the narratives of Dugin, with 
Russia viewed as the vanguard of a classical sovereignty so treasured by the RN.67 This is 
clear regarding various stories that detail the country’s foreign engagements, with Le Pen 
stating that “Russian determination has helped much in the deliverance of Syria and, 
consequently, Iraq, two countries that are victims of Western irresponsibility”.68 This defence 
of traditional principles is also apparent in the Ukraine conflict. Supposedly “vassalized” by 
Western interests, Kiev is viewed as the spearhead of attempts to maintain the Kremlin’s 
isolation according to Brzezinski’s “The Grand Chessboard”.69 As such, seemingly 
‘aggressive’ Russian actions are understood as protecting long-established state-centric 
norms, with Crimea’s “return” defending the principle of “self-determination”.70 These 
 
63 1er mai 2019 à Metz: discours de Marine Le Pen 
“Ils ont ignoré l’idée même de puissance et ont abdiqué devant l’impérialisme juridique des Etats-Unis qui, 
avec l’extraterritorialité de son droit, s’empare de nos fleurons industriels comme Alstom ou vassalise nos Etats 
et nos entreprises pour les soumettre aux injonctions de la politique américaine” 
64 Réélection de Vladimir Poutine 
“Ce large succès électoral confirme la stabilité et l’ancrage démocratique de la Russie, il témoigne de la 
volonté du peuple russe de poursuivre sur la voie des réformes engagées par le président Poutine qui a permis 
notamment depuis plusieurs années le retour de cette puissance incontournable sur la scène internationale.” 
65 Discours de Marine Le Pen dans l’Orne 
“Protéger notre pays c’est aussi le conduire sur les chemins de la grandeur et de la puissance.” 
66 Matt Golder, Far Right Parties in Europe, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 19 (2016), p. 481 
67 Paul F. Robinson, Russia’s Emergence as an International Conservative Power, Russia in Global Affairs, 
Vol. 18, No. 1 (2020), pp. 28-31 
Julia Himmrich, The Foreign Policy of the Radical Right: Targeting the EU’s Multilateralism, Dahrendorf 
Forum, Working Paper No. 14 (2019), pp. 6-7 
68 Discours de Marine Le Pen dans l’Orne 
“La détermination russe a beaucoup aidé à la délivrance de la Syrie et, par voie de conséquence, de l’Irak, ces 
deux pays martyres de l’irresponsabilité des pays occidentaux.” 
69 L’Ukraine de l’Ouest désormais «ouvertement» vassalisée par Washington [Western Ukraine now "openly" 
vassalized by Washington], Rassemblement National, 5th December 2014 - 
https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/lukraine-de-louest-desormais-ouvertement-vassalisee-par-
washington/ [accessed 27th March 2020] 
70 Le Parlement européen attaque la Russie! [The European Parliament attacks Russia!], Rassemblement 
National, 13th December 2018 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/le-parlement-europeen-attaque-
la-russie/ [accessed 3rd April 2020] 
“Sur le fond, elle est d’ailleurs injustifiée car la Crimée est historiquement un territoire russe, donné 
arbitrairement par Khrouchtchev à l’Ukraine du temps de l’URSS, et dont la population a librement décidé par 
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activities solidify Moscow’s role as a unique pole of “state conservatism” within the 
narrative, with its ‘natural’ power allowing it to engage in a struggle at a level that currently 
evades the movement.71  
 
Simultaneously, Russia’s “spatiotemporal” defence of traditional sovereignty is often linked 
in the corpus to its promotion of equally conservative social values.72 Of course, whilst the 
RN now promotes a more inclusive image, the party’s Gaullist ‘Self’ still encourages a strong 
attachment to tradition. This is exemplified by the party’s emotional response to the 2019 
Notre Dame fire, which is described as “a symbol of our Christian civilization around the 
world since the 12th century”.73 Though whilst the party attempts to defend France from 
“ultra-liberalism”, it is once again the Kremlin, a continental ‘redoubt’ free from the EU and 
NATO, that appears as an essential partner in this traditionalist ‘struggle’.74 Indeed, when 
asked about Putin in a 2014 interview, Le Pen stated that “He is aware that we defend 
common values. These are the ideals of ‘European civilization’. These values are those of the 
‘Christian heritage’ of European civilization…”75 This synthesis of esotericism with 
geopolitical conflict throughout the party’s stories is perhaps the best example of 
Eurasianism’s influence on party narrative. Certainly, whilst the RN rejects Dugin’s more 
extreme ideas, his ‘story’ of a Russian traditionalism struggling against Western universalism 
appears to summarise much of the party’s outlook.76 Consequently, the group views Russia’s 
 
référendum son retour au sein de sa mère patrie. Le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes est un principe 
fondamental dont le respect devrait l’emporter sur toute autre considération.” 
71 Paul F. Robinson, Russia’s Emergence as an International Conservative Power, pp. 28-31 
72 Ian Klinke, Chronopolitics, p. 680 
73 Incendie de Notre-Dame de Paris : la France en état de choc [Fire at Notre Dame in Paris: France is in a state 
of shock], Rassemblement National, 16th April 2019 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/incendie-
de-notre-dame-de-paris-la-france-en-etat-de-choc/ [accessed 3rd April 2020] 
“Notre-Dame est à la fois un symbole de notre civilisation chrétienne à travers le monde depuis le XIIe siècle, 
mais aussi un joyau de l’architecture gothique avec ses arcs-boutants si caractéristiques qui ont permis de 
percer de vitraux ses murs et d’y faire pénétrer la lumière.” 
74 Le développement chinois ne doit pas nous laisser indifférents [We should not be indifferent to Chinese 
development], Rassemblement National, 25th October 2017 - https://rassemblementnational.fr/communiques/le-
developpement-chinois-ne-doit-pas-nous-laisser-indifferents/ [accessed 4th April 2020] 
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75 Marine Le Pen fait l'éloge de Vladimir Poutine «le patriote» [Marine Le Pen praises Vladimir Putin “the 
patriot”], Le Figaro, 18th May 2014 - https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/citations/2014/05/18/25002-
20140518ARTFIG00118-marine-le-pen-fait-l-eloge-de-vladimir-poutine-le-patriote.php [accessed 4th April 
2020] 
“Monsieur Poutine est un patriote. Il est attaché à la souveraineté de son peuple. Il a conscience que nous 
défendons des valeurs communes. Ce sont les valeurs de la civilisation européenne. Ces valeurs sont celles de 
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76 Alexander Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii [The Foundations of Geopolitics: 
The Geopolitical Future of Russia] (Moscow: Arctogaia, 1997), pp. 11-14 
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foreign politico-military actions as integrally tied to the protection of time-honoured 
European traditions. For instance, a delegation of party members to the Kremlin last year 
personally thanked Putin “for what the Russian army is doing in the interests of the Eastern 
Christians”.77 It appears, then, that the RN views its shared struggle with Russia as one that is 
simultaneously spiritual and material, with Moscow endowed with a natural conservative 
‘mission’. These party ideals closely resemblance the ‘geopolitical stories’ proposed by 
Russian philosopher Alexander Panarin, who saw the country as destined to help preserve 
“cultural-civilizational diversity”.78  
 
Russia’s role as a defender of global autonomy is also made clear during the party’s brief 
discussions regarding the geopolitical future. For instance, the Kremlin’s rigid anti-
Westernism is viewed as playing a critical role in hastening the emergence of a “multi-polar 
world”.79 This often results in party literature tying Russia closely to other “rising powers” 
such as China, who are seen as the pillars of a new system in which “every country has the 
right to defend its own interests”.80 Such developments would prove to be of great 
consequence for the party and Russia’s ‘organic’ European forum, with Le Pen directly 
linking the country’s continued defiance of the EU and NATO to the eventual fall of the 
“Brussels Wall”.81 Simultaneously, the rejection of these organisations’ ‘postmodern’ values 
would see the area’s diplomacy return to its inherent ontology as an ill-defined “Europe of 
Nations”, which had previously brought about a Franco-Russian ‘Golden Age’.82 Of course, 
these developments would allow the nation-protagonist to overcome “present inadequacies” 
and express its Gaullist ‘Self’, with France reclaiming its geopolitical ‘grandeur’ as a 
sovereign great power.83 Whilst the party places Russia at the heart of these developments, 
 
77 Meeting with members of the public from the French Republic, President of Russia, 18th March 2019 - 
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78 Paul F. Robinson, Russia’s Emergence as an International Conservative Power, p. 22 
79 Andrew Marr BBC Interview - Marine Le Pen 
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Andrew Marr BBC Interview - Marine Le Pen 
83 Ibid. 
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however, it is important to note that the RN does not envisage a future relationship with 
Moscow beyond that of two friendly sovereign states. This important ‘counterstory’ provides 
nuance to the overall metanarrative and reflects the peculiar phenomenon of ‘cooperative 
nationalism’ found in radical right thought, with Russia’s actions ultimately responsible for 




In conclusion, it appears that rather than simply being described as a fellow anti-Western 
sceptic, the Kremlin and its role in the world has been the subject of great attention within 
RN literature. This vivid understanding of Moscow is the product of the party’s French 
‘Self’, whose fixation on restoring ‘unchanging’ ideals of Gaullist grandeur naturally lends 
itself to narrative. These ideas are transformed into a story as the party describes France and 
its fortunes, with Russia remaining a close ally throughout these experiences. Certainly, the 
party places the state at the forefront of Paris’ historical diplomacy, as both countries are said 
to cooperate as sovereign partners within their “Common European Home”.85 A narrative 
“crisis”, however, later emerges to divide the partners. This takes the form of NATO and the 
EU, whose imposition of a diffuse universalism artificially divides the ‘objective’ continental 
forum enjoyed by both states. Of course, given France’s current pro-Westernism, it may be 
questioned as to what extent ideology and circumstance have led to such complementary 
understandings of Russia. Indeed, the country’s ‘independence’ sees it endowed with a 
unique spatiotemporal mission to restore past norms, as the RN is unable to offer a similar 
level of resistance. This ‘struggle’ subsequently takes on both earthly and mystical properties, 
with Russia fighting for a ‘natural’ Europe in which France can restore its traditional 
peculiarities. Whilst this narrative relies on national quirks, its transformation of a rhetorical 
‘Golden Age’ into the national ‘Self’ raises questions as to its similarities with other parties. 
Further chapters, therefore, may reveal a “schematic narrative template” regarding Russia, in 
which these national ‘champions’ are ultimately bound by the confines of radical right 
thought.86  
 
84 Adoption de la résolution sur la levée des sanctions européennes contre la Russie: l’Exécutif socialiste 
contraint de renouer avec l’intérêt national 
“L’adoption de cette résolution est l’occasion de renouer avec la politique de l’équilibre qui a fait de la France 
un Etat renommé et respecté sur la scène internationale.” 
85 Pierre Joannon, The Cathedral and the Dacha, p. 51 
86 James V. Wertsch, Voice of Collective Remembering (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 60-
62 
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A new era of ‘reinsurance’? – The Alternative for 
Germany looks toward Moscow 
 
Another party which exemplifies this radical right fascination with Russia and its geopolitical 
role is the ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD). Created in 2013 by dissatisfied members of the 
German elite, the group is unique amongst the parties present in this study due to its 
relatively moderate roots.1 Certainly, the movement was founded in opposition to Berlin’s 
bailouts during the European economic downturn, with its anti-Euro message endowing the 
group with the image of a “professor’s party”.2 This led to the group narrowly failing to enter 
the Bundestag in the year of its founding.3 Nevertheless, party desires for a stronger national 
voice would draw in various demographics, with infighting quickly becoming the norm.4 For 
example, Bernd Lucke, the party’s original leader, was deposed by a growing “national-
conservative” faction in the midst of the 2015 migrant crisis, which was described by one 
leading member as “a gift to the party”.5 This saw new head Frauke Petry orient the party 
more towards identity issues, with a ban relaxed on cooperation with anti-migration protest 
movement Pegida.6 Such actions ultimately brought the party much-sought after political 
representation in many “Länder” elections.7 Ironically, however, this rightward turn would 
soon outpace Petry, whose desire to market the party as a potential coalition partner to 
Merkel’s CDU would provoke scepticism among members.8  
 
 
1 Kai Arzheimer & Carl C. Berning, How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and their voters veered to the 
radical right, 2013–2017, Electoral Studies, Vol. 60 (2019), p. 1 
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Politics and Society, Vol. 36, Issue 4 (2018), p. 36 
3 Ibid. 
4 Kai Arzheimer, “Don’t Mention the War!”: How Populist Right-Wing Radicalism Became (Almost) Normal in 
Germany, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 57 (2019), pp. 92-94 
Germany's AfD considers party split amid controversy over radical wing, Deutsche Welle, 2nd April 2020 - 
https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-afd-considers-party-split-amid-controversy-over-radical-wing/a-52999297 
[accessed 5th April 2020] 
5 Kai Arzheimer & Carl C. Berning, How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and their voters veered to the 
radical right, p. 1 
6 Karsten Grabow, PEGIDA and the Alternative für Deutschland: two sides of the same coin?, European View, 
Vol. 15 (2016), pp. 173-174 
7 Ibid. 
8 Kai Arzheimer & Carl C. Berning, How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and their voters veered to the 
radical right, p. 3 
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This subsequently brought about the party’s consolidation as a traditional radical right party 
in 2017 under the now former leadership of Alexander Gauland and Alice Weidel.9 Rather 
than disrupt the party’s federal election campaign the same year, this shift to an even more 
abrasive populism would quickly find widespread support, especially in the relatively 
impoverished former East.10 This resulted in the party not only becoming the official 
opposition but also the most successful nationalist party in post-war history.11 The group’s 
rise has naturally provoked existential questions regarding modern Germany’s relationship 
with its troubled past or ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’, with the party eager to re-assess 
contemporary orthodoxies.12 This has naturally impacted party thoughts on a resurgent 
Russia. For example, February 2017 saw Petry meet with State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav 
Volodin in order to discuss potential cooperation.13 Actions such as this have also led to 
allegations that Kremlin funding may have assisted the party’s impressive electoral 
performance the same year.14 Despite this, it is perhaps the AfD’s strong connection with 
Russian-Germans that presents its most enduring link with the country. Numbering just under 
eight million citizens, some community members have actively sought to act as a “unifying 
link” between the two nations and their politics.15 These actions have intimately influenced 
overall party narratives regarding Moscow’s geopolitical status, with the group’s thoughts on 
the Kremlin ‘Other’ challenging consensus at the very heart of the European Union.  
 
“Don’t Mention the War!” – In search of a new German assertiveness16 
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Of course, this seeming break with established Russia policy is the product of a long series of 
subjective considerations regarding Germany’s geopolitical ‘Self’. Overall, the AfD’s 
renegotiation of the nation-protagonist’s identity is perhaps the best example of a radical right 
party attempting to balance ideological logic with material issues of ‘image’. This is due to 
the political tradition’s desire to “return to a mythical and idealized version of the past where 
states were ethnically homogeneous”.17 In relation to Germany, therefore, it could be 
assumed that this ‘Golden Age’ period was that spent under Nazi rule, which ‘realised’ the 
country’s nationalist ‘Sonderweg’.18 Despite figures such as Björn Höcke, the head of the 
group’s radical “Flügel” faction, party heads continue to distance themselves from any 
potentially damaging association with neo-Nazism.19 This was made clear by Gauland in 
2018, who stated that “Hitler and the Nazis are just bird shit in more than 1000 years of 
successful German history”.20 As such, it is clear that party stories discussing Germany’s 
“glorious history” are deliberately detached from the fascist era’s ‘ideological aberrations’, 
with this allowing the party to emphasise less controversial, yet similarly ‘grand’ parts of the 
national story.21 This is exemplified by the party subjectively “carving up time” to emphasise 
Bismarck era grandeur.22 Indeed, the AfD’s former leader stated during a 2018 interview that 
many party members view “Bismarck Germany as a reference model”.23 Naturally, this 
outlook lends itself to geopolitics and party image, with the chancellor’s “balance of power” 
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diplomacy seemingly justifying the pursuit of a ‘natural’ leadership position in Europe, by 
means that are acceptable in modern Germany.24 For example, Gauland has stated that  
 
In foreign policy Bismarck is quite inspiring. Do not offend, cleverly hold 
everyone together - that was his foreign policy after 1870. One must not 
follow it slavishly, but pursue an enlightened national interest, not 
"Germany, Germany over everything": that is worthy of imitation.25  
 
As a result, it appears that the AfD not only views this leading ‘arbiter’ role as the natural 
expression of Germany’s ‘Self’, but also the country’s traditional means of securing 
geopolitical grandeur.  
 
Russia and Bismarckian “Realpolitik”26 
 
This self-conception leads to an understanding of the nation’s historical relations with Russia 
as intertwined with an ongoing struggle to maintain “peace between the powers”.27 This is 
made clear by stories which emphasise Germany’s central position in a Europe “characterised 
by different national and regional traditions”, with the country subsequently required to 
maintain relations with various geopolitical neighbours.28 For example, AfD spokesman Jörg 
Meuthen stated in 2018 that  
 
Due to its geographic location and historical experience, Germany is well 
advised not to bind itself unilaterally. We should understand ourselves as 
partners of both the West and the East for many good reasons.29  
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René Albrecht-Carrié, A diplomatic history of Europe since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harpercollins, 
1958), pp. 163-165 
25 Dr. Alexander Gauland im Gespräch mit Roger Köppel von der Weltwoche 
“In der Außenpolitik ist Bismarck durchaus inspirierend. Keinen vor den Kopf stoßen, klug alle 
zusammenhalten – das war seine Außenpolitik nach 1870. Man darf dem nicht sklavisch folgen, aber ein 
aufgeklärtes nationales Interesse, kein «Deutschland, Deutschland über alles»: Das ist nachahmenswert.” 
26 Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 
117-118 
27 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire: 1875 – 1914 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), p. 312 
28 Manifesto for Germany: The Political Programme of the Alternative for Germany, Alternative for Germany, 
1st May 2016, p. 15 
29 Jörg Meuthen: Dialog und Kooperation mit Russland statt Konfrontation und sinnlose Sanktionen [Jörg 
Meuthen: Dialogue and cooperation with Russia instead of confrontation and senseless sanctions], Alternative 
for Germany, 20th July 2018 - https://www.afd.de/joerg-meuthen-dialog-und-kooperation-mit-russland-statt-
konfrontation-und-sinnlose-sanktionen/ [accessed 10th April 2020] 
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Within the corpus, these ‘historical experiences’ possess a particular focus on France and 
indeed Russia, with the latter regularly overturning a Paris-Moscow alliance so damaging to 
Germany. This is made clear by Gauland’s beliefs that  
 
Prussia was saved in 1763 by a reversal of the alliance of Russia, and a 
second time in 1807 by the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon. The Wars of 
Liberation (1815) would not have been possible without Russia and 
unification by Bismarck is also the fruit of a reversal of alliance with 
Russia, letting Austria support Prussia.30  
 
This convenient reading of history therefore allows the party to conceptualise Moscow as a 
natural ally, mirroring German geopolitician Karl Haushofer’s belief that Berlin-Moscow 
forms an organic continental axis.31 These ‘traditional’ bonds are further strengthened by 
discussions of Bismarck’s 1887 bilateral “reinsurance policy”, which ensured non-
interference should one side go to war, as well as the belief that “Germany and Russia have 
had to endure totalitarianism” during the 20th century.32 This repeated appeal to ‘objective’ 
geopolitics over ideological ‘perversions’ thereby allows the AfD to obscure potentially 
uncomfortable discussions of the world wars. It appears, therefore, that this geopolitical 
‘narrative device’ has once again thrust history into the service of the present, with the radical 




“Deutschland tut allein schon aufgrund seiner geographischen Lage und seiner historischen Erfahrung gut 
daran, sich nicht einseitig zu binden. Wir sollten uns aus vielen guten Gründen als Partner sowohl des Westens 
als auch des Ostens verstehen.” 
30 Alexander Gauland: “We refuse to continue the federalisation of Europe”, Visegrad Post, 7th July 2017 - 
https://visegradpost.com/en/2017/07/07/alexander-gauland-we-refuse-to-continue-the-federalisation-of-europe/ 
[accessed 14th April 2020] 
31 Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen [The Geopolitics of Pan-Ideas] (Berlin: Zentral, 1931) 
32 Gustav Gressel, Bismarck and Germany’s pro-Russia lobby 
Secret Reinsurance Treaty with Russia (June 18, 1887), German History in Documents and Images, 18th June 
1887 - http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1862 [accessed 12th April 2020] 
Alexander Gauland: Ablehnung von ‘Nord Stream 2’: Grobes politisches Foul der Franzosen 
“Das Nord Stream 2-Projekt ist eine gute Gelegenheit, die deutsche Außenpolitik breiter aufzustellen und im 
Sinne der Rückversicherungspolitik Bismarcks die Verbindung zu Russland zu vertiefen.” 
 Zum Gedenktag der Russlanddeutschen [For the memorial day of the Russian Germans], AfD Kompakt, 25th 
August 2018 - https://afdkompakt.de/2018/08/25/zum-gedenktag-der-russlanddeutschen/ [accessed 11th April 
2020] 
“Deutschland wie Russland haben Totalitarismus durchleiden müssen.” 
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Russo-German relations in a “Europe of false ideology”33 
 
Certainly, the party offers a detailed account of the “crisis-driven present” now facing 
Germany, as well as its subsequent impact on its ‘traditional’ Russian ally.34 Much like the 
Rassemblement National, these issues are said to originate in organisations such as the 
European Union. In the AfD’s case, however, criticism of Brussels appears to be nuanced in 
line with Germany’s unique history and leadership in the body. For instance, whilst the 
organisation’s past existence as an “economic union based on shared interests, and consisting 
of sovereign, but loosely connected nation states”, is deemed compatible with a ‘natural’ 
Europe, the EU’s recent “centralist aspirations” have ultimately provoked narrative 
‘conflict’.35 These “post-sovereign” desires are viewed as inseparable from the imposition of 
liberal universalism, with Gauland stating that the EU has now become a “replacement 
fatherland”.36 This has resulted in demands that “the great European idea must not be buried 
by the megalomania of Brussels Eurocrats”, who have subsequently ‘distorted’ Europe and 
with it Germany’s ability to truly act as continental ‘arbiter’.37 Furthermore, ‘ideological’ 
figures such as Angela Merkel have allegedly forced Germany into a “one-sided strategic 
dependency” on Western ‘antagonists’ such as France and America.38 This aversion to 
 
33 Europatag – oder wie blinde Ideologie Europa spaltet [Europe Day - or how blind ideology divides Europe], 
Alternative for Germany, 9th May 2018 - https://afdkompakt.de/2018/05/09/europatag-oder-wie-blinde-
ideologie-europa-spaltet/ [accessed 15th April 2020]  
“Die AfD steht nämlich für ein vernünftiges Europa, nicht für ein Europa falscher Ideologie.” 
34 Hakkı Taş, The chronopolitics of national populism, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power (2020), 
p. 14 
35 Manifesto for Germany 
Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik – Keine EU-Armee – Souveränität der Vaterländer erhalten [Foreign and Security 
Policy – No EU Army – Preserve the sovereignty of the fatherland], Alternative for Germany - 
https://www.afd.de/aussen-sicherheitspolitik-aussenhandel-entwicklungshilfe/ [accessed 13th April 2020] 
“Wir stehen für ein Europa der Vaterländer und lehnen zentralistische Bestrebungen der EU entschieden ab.” 
36 Ian Klinke, Postmodern Geopolitics?: The European Union Eyes Russia, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 64, No. 5 
(2012), p. 934 
Alexander Gauland im Sommerinterview mit Roger Köppel (Weltwoche) [Alexander Gauland’s summer 
interview with Roger Köppel (Weltwoche)], AfD Kompakt, 15th August 2018 - 
https://afdkompakt.de/2018/08/15/alexander-gauland-im-sommerinterview-mit-roger-koeppel-weltwoche/ 
[accessed 13th April 2020] 
“In Deutschland prallen heute, hoch interessant, zwei Identitäten aufeinander: Nach dem Krieg war Europa für 
die Deutschen der Vaterlandsersatz, die sichere politische Rückfallposition, im Zweifel für Europa.” 
37 Keine EU-Erweiterung am Westbalkan [No EU enlargement in the Western Balkans], AfD Kompakt, 27th 
April 2018 - https://afdkompakt.de/2018/04/27/keine-eu-erweiterung-am-westbalkan/ [accessed 13th April 2020] 
“Die großartige europäische Idee darf nicht durch den Größenwahn Brüsseler Eurokraten zu Grabe getragen 
werden.” 
38 Jörg Meuthen: Russland-Sanktionen sind wirtschaftliches Eigentor für Deutschland [Jörg Meuthen: Russia 
sanctions are an economic own goal for Germany], Alternative for Germany, 14th December 2017 - 
https://www.afd.de/joerg-meuthen-russland-sanktionen-sind-wirtschaftliches-eigentor-fuer-deutschland/ 
[accessed 13th April 2020] 
Alexander Gauland: Ablehnung von ‘Nord Stream 2’: Grobes politisches Foul der Franzosen 
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Washington is made particularly clear during discussions of NATO General Breedlove, 
whose claims that “Russia and Syria would use the refugees as a 'weapon' against the West to 
destabilize Europe” are dismissed as a cover for America’s own culpability in a crisis deeply 
damaging for Germany.39 Such developments only exemplify this “critical juncture” now 
facing a supposedly traditional Russo-German partnership, with the Kremlin now 
experiencing geopolitical alienation.40  
 
Indeed, the Russian ‘Other’ has been directly affected by this ‘postmodern’ challenge to “the 
old rules of Russian-Prussian politics, namely good relations with Russia as a condition for 
good coexistence in Europe”.41 Many party stories directly blame this exclusion on Berlin, 
whose traditional power derived from ‘balance’ has been misused now that “blind ideology 
divides Europe”.42 Certainly, one 2016 article regarding NATO-Bundeswehr provocation 
draws an interesting comparison between modern ‘ideological’ compulsions and those of the 
Nazi era, stating, “Tanks in the Baltics? That went wrong once before!”43 Such beliefs 
therefore exemplify the shared fortunes of the German ‘Self’ and its Russian partner within 
party stories, with Gauland reiterating that “good relations with Russia are the condition of a 
strong and secure Germany”.44 In keeping with this logic, the country’s support of 
“nonsensical Russia sanctions” has also proven to be deeply damaging to bilateral ties.45 
These “common problems” appear to have disproportionately affected Germany, with 
 
“Deutschland ist als Nato-Mitglied aus guten Gründen ein enger Verbündeter der USA, aber wir dürfen nicht 
den Fehler machen, uns in eine einseitige strategische Abhängigkeit zu begeben.” 
39 Pazderski: NATO-Russland-Rat wiederbeleben [Pazderski: Reviving the NATO-Russia Council], Alternative 
for Germany - https://www.afd.de/pazderski-nato-russland-rat-wiederbeleben/ [accessed 13th April 2020] 
“Zu der Aussage des US-amerikanischen NATO-Oberbefehlshabers Europa, General Breedlove, vor dem 
Ausschuss für Streitkräfte des Repräsentantenhauses, dass die USA bereit seien „gegen Russland in Europa zu 
kämpfen und es zu besiegen“, und zu seiner Mutmaßung, dass Russland und Syrien die Flüchtlinge als ‚Waffe‘ 
gegen den Westen einsetzen würden, um Europa zu destabilisieren, erklärt das Bundesvorstandsmitglied Georg 
Pazderski.” 
40 Hakkı Taş, The chronopolitics of national populism, p. 6 
41 Alexander Gauland: “We refuse to continue the federalisation of Europe” 
42 Europatag – oder wie blinde Ideologie Europa spaltet  
43 Keine Panzer ins Baltikum! [No tanks in the Baltics!], AfD Kompakt, 28th October 2016 - 
https://afdkompakt.de/2016/10/28/keine-panzer-ins-baltikum-das-ging-schon-einmal-schief/ [accessed 14th 
April 2020] 
“Panzer ins Baltikum? Das ging schon einmal schief!” 
44 Alexander Gauland: “We refuse to continue the federalisation of Europe” 
45 Mittelständische Wirtschaft bestätigt AfD-Wirtschaftskompetenz! [Medium-sized business confirms AfD 
economic competence!], AfD Kompakt, 11th December 2017 - 
https://afdkompakt.de/2017/12/11/mittelstaendische-wirtschaft-bestaetigt-afd-wirtschaftskompetenz/ [accessed 
18th April 2020] 
“Wir haben die Aufhebung der unsinnigen Russland-Sanktionen beantragt und uns für Bürokratieabbau 
eingesetzt.” 
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sanctions greatly impacting the nation-protagonist’s famed industrial sector.46 This issue is 
made clear by a 2017 party press release, which stated that  
 
If we Germans are not careful, our foreign policy, but especially our 
economic policy, will suffer lasting damage and many jobs will be lost or 
moved abroad. Mrs Merkel must finally refrain from her ideology-blinded 
policy towards Russia. Russia is not an enemy but an opportunity and 
should become a true partner of Germany.47  
 
Simultaneously, the Kremlin is said to now be “working together with new business 
partners”, thereby exemplifying the existential threat posed by ‘liberal Europe’ not only to 
traditional links, but Germany’s naturally ‘grand’ ‘Self’.48 Of course, questions arise 
regarding why such a complementary image of the Russian ‘Other’ exists in the first place, 
with shared ideology and similar material circumstances leading the AfD to conclusions 
closely resembling those of its French counterpart.  
 
Russia – Europe’s other ‘policeman’? 
 
This resemblance is made particularly clear within the AfD’s brief discussions of Putin’s 
regime. Congratulating the Russian president on his 2018 re-election, the group also views 
the strong-man leader’s style of rule as a realisation of the radical right’s ‘ethnocratic’ 
 
46 Jörg Meuthen: Russland-Sanktionen sind wirtschaftliches Eigentor für Deutschland 
Weidel / Gauland: In Biarritz wurde die Chance zur Überwindung der Blockadepolitik gegen Russland verpasst 
[Weidel / Gauland: In Biarritz, the opportunity to overcome the blockade policy against Russia was missed], 
Alternative for Germany, 26th August 2019 - https://www.afd.de/weidel-gauland-in-biarritz-wurde-die-chance-
zur-ueberwindung-der-blockadepolitik-gegen-russland-verpasst/ [accessed 18th April 2020] 
“Strittige Fragen und gemeinsame Probleme können nur durch Dialog auf Augenhöhe gelöst werden.” 
47 Gauland: Drohungen und Sanktionen gegen Russland schaden nur uns selber [Gauland: Threats and 
sanctions against Russia only hurt us], Alternative for Germany, 6th January 2017 - https://www.afd.de/gauland-
drohungen-und-sanktionen-gegen-russland-schaden-nur-uns-selber/ [accessed 14th April 2020] 
“Wenn wir Deutschen nicht aufpassen, wird unsere Außen-, aber vor allem unsere Wirtschaftspolitik 
nachhaltigen Schaden nehmen und mit ihr viele Arbeitsplätze verloren gehen oder ins Ausland abwandern. 
Frau Merkel muss von ihrer ideologieverblendeten Politik gegenüber Russland endlich Abstand nehmen. 
Russland ist kein Feind, sondern Chance und sollte ein echter Partner Deutschlands werden.” 
48 Forderung nach ‘forciertem Außenhandel’ ist scheinheilige Propaganda der SPD [Demand for 'forced 
foreign trade' is hypocritical propaganda by the SPD], AfD Kompakt, 5th January 2018 - 
https://afdkompakt.de/2018/01/05/forderung-nach-forciertem-aussenhandel-ist-scheinheilige-propaganda-der-
spd/ [accessed 18th April 2020] 
“Russland arbeitet mit neuen Geschäftspartnern zusammen, unsere Exportwirtschaft verliert massiv und 
sächsische Arbeitsplätze gehen verloren.” 
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desires.49 This is in spite of the alleged “lies” of European ministers, whose actions are 
viewed as breaching “non-interference” against a sovereign state which has naturally decided 
to place ‘the nation’ at the heart of decision-making.50 Such ‘modern-era’ populism is 
contrasted with the Kremlin’s previously weak internal position, with Gauland stating that 
“Under predecessor Yeltsin pensioners in the countryside no longer received more pensions. 
Now it [the system] works again”.51 Overall, this story of Moscow’s transformation into a 
state pursuing “Russian interest politics” is viewed as a successful “revolt against the modern 
world”, with these decisions playing a key part in understandings of Moscow’s role on the 
international stage.52  
 
Certainly, Putin’s restoration of an ‘organic’ sovereignty is directly linked with the country’s 
embrace of a natural geopolitical position. Falling in line with a radical right fascination for 
the ‘objectivity’ of classical geopolitics, this position is said to be that of a natural power.53 
This is exemplified by the former party leader’s declaration that “Russia can be explained 
from its history, and Putin fits in well with the tradition of Russian power politics”.54 As a 
result, the inherently powerful state is subsequently said to possess legitimate interests in its 
 
49 Meuthen / Gauland: Wir gratulieren Wladimir Putin zur Wiederwahl [Meuthen / Gauland: Congratulations to 
Vladimir Putin for re-election], Alternative for Germany, 18th March 2018 - https://www.afd.de/joerg-meuthen-
wir-gratulieren-wladimir-putin-zur-wiederwahl/ [accessed 19th April 2020] 
Dr. Alexander Gauland im Gespräch mit Roger Köppel von der Weltwoche 
50 Stephan Protschka: Russlands Wahlen mit Vorverurteilungen nicht beeinflussen [Stephan Protschka: Do not 
influence Russia's elections with prejudices], Alternative for Germany, 13th March 2018 - 
https://www.afd.de/stephan-protschka-russlands-wahlen-mit-vorverurteilungen-nicht-beeinflussen/ [accessed 
30th April 2020] 
“Im Hinblick auf die bevorstehenden Wahlen in Russland muss diese Souveränität und Nichteinmischung 
ebenso gewahrt werden. Dass sich sogar Minister europäischer Länder zu Lügen hinreißen lassen, besonders 
kurz vor der Wahl, wirft ein fades Licht auf das Demokratieverständnis einiger Politiker der EU-Länder.” 
51 Dr. Alexander Gauland im Gespräch mit Roger Köppel von der Weltwoche 
“Unter Vorgänger Jelzin bekamen die Rentner auf dem Land keine Renten mehr. Jetzt funktioniert das wieder.” 
52 Ibid. 
“Er macht russische Interessenpolitik, und er hat enorm viel geleistet.” 
Julius Evola, Revolt against the modern world: Politics, Religion and Social Order in the Kali Yuga (Rochester: 
Inner Traditions, 1995) 
53 Ibid. 
Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik – Keine EU-Armee – Souveränität der Vaterländer erhalten 
Alexander Gauland: Gemeinsam Druck auf Nordkorea ausüben – Eskalation verhindern [Alexander Gauland: 
Together put pressure on North Korea - prevent escalation], Alternative for Germany, 11th August 2017 - 
https://www.afd.de/alexander-gauland-gemeinsam-druck-auf-nordkorea-ausueben-eskalation-verhindern/ 
[accessed 19th April 2020] 
Gauland: Seehofer zeigt gesunden Realismus [Gauland: Seehofer shows healthy realism], Alternative for 
Germany, 4th February 2016 - https://www.afd.de/gauland-seehofer-zeigt-gesunden-realismus/ [accessed 19th 
April 2020] 
54 Dr. Alexander Gauland im Gespräch mit Roger Köppel von der Weltwoche 
“Russland ist aus seiner Geschichte erklärbar, und da reiht sich Putin sinnvoll ein in die Tradition russischer 
Großmachtpolitik.” 
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‘sphere of influence’ akin to Haushofer’s “pan-regions” theory, with Gauland also stating that 
“Russia has always been an empire, and the old Tsarist tradition still plays a big role”.55 Party 
stories surrounding Russian involvement in events such as the Ukraine conflict, therefore, 
show a great amount of sympathy towards Kremlin actions. For example, whilst criticising 
the 2018 appointment of Heiko Maas as German foreign minister, AfD Bundestag member 
Armin-Paul Hempel stated that  
 
The new minister denounces Russia's annexation of Crimea and its ongoing 
aggression against Ukraine as unacceptable, forgetting that it was the West 
that had challenged the Russian bear by extensive NATO enlargement to 
the east.56  
 
This rhetoric is supported by Gauland’s appeals to historical ‘fact’, stating that “The Crimea 
never belonged to Ukraine, Catherine the Great, the Potemkin villages, you know that”.57 It 
could be argued, then, that the party also appears to believe in Russia’s unique “conservative 
power”, with this influence viewed as an organic reality similar to Eurasianism.58 Such 
beliefs thereby place the party firmly within the German ‘Putinversteher’ [Putin-
understander] tradition. Supported by influential figures such as former chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder, the tendency has called for an ‘understanding’ of Moscow’s actions beyond 
ideology.59 This empathy is seemingly built on these aforementioned ‘natural’ circumstances, 
with Russia subsequently understood as a “rational and predictable” actor.60  
 
55 Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen 
Dr. Alexander Gauland im Gespräch mit Roger Köppel von der Weltwoche 
“Russland ist eben immer ein Reich geblieben, und die alte zaristische Tradition spielt noch eine große Rolle.” 
56 Bei Amtseinführung verlegt SPD-Außenminister Mitte Europas ins Saarland [At the inauguration, SPD 
Foreign Minister relocated to Saarland in the middle of Europe], AfD Kompakt, 15th March 2018 - 
https://afdkompakt.de/2018/03/15/bei-amtseinfuehrung-verlegt-spd-aussenminister-mitte-europas-ins-saarland/ 
[accessed 20th April 2020] 
“Der neue Minister prangert Russlands Annexion der Krim und seine andauernde Aggression gegen die 
Ukraine als nicht hinnehmbar an und vergisst dabei, dass es der Westen war, der durch eine extensive NATO-
Osterweiterung den russischen Bären herausgefordert hatte” 
57 Dr. Alexander Gauland im Gespräch mit Roger Köppel von der Weltwoche 
“Die Krim hat nie zur Ukraine gehört, Katharina die Große, die Potemkinschen Dörfer, Sie kennen das.” 
58 Paul F. Robinson, Russia’s Emergence as an International Conservative Power, Russia in Global Affairs, 
Vol. 18, No. 1 (2020), p. 10 
59 Andrii Portnov, Germany and the disinformation politics of the Ukraine crisis, OpenDemocracy, 24th 
November 2014 - https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/germany-and-disinformation-politics-of-ukraine-
crisis/ [accessed 20th April 2020] 
60 How very understanding: Germany’s ambivalence towards Russia reflects its conflicted identity, The 
Economist, 8th May 2014 - https://www.economist.com/europe/2014/05/08/how-very-understanding [accessed 
20th April 2020] 
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Such ‘understanding’ plays a pivotal role in stories detailing the great power’s actual 
continental role. Whilst Russia is viewed as a uniquely influential anti-Western voice, the 
AfD’s material interests have resulted in an apparent reluctance to understand this position 
through a militant lens. These circumstances are namely those that led the party to imagine 
the national ‘Self’ as an arbiter, with Germany’s political moderation seemingly encouraging 
the Kremlin’s characterisation as a narrative “partner”, rather than the frontline of 
confrontation against a shared Western ‘antagonist’.61 This partnership supposedly results 
from geographic ‘destiny’, as the Kremlin is cast as an essential fixture in a diverse continent. 
As one press release stated, “Only with the involvement of Russia is it possible to have a 
stable peace order in Europe”.62 Solutions to continental conflict, therefore, are viewed as 
resulting directly from a geopolitical “balance” historically favourable to the German ‘Self’.63 
This sentiment was made particularly clear by the party’s support of Ukraine’s “Normandy 
Format”, which, in spite of a customary swipe at Berlin’s enthusiasm, was praised as a 
product of Macron’s call for a “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok”.64 On a wider scale, 
 
Pazderski: Dialog statt Militärmanöver [Pazderski: Dialogue instead of military manoeuvres], Alternative for 
Germany, 10th January 2017 - https://www.afd.de/pazderski-dialog-statt-militaermanoever/ [accessed 21st April 
2020]  
“Putins Politik war schon immer rational und berechenbar.” 
61 Zur Landtagswahl hat Sachsens CDU das Thema “Russland-Sanktionen” entdeckt [For the state election, 
Saxony's CDU has discovered the topic of "Russia sanctions"], AfD Kompakt, 18th July 2019 - 
https://afdkompakt.de/2019/07/18/zur-landtagswahl-hat-sachsens-cdu-das-thema-russland-sanktionen-entdeckt/ 
[accessed 21st April 2020] 
“Russland ist Partner und kein Feind.” 
Georg Pazderski: Gute Beziehungen zu Russland im deutschen Interesse [Georg Pazderski: Good relations with 
Russia in the German interest], Alternative for Germany, 21st September 2017 - https://www.afd.de/georg-
pazderski-gute-beziehungen-zu-russland-im-deutschen-interesse/ [accessed 21st April 2020] 
“Russland ist sowohl wirtschafts- wie auch sicherheitspolitisch als Partner von nicht zu unterschätzender 
Bedeutung.” 
Pazderski: Dialog mit Russland statt Abschreckung [Pazderski: Dialogue with Russia instead of deterrence], 
Alternative for Germany, 29th September 2016 - https://www.afd.de/pazderski-dialog-mit-russland-statt-
abschreckung/ [accessed 21st April 2020] 
“Wir brauchen Russland als Partner in der Wirtschaft und in der Sicherheit.” 
62 Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik – Keine EU-Armee – Souveränität der Vaterländer erhalten 
“Nur unter Einbeziehung Russlands ist eine stabile Friedensordnung in Europa denkbar.” 
63 “Weltpolizei” kann nur die UNO spielen [Only the UN can play “world police”], AfD Kompakt, 17th April 
2018 - https://afdkompakt.de/2018/04/17/weltpolizei-kann-nur-die-uno-spielen/ [accessed 21st April 2020] 
“Das Spiel mit dem Feuer ist sofort zu beenden und der friedliche Ausgleich zu suchen.” 
Weidel: Russland gehört genauso an den Verhandlungstisch wie der Nordatlantikpakt [Weidel: Russia is just as 
much at the negotiating table as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization], Alternative for Germany, 22nd April 
2016 - https://www.afd.de/weidel-russland-gehoert-genauso-an-den-verhandlungstisch-wie-der-
nordatlantikpakt/ [accessed 21st April 2020] 
“Ausgewogenheit ist das Zauberwort der Stunde.” 
64 Zum Gipfeltreffen Macron-Putin gibt’s aus Berlin nur “Schweigen im Walde” [For the summit Macron-Putin, 
there is only "silence in the forest" from Berlin], AfD Kompakt, 20th August 2019 - 
https://afdkompakt.de/2019/08/20/zum-gipfeltreffen-macron-putin-gibts-aus-berlin-nur-schweigen-im-walde/ 
[accessed 23rd April 2020] 
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Russia’s supposed role as an essential and powerful “partner” is also evident in stories 
concerned with Moscow’s inclusion in pan-continental organisations, with the potential 
strengthening of bodies such as the OSCE and NATO-Russia Council reducing its 
‘unnatural’ isolation from ‘Europe’.65 Interestingly, this ‘belonging’ is devoid of any 
supporting stories concerned with conservative values, with only a 2018 speech by a regional 
party representative mentioning a shared “Western Christian culture”.66 This absence reflects 
the party’s material pressures, as subjective ideology is once again influenced by German 
political norms. 
 
This desire for ‘partnership’ has further influenced AfD conceptions of its narrative future 
with Russia. These prospective links are supposedly the result of an emerging multipolar 
reality aided by Russian assertiveness, with this “problem statement” once again hinting at 
Moscow’s role as a vanguard of political diversity. Despite this seeming novelty, however, 
the party views international relations as returning to the state “as it existed from 1815 to 
1939”.67 Of course, it is no coincidence that this shift corresponds with the much-lauded 
Bismarck era, with the restoration of a multipolar system reviving a continental balance so 
essential to Berlin’s natural strategy. This convenient conclusion is made clear by group 
beliefs that Germany would merely renegotiate, rather than dismantle, the ideology driving 
NATO and the EU. For example, Gauland has voiced support for the latter’s reform into an 
“alliance of nation-states, which is the living model in Europe”.68 This shift towards an 
‘organic’ focus on sovereignty would simultaneously allow Germany to meet Putin “at eye 
level”, thereby allowing engagement with its ‘inescapable’ Eastern partner.69 Such 
cooperation would likely take the form of ‘realist’ projects such as Nord Stream II, viewed as 
 
“Dabei sprach Macron, in Anlehnung an ein Wort von Charles de Gaulles, von einem ‚Europa von Lissabon bis 
Wladiwostok“ und forderte eine ‚neue europäische Sicherheitsarchitektur’, in die Russland einbezogen werden 
müsse.” 
65 Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik – Keine EU-Armee – Souveränität der Vaterländer erhalten 
Pazderski: NATO-Russland-Rat wiederbeleben 
66 Zum Gedenktag der Russlanddeutschen 
“Russland und seine Kultur gehören zum abendländisch-christlichen Kulturkreis, es gehört zu Europa.” 
67 Dr. Alexander Gauland im Gespräch mit Roger Köppel von der Weltwoche 
“Aber durch die Beseitigung der Teilung der Welt in zwei festgefügte Machtblöcke entsteht nun, ohne dass man 
das gleichsetzen könnte, eine neue multipolare Machtordnung, wie sie von 1815 bis 1939 bestand.” 
68 Ibid. 
“Das Bündnis der Nationalstaaten ist in Europa das gelebte Modell…” 
69 Gauland: Nicht provozieren, sondern kooperieren [Gauland: Do not provoke, but cooperate], Alternative for 
Germany, 20th June 2016 - https://www.afd.de/gauland-nicht-provozieren-sondern-kooperieren/ [accessed 22nd 
April 2020] 
“Deshalb sollte man gerade jetzt auf Dialog und Kooperation mit Russland auf Augenhöhe setzen.” 
Weidel / Gauland: In Biarritz wurde die Chance zur Überwindung der Blockadepolitik gegen Russland verpasst 
“Strittige Fragen und gemeinsame Probleme können nur durch Dialog auf Augenhöhe gelöst werden.” 
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“a great opportunity to broaden German foreign policy and to deepen ties with Russia in the 
spirit of Bismarck's reinsurance policy”.70 As such, restoring the “old rules” of Prussia-
Russia, is ultimately viewed as reviving a uniquely powerful and essential continental axis, 
with desires to forge “a free trade area” between the EU and Eurasian Economic Union, 




It seems, therefore, that the AfD’s Russia narrative does give credence to a potential radical 
right ‘narrative template’ regarding Russian geopolitics. Naturally hoping to restore Germany 
to a ‘Golden Age’, the party overall follow a similar pattern to the Rassemblement National 
in constructing its ‘story’ of Moscow. This is made clear through the constant pressure 
exerted by an antagonistic Western postmodernism on the national ‘Self’, with both parties 
balancing reactionary desires with a need to maintain material power. Germany, perhaps, 
provides a more blatant example of these forces at work, with the country’s Nazi history 
encouraging the party to adopt a moderate, arbiter ‘Self’ based on Bismarck era grandeur. 
This subjective national ideal is of course described by the AfD as a wholly objective reality, 
with this organicism subsequently encouraging an interest in a classical geopolitical tradition 
fascinated by Russia. For example, the party metanarrative views Moscow as an inherent ally 
within a historic, natural Europe. This thereby produced a ‘special bilateral relationship’, 
which persisted until the recent ‘imposition’ of a ‘chaotic’ liberal universalism. As a result, a 
flattering image of Russia’s ongoing material challenge to these norms is born from such 
uncertainty, with the state viewed as an exemplary ‘modern-era’ power pursuing sovereign 
interests. Despite this, moderation has also resulted in the Kremlin’s conceptualisation as a 
constructive partner, whose participation in Europe can ultimately help restore Germany to its 
natural role as a geopolitical balancer. It appears, then, that a framework is indeed emerging 
 
70 Alexander Gauland: Ablehnung von ‘Nord Stream 2’: Grobes politisches Foul der Franzosen 
“Das Nord Stream 2-Projekt ist eine gute Gelegenheit, die deutsche Außenpolitik breiter aufzustellen und im 
Sinne der Rückversicherungspolitik Bismarcks die Verbindung zu Russland zu vertiefen.” 
71 Alexander Gauland: “We refuse to continue the federalisation of Europe” 
Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik – Keine EU-Armee – Souveränität der Vaterländer erhalten 
Wirtschaftskooperation statt politischer Konfrontation! [Economic cooperation instead of political 
confrontation!], AfD Kompakt, 28th November 2017 - 
https://afdkompakt.de/2017/11/28/wirtschaftskooperation-statt-politischer-konfrontation/ [accessed 22nd April 
2020] 
“Was wir brauchen ist eine Freihandelszone zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Eurasischen 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, eine Aufhebung der Visumspflicht und eine Zusammenarbeit gerade in den 
Zukunftstechnologien wie Nano, Biomedizin oder Künstliche Intelligenz.” 
 60 
regarding radical right narratives of Russia, with the tradition’s core illiberal tenets seemingly 
encouraging a fascination with the Putinist project. Despite this, questions must be asked 
regarding whether or not such an interest is inevitable? This may become clearer as the study 
moves eastward, where recent history may encourage material circumstances inconducive to 




Stories of militant contrasts – Jobbik’s 
understandings of Russia 
 
Certainly, Hungary’s Jobbik provides a vivid example of a radical right movement attempting 
to reconcile communist-era legacies with its Russia policy. Created in 2003 by right-wing 
students, the party’s extreme ideology appears typical of the former Soviet bloc’s nationalist 
groups.1 For example, Minkenberg has noted that the region’s relatively recent transition to 
Western liberalism has made the post-communist radical right “more reverse-oriented than its 
Western counterpart”.2 Jobbik’s ideological predecessor, the Hungarian Justice and Life 
Party, exemplifies this rhetoric, with the group advocating in the 1990s for a transition based 
on Christianity and anti-Trianon irredentism.3 This traditionalism has proven essential to 
Jobbik’s modern identity under Gábor Vona, who promoted the party as a populist, national 
alternative to the supposed failures of Europeanisation.4 As a result, the group experienced 
rapid electoral success, as Hungary experienced a perfect storm of factors in the late 2000s. 
These factors include the infamous 2006 Őszöd speech by Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, 
whose admittance of lying to the public set in motion an “illiberal revolution” dominated by a 
radicalised Viktor Orbán.5 For Jobbik, which first entered parliament in 2010 as a direct 
result of these changes, this situation left the party in a rather unique position. Ultimately 
acting as ideological “scout” for Orbán’s centre right Fidesz, the movement has been directly 
challenged by an establishment eager to appropriate nationalist rhetoric.6 Due to this, the 
 
1 Norbert Pap & Viktor Glied, Hungary’s Turn to the East: Jobbik and Islam, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 70, No. 
7 (2018), p. 1041 
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and Opposition, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2000), pp. 188-189 
3 Brigid Fowler, Nation, State, Europe and National Revival in Hungarian Party Politics: The Case of the 
Millennial Commemorations, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2004), pp. 60-61 
4 Lázár Nóra, Euroscepticism in Hungary and in Poland: A comparative analysis of Jobbik and the Law and 
Justice parties, Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, Issue 2, No. 33 (2015), pp. 215-
217 
5 Bartek Pytlas, Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Mainstream Party Competition and 
Electoral Fortune (Oxford: Routledge, 2016), p. 37 
Ivan Krastev, Eastern Europe’s Illiberal Revolution: The Long Road to Democratic Decline, Foreign Affairs, 
May/June 2018 - https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/hungary/2018-04-16/eastern-europes-illiberal-
revolution [accessed 12th July 2020] 
6 Péter Krekó & Gregor Mayer, Transforming Hungary – together? An analysis of the Fidesz-Jobbik 
relationship in Transforming the Transformation?: The East European Radical Right in the Political Process 
ed. Michael Minkenberg (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), p. 183 
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party has since moved to differentiate itself as a means of electoral survival. As party 
communications director Pal Losonczy stated, “They were draining air away from us…”.7   
 
Whilst the party has continued to court transitional “losers”, Jobbik has distanced itself from 
previous expressions of anti-Semitism and anti-Roma sentiment.8 This process only 
intensified after Jobbik became Hungary’s official opposition in 2018, with new leaders 
Tamás Sneider and Péter Jakab simultaneously attempting to forge an even more pronounced 
break with the party’s past and distinguish themselves from Fidesz.9 Such reform would 
ultimately influence Jobbik’s Russia policy, which represents this study’s most fluid 
understanding of Moscow. Traditionally, the party has maintained some of the radical right’s 
strongest connections with the country, with the Kremlin believed to have played a pivotal 
role in funding during Jobbik’s early years.10 These connections were spearheaded by former 
MEP Béla Kovács, who was charged with spying for Russian intelligence in 2017.11 Vona 
also possessed strong Russian links, with the former leader maintaining notable ties with 
Alexander Dugin.12 Despite this, the party’s aforementioned reforms have seemingly resulted 
in a contemporary rejection of the Kremlin. This ‘volte-face’, therefore, may help reveal the 
fundamental forces influencing radical right Russia narratives, with the party family 
continually balancing ideology alongside more material concerns.  
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[accessed 28th April 2020] 
8 András Kovács, The Post-Communist Extreme Right in Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and 
Discourse eds. Ruth Wodak, Majid Krosravinik & Brigitte Mral (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), p. 228 
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Shaun Walker, Does electing a leader with Jewish roots prove Jobbik has changed?, The Guardian, 12th 
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2020] 
Attila Juhász, Lóránt Győri, Péter Krekó & András Dezső, “I am Eurasian”, p. 26 
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“We are all Attila’s grandchildren!” – Magyar identity between East and West13 
 
This diversity of thought is also reflected in the various themes present within discourse 
regarding the natural Hungarian ‘Self’. For instance, Jobbik’s self-understanding firstly 
emphasises the Magyar nation’s natural unity, with the Trianon “diktat” failing to discourage 
the party’s defence of an “organic structure based on the traditions of a millennium”.14 
Simultaneously, this appeal to ‘tradition’ also leads Jobbik to embrace a story concerned with 
Hungary’s dual East-West ‘inheritance’, with any supposed incompatibilities related to this 
position viewed as a “false contradiction”.15 Certainly, foreign policy spokesman Márton 
Gyöngyösi noted in 2015 this dichotomy’s historical presence, stating, “we’ve been 
struggling with this false dilemma since our first king, St. Stephen”.16 Subsequently, the 
group appears to remedy this millennium of uncertainty through a skilful appeal to radical 
right thought, with Jobbik “carving up time” in order to transform this ‘hybrid’ identity into 
an ‘organic’ Hungarian path.17 This ‘special path’ was further discussed by Gyöngyösi in 
2018, who stated that  
 
identity should not be such an exclusive issue for a nation that should be 
equally proud of having migrated into Europe from the Asian steppe as well 
as having joined the European civilization by embracing Christianity.18  
 
This series of individual stories hints at the nation-protagonist’s wider ‘Eurasian’ identity, 
with traditional European nationalist concerns united with the esoteric tradition of Hungarian 
 
13 Turks support Székely Freedom Fight, Jobbik, 4th November 2013 - 
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Europe’s Future: At the crossroads of Eastern relations and Western fall, Jobbik, 31st July 2015 - 
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1st May 2020] 
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September 2018 - 
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16 Nobody trusts Orbán in the East, Jobbik, 1st April 2015 - 
https://www.jobbik.com/nobody_trusts_orban_in_the_east [accessed 28th April 2020] 
17 Ian Klinke, Chronopolitics: A Conceptual Matrix, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 37, No. 5 (2012), p. 
676 
18 Talking at the Krynica Economic Forum, Gyöngyösi reveals Jobbik’s vote on Sargentini Report 
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Turanism.19 Stressing Hungary’s (highly contested) Turkic connections, the belief 
conceptualises Hungary’s ‘Self’ as a geopolitical intermediary between East and West.20 This 
is exemplified by one document’s peculiar praise of Islam, with the religion sharing 
traditional values with Christianity.21 These unique ideals were summed up by Vona during a 
2013 visit to Istanbul, who declared that “This is our common mission and the universal task 
of Turanism: to build a bridge between East and West, Muslim and Christian and struggle 
together for a better world”.22  
 
Russia and Jobbik’s “sacred geometry” 
 
This intermediary role, therefore, is of great consequence to the party’s Russia relations. 
Indeed, the Kremlin ‘Other’ is carefully incorporated into Jobbik’s wider geopolitical outlook 
through the repeated use of a “Germany-Russia-Turkey triangle” narrative device.23 
Representing the “three great empires” that have most influenced the Central European 
nation’s history, the concept’s repetition hints at Hungary’s need to balance Moscow with 
other powers in order to fully express its geopolitical ‘Self’.24 As Gyöngyösi stated in 2016,  
 
For a thousand years, Hungary has been struggling in the pressing, 
embracing ring of great powers and the whirling currents of geopolitical 
interests so that the country could maintain its political, economic and 
 
19 Gábor Vona: The future of Eurasia will be based on traditions, Jobbik, 1st November 2013 - 
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20 Ibid. 
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military sovereignty. No wonder that the retention of national sovereignty is 
the most precious, the most valuable treasure for the Hungarian soul.25  
 
Due to this, the corpus characterises Russia as an unignorable and powerful neighbour 
historically bound to Magyar realities through geography, with this encirclement of powers 
bringing opportunity as well as risk. This abstract story is subject to particular 
“periodization” in the form of 17th century Transylvanian prince Gábor Bethlen’s diplomacy, 
whose balancing of the Habsburgs, Ottomans and Muscovy saw Jobbik name their 2007 
manifesto in his honour.26 A 2015 press release even directly referred to this period as a 
“Golden Age”, with this interlocutor role subsequently allowing Hungary to engage Russia as 
an equal.27 Recent historical legacies, however, force the party to discuss less fortunate 
interactions with Moscow, with this ‘triangle’ distorted as a result of “40 years of 
communism”.28 Despite this, it is interesting to note that such negative ‘counterstories’ are 
obscured from discourse, as communist “messianism” is ultimately blamed for “a complete 
lack of understanding [sic] the idea that different societies could develop along different 
courses”.29 The West is not afforded such retrospective leniency, with the party’s declaration 
that “The Trianon Pact… was devised by the same powers that are the spearheads of liberal 
democracy today”, revealing as to the radical right party’s subjective understanding of the 
“degenerate present”.30 
 
Resisting “neo-colonialism” – Jobbik and a ‘postmodern’ Europe31 
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Consequently, it appears clear as to why the corpus’ most repeated “problem statement” 
refers to the “Western, Euro-Atlantic world order”.32 Described as “the biggest problem of 
the past 25 years” by a 2015 press release, this antagonist is viewed as having deprived 
Hungary of a ‘true’ post-communist transition to a position of “sovereignty and neutrality”.33 
Indeed, the aforementioned article that discussed communism also attributes the same 
imposing, universalist tendencies to today’s “liberalism”, as the country simply “went 
straight from one dependence into another” within its geopolitical ‘triangle’.34 Subsequently, 
the nation-protagonist has again become vulnerable to ‘ideological’ organisations such as the 
German-led EU, whose geopolitical desire to build a “federal superstate” is linked by Vona to 
a diffuse postmodernity of “modern individualism, valuelessness, deviance and liberalism”.35 
This narrative “chaos” is repeatedly connected to American geopolitical interests, with 
Gyöngyösi stating during a Sputnik interview that “The US uses its biggest puppet, the EU, 
for economic and commercial goals and NATO for the military”.36 This existential story is 
directly linked to a recurrent ‘conspiracy theory’ surrounding Budapest’s true loyalties. For 
example, having discussed Hungary’s NATO integration, the party spokesman stated that  
 
All political parties involved in the replacement of the Communist political 
system, from the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) through the 
Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) to 
Fidesz, consist of carefully selected puppets, who were chosen for this 
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As a result, Jobbik views Budapest as simply a “mouthpiece” of outside interests, with the 
state’s current divorce from its organic historical ‘Self’ directly responsible for its diplomatic 
servility.38 
 
Of course, this “liminal crisis” is also understood to have affected Hungary’s ‘natural’ 
Russian neighbour. Also denied a ‘true’ transition, the country has been described as “the 
ultimate target of NATO and the US”.39 Such language hints at Jobbik’s wider belief in a 
shared narrative fate, with Gyöngyösi declaring during a visit to Donbass that  
 
When the Western colonization, or to use the politically correct 
terminology: the Euro-Atlantic integration of Central Eastern Europe was 
completed, the front moved to the east, closer to Russia.40  
 
This is confirmed by various stories detailing this mutual antagonist’s threat to Moscow. For 
example, one article states, “Ever since the end of the cold war, all they’d [Russia] been 
asking for is to have a security zone (from the aspect of Russian security), which is free of 
CIA and NATO activity”.41 This provocation is subsequently elevated to the ‘higher’ 
concerns of Anglo-American geopolitics, as the same article stated that “There is an entire 
library available about the US’s geopolitical goals from Brzezinski to Fukuyama…”.42 As 
such, the Kremlin now also finds itself at a “critical juncture”, with geopolitical isolation 
disturbing a once fruitful relationship with Budapest.43 These bilateral troubles are again 
dominated by discussions of anti-Kremlin sanctions, which are understood as a “ritual self-
sacrifice at the altar of American interests”.44 Naturally, these actions run “contrary to 
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Hungary’s national interests”, thereby strengthening the idea of a common bilateral destiny.45 
Despite this, the aforementioned language used to describe Moscow hints at a ‘messianism’ 
common in radical right thought, with this ideal impacting Jobbik’s further discussions. 
 
Russia as a “spearhead” of “resistance”46 
 
Certainly, the party’s overall understanding of Russia’s geopolitical role, at least under Vona, 
conforms to a Eurasianist metanarrative.47 This is made clear by the recurrent theme of 
Russia’s growing assertiveness, with Gyöngyösi noting that “Hungary can only expect to rise 
if there is a balance between the larger powers, so “now we should welcome Russia gaining 
ground against the West””.48 Chronologically, this ‘struggle’ is explicitly linked to Moscow’s 
increasingly ‘traditional’ domestic politics.49 For instance, one press release stated that  
 
You can’t even compare the current period with Boris Yeltsin’s era which 
was constantly praised by the West for its transition to democracy. 
Obviously because they could enforce their interests much better under a 
weak leader than now under Putin.50  
 
Naturally, this ‘redemption story’ is understood to have aligned with the national will, as the 
spokesman qualifies that, “It’s not my job to decide if Putin is a good or a bad leader for his 
nation, this is the Russian people’s job”.51 Therefore, the country is once again viewed as 
having uniquely reconciled the state with its historical ‘Self’, which has subsequently allowed 
the Kremlin to ‘reclaim’ its “great power” position.52 The corpus frequently ties these events 
to Russia’s ‘traditional’ power.53 As one 2017 article stated, “Russian geostrategic thinking 
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has essentially remained unchanged since tzar [sic] Peter the Great”.54 This logic is said to 
focus on the state’s natural “sphere of influence”, with this spatial reality gifting the state a 
uniquely powerful voice.55 
 
Subsequently, this ability to enforce traditional norms is of great interest to the radical right 
party. This can be seen throughout discussions of the Ukraine conflict, with the group 
viewing Russia’s actions as a struggle for the ‘national interest’ against “postmodern 
geopolitics”.56 Of course, these values are understood through a Hungarian lens, as Jobbik 
views Moscow as “having successfully protected its minorities” in line with its anti-Trianon 
beliefs.57 On a more esoteric level, however, it is important to note that the movement 
rhetorically ties these actions to concerns of ‘objective’ geography. For example, further 
discussions of Ukraine also led Jobbik to declare that “Europe is not complete without Russia 
while Russia as a European power cannot turn away from Europe”.58 Moscow’s position as 
an unavoidable continental fixture thereby leads to direct acknowledgement of its wider 
Eurasianist ‘mission’, with the country described as “the only one [in Europe] that has the 
necessary economic, military and political authority. Therefore it is Russia’s historical duty 
to set Europe back on the track of traditions”.59 Subsequently, this fight for the “diversity of 
civilizations” against Western universalism is viewed as conducive to Hungary’s Bethlen-era 
‘Self’.60 Vona made this sentiment particularly clear during his aforementioned Istanbul 
speech, placing Russia on the frontline of a traditionalist struggle that will restore Hungary’s 
historical ‘triangle’ and with it, its organic intermediary position, “The two great powers of 
Eurasia, Russia and Turkey, and my own homeland, Hungary... These nations are destined to 
present the Eurasian alternative”.61 
 
Why does Orbán keep voting for anti-Russia sanctions? 
54 Ibid. 
55 Nobody trusts Orbán in the East 
56 Ibid. 
Index: Gyöngyösi: Crimea means a chance for Hungarians as well 
Why does Orbán keep voting for anti-Russia sanctions? 
Ian Klinke, Postmodern Geopolitics?, pp. 929-930 
57 Index: Gyöngyösi: Crimea means a chance for Hungarians as well 
58 Europe’s Future: At the crossroads of Eastern relations and western fall 
59 Ibid. 
60 Paul F. Robinson, Russia’s Emergence as an International Conservative Power, Russia in Global Affairs, 
Vol. 18, No. 1 (2020), pp. 22-23 
Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1st 
December 2016, Section 2, Articles 4-5 - https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248 [accessed 8th May 2020] 




A turn towards the Atlantic? – Jobbik’s new anti-Russia discourse 
 
Geopolitical messianism, aside, it is also important to discuss Jobbik’s aforementioned 
rejection of these beliefs. This development is directly connected to the group’s electoral 
competition with Fidesz, with the party’s myriad of anti-establishment ‘stories’ conforming 
to a common “chain of problems” shared with this study’s other parties.62 This scepticism of 
a government-enforced status quo is naturally supported by academic literature, with Givens 
arguing that “Although they do not have the goal of tearing down the current political system, 
they are anti-establishment. They consider themselves "outsiders" in the party system, and 
therefore not tainted by government or mainstream parties' scandals”.63 What makes Jobbik’s 
position particularly interesting, however, is the illiberal nature of its government, which now 
competes with the group to represent ‘the nation’. Naturally, this has affected the party’s pro-
Russia metanarrative, with Budapest’s embrace of a similar outlook now transforming stories 
of ‘Eurasianist liberation’ into an electoral liability. This thinking is exemplified by the 
change in tone of this investigation’s corpus from 2018, with anti-Russia arguments that were 
initially considered ‘counterstories’ now so numerous as to supersede the party’s previous 
line of thought altogether. As a result, Jobbik appears to have overturned its overarching 
Moscow narrative, as the state now inhabits the position of ‘postmodern geopolitical villain’. 
This is made clear by Jobbik’s sudden acknowledgement of Russia’s Soviet era, which now 
plays a key part in a new “periodization” of Hungarian history.64 Described as a “looming 
Soviet threat” akin to that faced by Western Europe during the Schuman Declaration, 
Moscow is now increasingly ‘Othered’ through a narrative now more aligned with Euro-
Atlanticism.65 This antagonist is also viewed as a key supporter of Budapest’s “mafia 
network”, with the radical right party’s ideological norms still channelled through the 
traditional binaries of geopolitics.66 
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Naturally, this ‘volte-face’ has originated in a need to reassess the narrative ‘Self’ in relation 
to changing realities. This is exemplified by Jobbik’s adherence to a 2019 manifesto issued 
by the Hungarian opposition, which was agreed under the reform-minded leadership of 
Tamás Sneider.67 For example, the statement’s fourth section reads,  
 
Hungary historically belongs to the community of European nations. We 
stand united to resist any agenda which, contrary to our national interests, 
would lead Hungary out of the European Union and make it a part of 
Russia’s sphere of influence. We will defend our homeland!68  
 
This explicitly more European ‘Self’ is further supported by a number of stories which 
appropriate popular narratives surrounding the 1956 Revolution. Describing themselves as a 
“resistance movement” against Fidesz’s “Bolshevik government”, Jobbik now appears to 
characterise Russia as an unchanged, intrusive force still eager to manipulate Hungary.69 This 
new “liminal crisis” is made particularly clear during discussions of Austria’s 2019 Ibiza 
affair. Involving former Vice Chancellor and Freedom Party chairman Heinz-Christian 
Strache’s willingness to secretly engage with Russian business interests, the scandal was 
viewed by the party as merely showcasing an “ongoing practice in Hungary”.70 Jobbik MP 
Tibor Bana even described the country as now subject to “Russian colonization”, with 
Hungary’s triangular “balance” now distorted from the East.71 Indeed, Gyöngyösi even tied 
this issue to a wider story concerned with threats such as “Muslim fundamentalism”, thereby 
highlighting the danger that this resurgent Russian power poses to the party’s new ‘Self’.72 
Jobbik’s increasing “pro-NATO” sentiment and desires to “strengthen Europe” (despite 
reservations regarding federalism), therefore, provides a key insight into the mechanisms of 
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radical right political manoeuvring and its effect on geopolitical narrative.73 Possessing a 
fundamental distaste for establishment thinking, the party’s renegotiation of the ‘Self’ has 




It seems, then, that rather than simply provide another example of Russia’s illiberal 
credentials, Jobbik’s narratives allow for a much more theoretical understanding of these 
beliefs and their production. This takes the form of two distinct geopolitical ‘metanarratives’, 
which, despite their divergent outcomes, are ultimately the product of the same ‘Self’ and 
‘Other’ relationship peculiar to Europe’s radical right. The first of these outlooks is that 
forged under Vona’s radical leadership. Stressing the importance of an intermediary position 
for Hungary’s natural circumstances, the overarching story sees Budapest continually attempt 
to assert its sovereignty by balancing a triangular relationship with outside powers. Naturally, 
Russia is viewed as one of these influences, with Jobbik manipulating time in order to stress 
the mutually beneficial relationship forged under Bethlen’s diplomacy.74 Despite the rather 
precise nature of this ‘Golden Age’, such stories seem to be emphasised due to ongoing 
problems with Western universalism. This results in the deliberate side-lining of inevitable 
‘counterstories’ related to Moscow’s communist era, with ‘objective’ Eurasianist ideals 
helping to bridge this theoretical gap. Despite this previous belief that Russia’s natural power 
may help restore order in Europe and with it the true Magyar ‘Self’, government policy and 
historical legacies have seemingly made the concealment of these ‘counterstories’ intolerable. 
In keeping with this study’s subjective presuppositions, this reimagination of the ‘Self’ and 
its relationships only highlights the political tradition’s tendency to reimagine ‘the nation’ in 
relation to electoral needs. This logic is all the more important as the study concludes its 
discussions with Golden Dawn, whose extremism appears to have been encouraged by the 
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Returning to ‘Orthodox geopolitics’? - Golden 
Dawn’s visions of the Kremlin 
 
Certainly, Greece’s Golden Dawn is perhaps the most controversial party discussed in this 
investigation. The vision of life-long leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos, the group ultimately 
emerged as a result of the radical nationalist’s imprisonment on weapons charges in the late 
1970s.1 This time saw Michaloliakos forge close ties with members of Greece’s former 
military junta, whose shared extremism would leave an indelible mark on party ideology.2 
Indeed, Golden Dawn’s official creation in 1993, following a decade of existence as a 
magazine, would be marked by an open adherence to neo-Nazism.3 This abrasive approach 
quickly evolved into often violent street activities, thereby securing the group a fearsome 
reputation within Greece’s radical fringe.4 Despite this, the 2000s would see the party shift to 
a “popular nationalism” in line with radical right norms.5 This strategy was implemented on 
the eve of Europe’s financial downturn, with the recession’s catastrophic effects on Hellenic 
society allowing the party to enter parliament in 2012.6 Greece’s frontline position during the 
2015 migrant crisis would only exacerbate this uncertainty so beneficial to the group, which 
claimed third place in elections the same year.7 This success appeared emblematic of a 
movement that had come to terms with its extremist past, with a membership including 
professors, lawyers and even a former NATO commander helping Golden Dawn to promote 
itself as the ‘responsible’ face of a ‘betrayed’ nation.8 
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This moderate mask, however, would slip following the 2013 murder of left-wing musician 
Pavlos Fyssas by party members. Whilst there were no immediate repercussions, revelations 
detailing the group’s involvement during an ongoing trial would severely impact party 
popularity. This has resulted in the group now only maintaining representation in the 
European Parliament, with the “biggest trial of fascist criminality since Nuremberg” 
threatening Golden Dawn with a return to the political wilderness.9 Nevertheless, the group’s 
long lasting position at the forefront of radical right trends is difficult to ignore. This is 
particularly true regarding its Russian connections, as the party was one of the first to 
spearhead relations during the 1990s. This is exemplified by Michaloliakos’ 1996 visit to 
Moscow, where he met various nationalist figures such as Vladimir Zhironovsky.10 Such 
meetings helped to set the foundations for the party’s strong Russian network today, as 
Michaloliakos maintains regular correspondence with Dugin.11 Simultaneously, the Kremlin 
has also allegedly provided Golden Dawn with extensive funding.12 This has possibly 
resulted in the party carrying out unprecedented actions in support of Moscow. For example, 
evidence suggests that Golden Dawn may have played a role in Russian diplomats’ alleged 
attempts to disrupt Athens’ ‘naming dispute’ talks with Skopje in 2018.13 These decisive 
negotiations have subsequently led to Northern Macedonia’s NATO accession, thereby 
potentially placing the party at the centre of European geopolitics.  
 
Hellenic grandeur - A ‘mosaic’ of identities 
 
This predisposition to geopolitics is also evident with regard to the movement’s 
understanding of the organic Greek ‘Self’. Perhaps this study’s most vocal disciple of 
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classical geopolitics due to its extremism, Golden Dawn repeatedly characterises the nation-
protagonist as a ‘thalassocracy’. Stating in 2017 that “our country is a par excellence a 
maritime country with an extended coastline”, the party leader’s stories appear to appropriate 
land-sea dichotomies promoted within the tradition.14 This theoretical interest is further 
evident in Michaloliakos’ support for Haushofer’s belief that “the existence of a state is 
determined by three indispensable traits: a) the territory b) the people c) the sovereignty”.15 In 
line with national traditions, this logic directly leads the party to view a sovereign ‘Self’ as 
only possible through the unification of the Eastern Mediterranean’s Hellenic communities. 
These groups are defined by a shared adherence to Orthodoxy, which is deemed so important 
by Golden Dawn that one article proclaimed that “the state was founded on this religion”.16 
Spatial desires to unite an “entire Hellenism” are made evident throughout the corpus, with 
memorials to Anatolia’s Greek communities mirroring contemporary concerns regarding the 
Cyprus dispute.17 This geographic and ethnic unity is said to have brought about various 
historical ‘Golden Ages’. For instance, Michaloliakos declared in 2017 that “The Byzantine 
Empire was also a superpower for almost [sic] thousand years”, with the party also 
supporting the irredentist ‘Megali Idea’ [“Great Idea”] to restore this grandeur during the late 
19th and early 20th centuries.18 Such ideals were ultimately embraced once again under the 
inter-war dictator Iaonnis Metaxas, whose rule is viewed as the last time “the will of the 
Greek People” was truly represented within the state.19 This narrative hero’s actions, 
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therefore, are understood to have returned the ‘Self’ to its traditional path of geopolitical 
power, with Michaloliakos stating bluntly that “Greece will be either great and dominant or 
no Greece at all”.20   
 
Dreams of Byzantium - Russia and the ‘Greek Plan’ 
 
Such an interesting mix of ‘objective’ geopolitics and national tradition is of great 
consequence to Golden Dawn’s historical understanding of Russia. This is exemplified by the 
party’s rhetorical “periodization” of relations “since Catherine the Great”, whose neo-
Byzantine ambitions present the framework for a past dominated by ‘unchanging’ 
characteristics.21 For example, many party stories stress that relations have occurred in line 
with a “common cultural background” of Orthodoxy.22 This consequently casts Russia as a 
“natural ally”, whose support was essential to the birth of the modern-era Greek nation-
state.23 Direct quotation of figures from the country’s 19th century independence struggle 
makes this especially clear, with Michaloliakos referring to the “invocations of Papaflessas 
and Ypsilanti that the Russian Tsar supported the Revolution”.24 Chronologically, this 
support is viewed as the product of inevitable geopolitical struggle, with Trikoupis stating 
that  
 
Ever since the beginning of the fight, England was afraid [sic] the armed 
intervention of the Russian court in the Greco-Turkish war… They were 
afraid of the tendency of Russia to fight against Turks in favor of the 
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tortured coreligionists. They were afraid of the interruption of the 
conferences about the Greco-Turkish issue.25  
 
Certainly, this criticism of London originates in the ‘common misconception’ that “Greece 
ought to always be an ally with the great naval force that dominates in Mediterranean”.26 In 
comparison, Russia is understood as a complementary “central empire”, whose “conflict with 
Turkey for over 300 years” is driven by land-sea concerns.27 Of course, such ‘objective’ fact 
is beneficial for the thalassocrat nation-protagonist, whose desire to be the “dominant power 
in the Strait of Bosporus” is seen as “good not only for Greece but also for Russia”.28 
Interestingly, this series of “problem statements” related to this struggle for an ‘organic’ land-
sea alliance obscures any ‘counterstories’ regarding Moscow’s Soviet past, as Michaloliakos 
stated that “now things are different”.29 As such, this ‘objective’ history is once again the 
product of subjective renegotiation today, with Greece’s current circumstances seemingly 
encouraging beliefs in a “Russia that has never harmed our Homeland”.30 
 
Golden Dawn, Russia and a postmodern Greek tragedy 
 
Golden Dawn’s nostalgia for a modern era ‘defined’ by Russian cooperation seems to be the 
result of an inherent distaste for the political present. Aside from various circular ‘nonstories’ 
condemning today’s liberalism, such unease is made clear by the corpus’ preponderance of 
Euro-Atlantic ‘villains’, whose “imperialistic” tendencies have restricted Greece’s natural 
‘Self’ within a normative ‘Europe’.31 These antagonists bear a striking resemblance to those 
of the narrative past, thereby characterising Athens as the victim of an ongoing ‘conspiracy’. 
This is exemplified by the continuing presence of a hostile thalassocracy. For example, a 
 
25 1821 and the Greeks of 2017- Article of N. G. Michaloliakos, Golden Dawn, 27th March 2017 - 
http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/view/1821-and-the-greeks-of-2017-article-of-n.-g.-michaloliakos [accessed 18th 
May 2020] 
26 Greece and Geopolitics: A “strategic” perception of submission – Article of N. G. Michaloliakos 
27 Ibid. 
N. G. Michaloliakos’ interview on the Russian Network “Russia Athens” about the deep roots of the 
relationship between Greece and Russia – VIDEO 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 N.G. Michaloliakos: Attila 1974-Never forget! NO to the submission of SYRIZA and ND to USA, Golden 
Dawn, 20th July 2018 - http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/view/n.g.-michaloliakos-attila-1974-never-forget-no-to-
the-submission-of-syriza [accessed 18th May 2020]  
31 N. G. Michaloliakos at “Parapolitika”: A Nationalistic wind changes Europe, Golden Dawn, 8th December 
2016 - http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/view/n.-g.-michaloliakos-at-parapolitika-a-nationalistic-wind-changes-
europe [accessed 20th May 2020] 
 78 
2014 publication noted the existence of a “dominant force, which once in the time of the 
national revolution of 1821 was England and today lieu in it is USA”.32 This Anglo-
American connection reveals the policies currently believed to restrict the ‘Self’, with 
Europe’s “current geopolitical “game”” following the theories of Mackinder and Spykman.33 
Due to this, the German-led European Union is said to act in “servitude” to these strategies 
by enforcing Western universal norms.34 As the party stated in response to Brexit, the EU 
operates as  
 
An oligarchy, who devastates the peoples through an austerity policy, who 
has shattered our national independence, who promotes the illegal 
immigration, imposes quotas even to the agricultural production and does 
not allow the establishment of lasting ties with the fellow-believer Russia.35  
 
At a more local level, this ‘postmodern uncertainty’ is blamed on Athens’ “para-state”, which 
has weakened the country by ‘ignoring’ essential fixtures such as Orthodoxy.36 
Simultaneously, this disregard for tradition has only encouraged the “neo-Ottoman” 
ambitions of ““sultan” Erdogan”, with Turkish interests once again ‘accepted’ by Western 
diplomacy.37 This is most clear regarding the ongoing “conquest” of Cyprus’ EEZ by Turkish 
interests.38 Both literally and metaphorically, therefore, it appears that a ‘counterstory’ 
promoting a “small and honest Greece” has now been forced on the nation-protagonist, with 
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Golden Dawn determined to ‘correct’ this status-quo “radically opposed to the laws of 
geopolitics”.39 
 
As aforementioned, these dire circumstances currently facing the Greek ‘Self’ are of direct 
consequence to its ‘organic’ relationship with Moscow. Now seemingly contending with 
diplomatic isolation, the Kremlin is also understood to be a victim of the Euro-Atlantic 
‘Other’ and its “black-white” geopolitical dichotomies.40 This is made vividly clear 
throughout stories connected to the Ukraine conflict. Understood as a Western geopolitical 
plot to “punish Russia”, the war is viewed as a direct threat to norms of “global peace”.41 
Indeed, the narrative villain is seen as especially willing to “give weapons to government 
forces to keep on fighting”, with such actions ultimately disturbing ‘objective’ continental 
circumstances conducive to the Greek ‘Self’ and Russia’s alliance.42 Of course, it ought to be 
remembered that the relationship’s current state is ultimately viewed through a subjective 
Hellenic lens. This is exemplified by the party’s focus on the effects of ongoing anti-Russian 
sanctions on Greek society. Said to be “devastating not only our domestic economy, but also 
our fine diplomatic relations”, the economic embargo is characterised as an artificial division 
directly harming the nation-protagonist.43 This is evident from Golden Dawn’s romantic 
appeal to subsequently “support the Greek farmer”, with Russia essential to the nation’s 
everyday prosperity.44 This theme of national well-being is taken to extremes within the 
corpus through discussions of Islamist terrorism “which threatens the whole of Europe”.45 
Both states are viewed as victims of this problem, with the party stating after the 2017 St. 
Petersburg attacks that “all the civilized nations should unite and fight in common for the 
elimination of Islamic terrorism”.46 This metaphysical ‘chaos’ now plaguing the Greek ‘Self’ 
 
39 Greece and Geopolitics – Article of N. G. Michaloliakos 
40 Turkey buys oil platform for the Cyprus’ EEZ! 
41 General Epitidios: “The European Union destroyed Ukraine in order to punish Russia”, Golden Dawn, 17th 
February 2015 - http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/view/general-epitidios-the-european-union-destroyed-ukraine-
in-order-to-punish-r [accessed 22nd May 2020] 
42 Ibid. 
43 Greek-Russian Alliance: Visitation of N. G. Michaloliakos at the Russian stand during the 81st TIF- 
Photography, Golden Dawn, 17th September 2016 - http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/view/greek-russian-alliance-
visitation-of-n.-g.-michaloliakos-at-the-russian-sta [accessed 22nd May 2020] 
44 Interview of N. G. Michaloliakos at TΙF: Greek Nationalists resist to Memoranda and to the illegal 
immigration-VIDEO, Golden Dawn, 17th September 2016 - http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/view/interview-of-n.-
g.-michaloliakos-at-deth-greek-nationalists-resist-to-memor [accessed 24th May 2020] 
45 Golden Dawn in the Russian Embassy to honor the memory of the Ambassador Andrey Karlof - Photos – 
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46 Condolences from N. G. Michaloliakos to the Russian Nation, Golden Dawn, 4th April 2017 - 
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is subsequently correlated with Russia’s geopolitical absence, thereby hinting at Moscow’s 
essential position within this subjective narrative. 
 
An alliance built on fertile soil? 
 
Overall, it appears that Golden Dawn also envisions Moscow as a ‘spatiotemporal’ force 
capable of restoring an ambiguous “old order” so desired by Europe’s radical right.47 
Continuing its rise as a key global player, Russia appears to have encouraged the party to 
subjectively renegotiate its narrative in line with these advantageous developments. This is 
justified through stories that describe the state as acting uniquely in accordance with its true 
‘Self’. For instance, whilst the party offers little discussion of the Kremlin’s own domestic 
revolution under Putin, the movement views the country as having embraced its natural 
“great power” role.48 This is best seen through Michaloliakos’ 2014 messianic declaration 
that in relation to the West it is “the only superpower that can obstruct its hegemony”.49 As a 
result of this dichotomy, it appears that the country is essentially understood to be a harbinger 
of various realist values that are simultaneously integral to the illiberal Greek ‘Self’. This is 
made clear during Golden Dawn’s aforementioned discussions of Ukraine, with former party 
MEP Georgios Epitidios’ statement that “Ukraine is a vital space for Russia’s defence”, 
essentially characterising Russian actions as a defence of ‘organic’ state interests.50 
Simultaneously, Moscow’s embrace of its ‘national circumstances’ is also seen as responsible 
for its defence of Syrian sovereignty, as “close bonds with Russia” guarantee protection from 
Western ‘aggression’.51 In contrast, Greece is viewed as currently lacking “such bonds”, with 




47 Aristotle Kallis, A Thin Red Line?: Far Right and Mainstream in Relational Perspective in The European Far 
Right: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives ed. Giorgos Charalambous (Nicosia: Friedrich Ebert Shiftung, 
2015), p. 10 
48 N. G. Michaloliakos’ interview on the Russian Network “Russia Athens” about the deep roots of the 
relationship between Greece and Russia – VIDEO 
49 Turkey buys oil platform for the Cyprus’ EEZ! 
50 General Epitidios: “The European Union destroyed Ukraine in order to punish Russia” 
51 Greece-Syria The international suzerains are the common enemies, Golden Dawn, 17th May 2016 - 
http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/view/greece-syria-the-international-suzerains-are-the-common-enemies 
[accessed 24th May 2020] 
52 Ibid. 
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For the party, this transformative power appears especially true due to the Kremlin’s 
inescapable ties with a traditional ‘Europe’. This connection is the result of Golden Dawn’s 
aforementioned engagement with Anglo-American geopolitics, with the group’s direct use of 
the tradition’s terminology revealing the origins of Moscow’s ‘objective’ conservatism. This 
is ultimately linked to various stories that allude to Russia’s position as a “land power” or 
‘tellurocracy’.53 Such a description bears an intentional resemblance to the neo-Eurasianist 
ideals of Dugin, with the political lives of these polities characterised by “fixed space, 
leading to stable social norms and traditions that manifest themselves in authoritarian, 
hierarchical system with an opposition to trade”.54 At the same time, however, this inherent 
traditionalism is seen as especially unique by the party. For example, a 2016 Golden Dawn 
meeting appeared to hint at Moscow’s position as “the crucial geopolitical region of 
Heartland, a fact that makes this region attractive to the imperialists and in parallel makes this 
region a land of atrocities”.55 Of course, these “imperialists” are later identified as a mutual 
Euro-Atlantic antagonist, thereby characterising the Kremlin as naturally mired in conflict 
with Western liberalism.56 It appears, therefore, that Russia is understood by the party to 
essentially operate as a redoubt of tradition, with its natural presence in Europe making it 
especially relevant for a traditional Hellenic ‘Self’. 
 
This link is made even more clear by the party’s constant allusions to the thoroughly 
‘Christian’ nature of Russia and its foreign policy outlook. Described in multiple stories as a 
“fellow believer”, the country appears to thoroughly embody the ideals of “Greco-Roman 
civilization and Christianity, the foundations of our Europe!”57 These beliefs appear to have 
fundamentally influenced Moscow’s geopolitical decisions, particularly in relation to Syria 
and its Christian minorities. Indeed, discussions following the election of Donald Trump 
 
53 Sofia Tipaldou, The Dawning of Europe and Eurasia?, p. 203 
Greece and Geopolitics: A “strategic” perception of submission – Article of N. G. Michaloliakos 
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54 Kirill Kalinin, Neo-Eurasianism and the Russian elite: the irrelevance of Aleksandr Dugin’s geopolitics, Post-
Soviet Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 5-6 (2019), p. 462 
55 With high attendance the “Four overviews on geopolitics” by the Institution A.I.G.I.S.-Photography 
56 Ibid. 
57 “The City has fallen”: The Greek nationalists honored the Memory of the last defenders of Constantinople, 
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honored-the-memory-of-the-last-d [accessed 26th May 2020] 
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characterised the upstart American president as directly following in Putin’s ideological 
footsteps, with an associated article stating that “Trump and Putin unshakably believe in the 
freedom of religions and the need for respect of the national and religious minorities”.58 Such 
an understanding once again characterises the Kremlin as a Eurasianist defender of the 
“Cultural and civilizational diversity of the world”, thereby inherently promoting the validity 
of Golden Dawn’s conservative ‘Self’.59 For Greece, however, this relationship is viewed as 
particularly important due to Russia’s continued embrace of a more specific ‘Orthodox’ 
tradition. Often paired to Athens through phrases such as “the two Orthodox people”, the 
country’s description is strikingly similar to Huntington’s theory that Russia is the “core 
state” of a uniquely Orthodox civilization.60 This therefore allows Moscow to offer a 
specifically enticing alternative narrative to the continent’s current liberalism. As 
Michaloliakos stated, “Notably for us, Greeks, a Europe with Russia would be crucial, 
because we could have by our side hundred millions of Orthodox”.61 
 
These understandings subsequently impact the party’s envisioned narrative future. Overall, 
this brief cluster of stories is united by assumptions surrounding an emerging international 
system, dominated by “multipolar” realities.62 Naturally, Russia’s aforementioned actions are 
seen as playing a key role in this system’s growth, with the country often grouped together 
with ‘alternative’ powers, such as China.63 As a result, Golden Dawn believes that the 
rhetorical and material freedom afforded by such changes would allow Greece to perform a 
 
58 The importance of the Trump-Putin contact for Turkey, Syria and Middle Asia, Golden Dawn, 25th January 
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“geostrategic shift” back to its “natural ally”.64 This would subsequently encourage 
conditions conducive to the natural ‘Self’, as a thalassocrat Athens could offer Russia an 
“outlet to the sea” in return for protection against a mutual Turkish antagonist.65 Certainly, 
much of the party’s future hopes focus on Russia’s military, with one article excitedly 
discussing  
 
joint aeronautical exercises in the south Aegean sea for Greek and Russian 
armed forces, and transnational contacts for permanent installation of the 
Russian fleet in the Aegean bases of Syros or Poros.66  
 
These developments ultimately strengthen beliefs that  
 
A Greek-Russian alliance will offer enormous geostrategic advantages for 
both of our countries. It will provide the opportunity for Greece to declare 
the Greek EEZ, to exploit our rich energy resources to the benefit of the 
Greek people in order to make Greece a force to be reckoned in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.67  
 
This sovereign cooperation contrasts with ‘spurious’ ‘counterstories’ claiming that the party 
would “sell their Homeland for “mother Russia””, with Russian relations fundamentally 
viewed as ‘organic’.68 As such, it seems that Moscow’s ongoing rise is directly connected to 
Golden Dawn’s long-held desire “For a Great Greece in a Free Europe”, the headline of its 
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In conclusion, therefore, it appears that the group’s overarching story has simultaneously 
strengthened the potential existence of a positive narrative template, whilst also providing 
more information as to this shared outlook’s theoretical underpinnings. Seemingly this 
study’s most militant party, Golden Dawn appears eager to openly engage with classical 
geopolitics’ more esoteric vocabulary. Of course, this is complemented by a common radical 
right interest in defending ‘national tradition’, with Russia allowing the party to weave both 
pursuits together. Certainly, party stories offer an elaborate discussion of Russian links, 
casting both Orthodox nations as historically engaged in a natural alliance of land and sea 
power. For a traditionally grand and thalassocrat Greek ‘Self’, however, such links are left 
strained by the spatiotemporal confusion enforced by a now almost predictable Euro-Atlantic 
‘Other’. Subsequently, the state is forced to endure a ‘post-sovereign’ political present under 
an alien Western universalism, thereby making it vulnerable to an ‘eternal’ Turkish enemy. 
This results in perhaps the most messianic understanding of Russia within this investigation, 
with the state embodying a mystical "Orthodox collectivist East", directly linked to neo-
Eurasianist theory.70 Of course, it ought to be remembered that such extremist tendencies 
were ultimately responsible for the party’s aforementioned downfall. Questions may be 
asked, therefore, as to the relevance of such ideas today. Nevertheless, whilst the party may 
have fallen foul of radical right needs to maintain a moderate image, Golden Dawn’s 
narrative is revealing of ongoing nationalist thought in Greece and Europe. This is 
exemplified by Kyriakos Velopoulos’ new ‘Greek Solution’ party, which is rumoured to 
possess close Kremlin ties. Stating that “we go logically towards Christian Russia…”, the 
fledgling group appears to be directly influenced by Golden Dawn’s pioneering history 
within radical thought.71 
 
 
70 Alexander Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii [The Foundations of Geopolitics: 
The Geopolitical Future of Russia] (Moscow: Arctogaia, 1997), p. 389 




Comparison and Reflection 
 
Having examined the four parties’ individual Russia narratives, it is now useful to reflect on 
what such analysis may reveal regarding the European radical right’s overall understanding 
of Moscow. Of course, whilst the groups have shown great diversity in line with this study’s 
expectations, it is also clear that their patterns of behaviour are ultimately bound by 
Wertsch’s “schematic narrative template”.1 Stressing universal desires to restore a lost 
national grandeur akin to the Nouvelle Droite philosophical tradition, the four movements’ 
fundamental narratives appear to traverse the “specific” national circumstances so lauded by 
their literatures.2 This abstract ‘template’ thereby places a common radical right ‘nation-
protagonist’ in an inherently “crisis-driven present”, with the subjective understandings of 
this chaotic, postmodern existence influencing the contours of a modern-era ‘Golden Age’ 
and a potential future ‘return’ to this reality.3 On an international scale, this ‘struggle’ occurs 
within an Anglo-American geopolitical dichotomy, with Russia’s position as a narrative 
‘hero’ or ‘villain’ decided according to the subjective, contemporary needs of the party. 
Certainly, Jobbik’s decisive turn against Moscow has showcased the crucial fact that the 
European radical right does not always look favourably upon a resurgent Russia. Whether 
positive or negative, however, it is important to note that these outlooks are invariably 
presented as ‘objective fact’, leaving little room for nuance.4 This rather ironic situation in 
which supposedly ‘unchangeable’ realities are manipulated for subjective gain is reflected in 
the actions of geopolitics’ very founders. For example, Ó Tuathail has noted the bias present 
in Mackinder’s own method during his ventures in Kenya, stating that “Mackinder’s science 
was neutral yet absolutely superior, objective yet thoroughly personalized”.5 As a result, 
whilst further research will be needed in order to strengthen its validity, it does appear that a 
‘mechanism’ exists by which a radical right ‘Self’ understands the resurgent Russian ‘Other’. 
This framework has been exposed by the fundamental fixtures of radical right narrative, with 
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3 Hakkı Taş, The chronopolitics of national populism, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power (2020), p. 
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(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), p. 300 
5 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 
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overarching realities regarding Moscow ultimately viewed through the lens of national 
peculiarities. 
 
Between myth and reality – Constructing radical right ‘truth’ 
 
In practical terms, this ‘mechanism’ begins with the acknowledgement that European radical 
right parties desire to achieve two interconnected aims. These goals are both related to the 
tradition’s inheritance from its neo-fascist predecessors, with the groups showcasing both 
continuity and novelty in relation to established theory.6 For example, radical right outlooks 
still desire to “save the nations” by enforcing ‘objective’ nationalist values within state 
structures, with differences only appearing once the details of this goal are placed under 
scrutiny.7 Indeed, whilst the extra parliamentary far-right have maintained revolutionary 
tendencies, the radical right’s reactionary nature has seen parties focus on ‘restoring’ a 
historical “Golden Age”.8 Such a comparative lack of militancy hints at a crucial factor that 
has influenced the subjectivity of the radical right ‘Self’. This is namely the tradition’s 
frustration with fringe politics and its subsequent desire to restore this grandeur by operating 
as a “democratic” force.9 Such willingness to amass power in line with Western liberal 
practices, which remain the reality for the majority of Europe’s population, thereby places the 
‘objective Self’ de facto under the stresses and strains of societal influence. This desire for 
electoral approval is made clear by the radical right’s embrace of a thoroughly nationalist 
form of ‘populism’, with the four groups eager to champion ““the pure people” versus “the 
corrupt elite””.10 Due to this, the exact nature of this nationalist ‘Self’ appears to be 
fundamentally influenced by material concerns of power, with this study documenting two 
key practices that have affected this self-understanding. 
 
6 Matt Golder, Far Right Parties in Europe, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 19 (2016), p. 481 
7 Ibid. 
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leurope/ [accessed 12th June 2020] 
8 Jean-Yves Camus & Nicolas Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2017), p. 22 
Nobody trusts Orbán in the East, Jobbik, 1st April 2015 - 
https://www.jobbik.com/nobody_trusts_orban_in_the_east [accessed 12th June 2020] 
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No. 2 (1996), pp. 230-231 
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Refining ‘the struggle’ for the national audience 
 
Firstly, perhaps the most obvious influence on these radical right identities is the direct 
rejection of ‘status-quo’ ideals. Often taking the form of government policy, these beliefs are 
almost invariably viewed as responsible for a ‘uncertain’ present wholly incompatible with 
the nation-protagonist’s ‘natural’ circumstances.11 As aforementioned, a distaste for the 
contemporary appears to be inherent to this political tradition, with the certainties of a 
historical ‘Golden Age’ contrasting with today’s “paranoid mindset”.12 This is exemplified 
by the parties’ various stories that condemn the status-quo supported in their capitals, with 
the groups using phrases such as “para-state” and “megalomania” to describe authorities and 
their ‘treacherous’ behaviour.13 Such ‘betrayal’ often takes the form of an adherence to the 
‘postmodernity’ of Western liberal values, with this universalism threatening national 
distinctiveness according to modern-era norms.14 In spite of this, Jobbik’s newfound 
scepticism of Russia once again challenges this one-dimensional understanding, with 
Moscow’s supposed activities in Hungary now viewed by the party as a “colonization”.15 As 
such, it could be argued that rather than instinctively opposing outside ideology of a certain 
origin, the radical right in practice dislikes the very concept of foreign influence, which 
naturally implies a ‘post-sovereign’ distortion of the nation-state. This is made clear by 
similar stories detailing government “servitude” regardless of the supposed ‘master’, as these 
actions naturally contrast with the independent ‘Self’.16 This subsequently encourages an 
inverse correlation in relation to the party’s identity creation, with government actions 
narrowing the resources available to radical right parties in their search to construct a ‘Self’ 
that is simultaneously nationalist and popular. 
 
11 Terry Givens, Voting Radical Right in Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 20 
12 Hakkı Taş, The chronopolitics of national populism, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power (2020), 
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Dawn, 21st December 2016 - http://www.xryshaygh.com/en/view/with-high-attendance-the-four-overviews-on-
geopolitics-by-the-institution-a [accessed 13th June 2020] 
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Furthermore, this rather blunt instrument of identity formation is complemented by a constant 
refinement of the nationalist ideals available to the parties. This process has been made clear 
by policies such as the Rassemblement National’s “dédiabolisation”, which has enforced a 
strict “periodization” of historical grandeur in line with national circumstances and popular 
sentiment.17 The Alternative for Germany’s continued dismissal of neo-Nazism perhaps 
exemplifies this tendency of geopolitical actors to act as “timetravellers”, emphasising and 
obscuring ‘national time’ to their liking.18 Subsequently, any attachment to National Socialist 
ideals that are deeply unpopular in German society and even banned by official decree is 
avoided by the party, as this would likely impact its electoral popularity and official 
legality.19 Of course, this would subsequently affect the group’s ability to promote any form 
of grand national ‘Self’ within state institutions. This would thereby disrupt its two core aims 
as set out within the political tradition’s theoretical background. As such, radical right parties 
gravitate towards a national “emplotment” focused on historical ideals free from controversy, 
with the RN’s admiration of De Gaulle mirroring Golden Dawn’s defence of Orthodoxy.20 In 
line with this study’s theory, it is perhaps best to view and measure this phenomenon through 
the use of the ‘Overton Window’ concept. This theory describes the range of political thought 
deemed acceptable by a society at a given time.21 These thoughts can be mapped onto six 
levels of severity ranging from “Unthinkable” to “Policy”, with societies constantly 
renegotiating the limits of this ‘window’.22 Certainly, Europe’s radical right have played a 
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crucial role with regards to the limits of acceptable thought, with many adherents openly 
embracing Overton’s concept.23 It could be argued, then, that by reflexively influencing the 
parameters of acceptable thought, radical right parties have been able to fine tune their own 
stories surrounding the nation’s changing fortunes. In relation to Russia, this approach may 
be responsible for whether or not a party rhetorically decouples the country from its Soviet 
legacies, as the wrong decision could potentially damage the group’s ability to act as a 
‘national champion’.  
 
“The mythic past” – The emotional pull of narrative24 
 
These processes ultimately decide what resources are available to radical right movements as 
they construct the national ‘Self’, which possesses an inherently ‘temporal’ nature. All four 
of these thoroughly conservative parties have shown a great interest in developing narrative 
as part of their identity. Of course, this is exemplified by the corpus’ myriad of ‘stories’, 
which help reveal the nature of these nations’ pasts, presents and potential futures when 
viewed in a wider context. These eras are explicitly endowed with specific emotional value 
by the radical right, thereby placing the contemporary ‘concerns’ of the electorate within an 
‘objective’ temporality.25 This is perhaps best seen with regards to the fact that the radical 
right parties’ national ‘Selfs’ wholly align with aforementioned ‘Golden Ages’, with this time 
believed to embody the country’s “eternal values”.26 Such a romantic understanding thereby 
hints at the thoroughly objective nature with which these ideals are promoted to the electorate 
through mediums such as party websites. This tendency has been discussed by various 
researchers, with Megal Cinar noting how “organicism” can simplify narratives into their 
core concepts.27 Such terminology closely resembles that of the radical right philosophy 
discussed throughout this study, as parties bluntly distinguish between geopolitical ‘heroes’ 
 
23 Ibid. 
Christian Bjørnskov, Populism: Three approaches to an international problem, Economic Affairs, No. 39 
(2019), p. 275 
Kai Arzheimer, “Don’t Mention the War!”: How Populist Right-Wing Radicalism Became (Almost) Normal in 
Germany, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 57 (2019), p. 97 
24 Ishay Landa, The Magic of the Extreme: On Fascism, Modernity, and Capitalism, The Journal of Holocaust 
Research, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2019), p. 61 
25 Hakkı Taş, The chronopolitics of national populism, p. 2 
26 Roger Griffin, Afterword, p. 300 
27 Meral Cinar, Collective Memory and National Membership: Identity and Citizenship Models in Turkey and 
Austria (London: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 5-7 
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and ‘villains’.28 This simplicity ensures the party’s continued dominance over the narrative 
and its subsequent position as national ‘vanguard’. As Hakkı Taş has argued, the certainty of 
these narratives “ensures individuals cease to be the autonomous agents of their lives, but 
float through time as part of the greater nation”.29 Overall, these developments ultimately 
result in the articulation of an objective and detailed national ‘Self’, whose monolithic 
narrative is used as a powerful political weapon. This finally allows the radical right to 
mobilise the electorate, with these groups promoting themselves as the messianic inheritors 
of an unchanging tradition that will cast aside the troubles of the present day.30  
 
A matter of time and space – Grounding narrative in an ‘organic’ Europe 
 
This narrative ‘objectivity’ appears to be the key link between radical right ideology and its 
fascination with classical geopolitics. At first glance, such a connection may seem obvious 
due to the tradition’s interest in militaristic rhetoric.31 Indeed, geopolitics naturally helps to 
endow the national ‘Self’ with a physical, territorial reality, with a historical ‘struggle’ to 
protect this presence appealing to the parties’ existential rhetoric.32 On a more theoretical 
level, however, it is perhaps the various ‘certainties’ offered by such realism which is 
ultimately so appealing to the groups. This can be seen in the way in which classical 
geopolitics explicitly ties ‘national interests’ to the very soil that countries inhabit, thereby 
implying that nations possess an unchanging character.33 Of course, such ideals naturally 
complement radical right thought, which actively claims to represent objective values. As a 
result, geopolitics plays a crucial role in ‘elevating’ the national ‘Self’ to the international 
stage, with parties tying their ‘stories’ to the classical tradition throughout their literatures. 
For example, whilst Golden Dawn’s extremism sees the party engage with the tradition’s 
esoteric terminology, the other three groups are still eager to make direct reference to thinkers 
such as Brzezinski and Dugin.34 The universal acceptance of these theoretical precepts 
 
28 Lynn Davies, Gender, Education, Extremism and Security, Compare: A Journal of Comparative and 
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29 Hakkı Taş, The chronopolitics of national populism, p. 5 
30 Roger Griffin, Afterword, p. 300 
31 Ian Klinke, Geopolitics and the Political Right: Lessons from Germany, International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 3 
(2018), pp. 498-501 
32 Ibid. 
33 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 42 
34 With high attendance the “Four overviews on geopolitics” by the Institution A.I.G.I.S.-Photography  
L’Ukraine de l’Ouest désormais «ouvertement» vassalisée par Washington [Western Ukraine now "openly" 
vassalized by Washington], Rassemblement National, 5th December 2014 - 
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subsequently hints at a shared understanding of what ‘forces’ drive European politics, with 
this directly impacting narratives surrounding the Russian ‘Other’.  
 
It ought to be noted that this study’s parties appear to focus specifically on the 
aforementioned norms of Anglo-American geopolitics. This is in spite of the rhetorical 
diversity of the corpus, with this study’s critical perspective suggesting that even nationalist 
parties are prone to engage with hegemonic discourse. The inherent ‘power’ of this outlook is 
made clear by its focus on British and American strategy in Europe, which may be 
understood critically as representing ‘the world’ to those who embrace the tradition.35 This is 
evident with regards to Mackinder and his ‘Heartland’ thesis when viewed as a subjective 
assessment of British continental strategy. Described by Zhengyu Wu as a plan to “oppose 
any European power unifying or achieving hegemony on the continent”, the strategy 
ultimately aimed to maintain London’s naval supremacy by denying a ‘land state’ possession 
of resources capable of opposing such dominance.36 This dichotomous worldview 
subsequently results in the creation of a Russian Heartland ‘Other’, which embodied a 
distinct ‘land power’ most likely to accrue said resources through expansion.37 For this 
study’s radical right narratives, this inherent conflict appears to be understood as a fact of 
European diplomacy. Certainly, the conflict’s ‘organic’ nature also appears to function as a 
realist understanding of ‘order’, with objective geography ensuring a “balance of power” so 
often tied by the groups to their independent ‘Self’.38 This ‘balance’ is subsequently linked to 
the four movements’ repeated characterisation of Europe as a diverse “community of 
civilisation”, with Ian Klinke noting extreme right desires to enforce a continental “Monroe 
Doctrine”, in which all nations can fully express themselves.39 As a result, it appears that 
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Europe’s radical right uses this Anglo-Russian dichotomy in order to understand from where 
an ‘ideological’ threat may appear in relation to Europe and subsequently their own country. 
Naturally, the use of this theory to navigate ongoing tensions is motivated by material 
interests, with parties ‘picking sides’ according to their self-understandings. With regards to 
Moscow, this results in two potential outlooks, with the acceptance or rejection of Russia’s 
inherent power viewed as important to restoring a historical “balance” deemed essential to a 
lost and wholly objective ‘Golden Age’.40 
 
Russia as narrative hero and villain 
 
Given the tendency of this study’s parties to view Russia as ‘heroic’, it is perhaps appropriate 
to first discuss the positive outlook that has emerged from the corpus. Overall, these beliefs 
effectively view Russia as an ‘Eurasian Saviour’, as such views rely on the core tenets of 
neo-Eurasianism. Of course, many of the parties have not just engaged with Dugin’s ideas 
but have actively maintained long-term professional contact.41 This tendency has occurred in 
the face of a ‘postmodern’ Euro-Atlantic ‘villain’, whose liberal universalism has supposedly 
challenged the geopolitical independence and modern-era values of both the radical right 
‘Self’ and Russia. Due to this, it may seem clear why Dugin’s Russo-centric interpretation of 
Anglo-American geopolitics may be so appealing to these groups. As aforementioned, neo-
Eurasianism transforms the supposed “backwardness” of Moscow’s static ‘land power’ into a 
virtue, characterising the country as a uniquely anti-Western redoubt of traditionalism.42  
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This position is justified through Moscow’s retrospective incorporation into a party’s overall 
narrative. For example, Russia’s historical interactions with the ‘Self’ are viewed as 
emblematic of a historical sovereignty based on natural circumstance. This is clear in the way 
bilateral interactions are explicitly facilitated through an ‘organic’ continental framework that 
stress the national voice. Such constructs include the RN’s “Europe from Brest to 
Vladivostok” and Jobbik’s “Germany-Russia-Turkey triangle”.43 This theme continues with 
Russia’s contemporary conceptualisation as a uniquely “international conservative power” 
struggling for modern-era certainties regarding state and society.44 This is made particularly 
clear in relation to the actions of Vladimir Putin, who appears to have ‘squared the circle’ by 
uniting traditional values with the state.45 Such an achievement naturally contrasts with a 
continent dominated by “ultra-liberalism”, with the Kremlin’s foreign policy actions 
subsequently viewed as a ‘spatiotemporal’ defence of “national interests”.46 Ultimately, this 
messianic position is seen as playing a decisive role in restoring a diverse, “multipolar” 
world, conducive to the ‘Self’.47 It could be argued, then, that such conceptions view the 
country as the harbinger of what Dugin describes as “plural anthropology”, with the state 
endowed with a “universal mission” to defend “national diversity”.48  
 
In spite of such praise, it is also important to discuss the negative outlook that has emerged in 
this investigation. Of course, given the fact that only one party has expressed such ideas, it is 
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naturally difficult to explicitly ground this interpretation within the “schematic narrative 
template”. However, given the radical right’s tendency to promote ‘objective’ dualities of 
‘good’ and ‘evil’, it is possible that wider evidence for this outlook may appear with further 
research. Having examined Jobbik’s increasing scepticism of Russia, it seems that this 
outlook ultimately describes Moscow as a ‘Neo-Soviet Meddler’. Whilst the party accepts 
Russia’s inherent geopolitical power, it by no means views it as benevolent. This is made 
clear by Jobbik’s characterisation of Russia’s resurgence as akin to Soviet repression, with 
the group now refusing to ‘bend time’ in order to argue that “now things are different”.49 
Often compared to a “looming Soviet threat”, Russia is subsequently ‘Othered’ due to its 
‘normative’ challenge to the national ‘Self’.50 This tendency to compare the country to its 
communist past suggests that its actions are dismissed as ‘postmodern’ and ‘ideological’, 
much like the Euro-Atlantic ‘villain’. As such, radical right calls to “strengthen Europe” 
ultimately resemble Russophile desires for ‘multipolarity’, with Moscow now viewed as 
responsible for having distorted a ‘Golden Age’ aligned with Europe’s ‘natural’ geopolitics.51 
This renegotiation of shared presuppositions suggests that this outlook may follow a 
theoretical outline promoted by Atlanticist thinkers such as Zbigniew Brzezinski. Much as 
Dugin’s interpretation of Anglo-American geopolitics provides a framework for pro-Russian 
sentiment, the intellectual’s policy of ‘containing’ Eurasia may simultaneously function as a 




In conclusion, therefore, it appears that whilst comparison of the four party narratives yields a 
great number of similarities and differences, it also reveals how these groups operate on a 
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theoretical level. This is seemingly due to the organisations’ “specific” interpretations of a 
shared ideological ‘template’, with the political tradition’s essential beliefs acting as a 
mechanism by which the Russian ‘Other’ is understood as a geopolitical actor. This 
framework is exposed through the material decisions made by the parties when constructing a 
glorious national ‘Self’, which is always nationalist and ‘popular’, regardless of the distinct 
‘colouring’ left by national tradition. This self-understanding is ultimately presented as the 
narrative’s historical ‘Golden Age’, with this ‘organicism’ acting as the crucial link for the 
identity to classical geopolitics. This interest in geopolitical theory is expressed through the 
rigid dichotomy of the Anglo-American tradition, with its appeal to the soil inseparable from 
the nation’s ‘objective’ reality. This thereby transforms Moscow into a narrative ‘hero’ or 
‘villain’ depending on subjective circumstance. For instance, the four parties have generally 
shown a tendency to characterise the Kremlin as a messianic ‘saviour’. This discovery 
validates the connections made by Marlene Laruelle between the radical right and neo-
Eurasianism, with Russia understood as a redoubt of values cherished by the political 
tradition.53 Certainly, Moscow is essentially viewed as the harbinger of an ‘alter-
universalism’, capable of restoring modern-era values conducive to the ‘Self’. At the same 
time, however, it is clear that some parties may negatively view the country’s inherent power, 
with tentative research suggesting that this may result from a reluctance to decouple Russia 
from a “Soviet threat” akin to the thoughts of Brzezinski.54 This theoretical engagement 
thereby challenges the “useful idiots” discourse so often attributed to the radical right, with 
desires for national salvation encouraging parties to pick sides in an existential debate 
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Following the previous chapter’s findings, it appears that this study has come to a number of 
new and sometimes surprising conclusions. Shifting focus onto the European side of the 
radical right-Russia relationship, the investigation has produced knowledge that is both 
innovative and potentially valuable for further research. This is the culmination of a 
methodology which has attempted to engage directly with various parties’ publications on 
Moscow, which have remained unexplored to a considerable degree. As expected, these texts 
are characterised by monolithic understandings of ‘the nation’ and its global position, with 
radical right ideology possessing an especially militant adherence to ‘objectivity’. 
Subsequently, the adoption of a critical, interpretivist approach has proven effective in 
providing satisfying answers to the study’s two research questions. Certainly, the method’s 
‘deconstruction’ of party data has not only helped identify detailed geopolitical narratives but 
also expose the fundamental forces controlling the extent to which these “eternal values” 
coincide and contrast. This subjective renegotiation within radical right Russia policy, 
therefore, has ultimately resulted in the country being understood through a specifically 
radical lens of shared ideology and national tradition. 
 
This is first evident with regard to the study’s application of critical geopolitics. Aiming to 
democratise the practice of ‘labelling’ territory away from statecraft’s “wise men”, the 
tradition has proven effective in giving voice to the foreign policies of ‘non-traditional’ 
actors, such as the European radical right.1 Furthermore, this critical understanding has 
succeeded in challenging the bias of these parties’ geopolitical outlooks, characterising it as 
the result of a subjective ‘Self’ based on material circumstance.2 At the same time, however, 
it is worth reflecting on the particular suitability of this approach in relation to understanding 
the increasingly popular radical right. Overall, the nationalist tradition’s presuppositions, 
perhaps somewhat ironically, lend themselves to the hegemonic norms of geopolitics to a 
remarkable degree, with party samples expressing an especial admiration for these “wise 
men” and their realism. As aforementioned, this results in the Russian ‘Other’ being viewed 
through the prism of a “geopolitical gaze” forged by over a century of Anglo-American 
 
1 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Thinking Critically about Geopolitics in The Geopolitics Reader eds. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 
Simon Dalby & Paul Routledge (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 3 
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continental strategy.3 Intimately tied to politics’ ‘natural laws’ as laid out by Mackinder in 
1904, the school of thought casts Europe as existing organically between Anglo-American 
naval power and an inherently influential Russian “Heartland”.4 Interestingly, this land-sea 
dichotomy is eagerly accepted by this study’s radical right groups, who appear to draw 
objective certainty from this natural ‘conflict’. Indeed, it could be contended that the four 
parties appear to embrace this metaphysical existence within a spatial reality akin to 
Spykman’s intermediary “Rimland”, with this ‘organic’ position providing a “balance” 
essential to the articulation of a grand national ‘Self’.5 
 
Simultaneously, the power of national peculiarities in deciding how the four parties use this 
information is striking.6 This investigation has made a strong case for the use of narrative 
analysis in exposing such decisive information, with the radical right ‘Self’ existing as much 
in an imagined past and future as the political present.7 Such temporality is made clear by the 
four groups’ profound ambitions to emulate Julius Evola’s “revolt against the modern world”, 
with ‘eternal’ heroes and villains renegotiated in line with the uncertainties of a “liminal 
crisis” now threatening the country.8 This shared framework’s alignment with James 
Wertsch’s theory of “schematic narrative templates” is particularly noteworthy, as the 
movements use abstract ideological touchstones in order to subjectively construct their own 
“specific narratives” surrounding the struggle to restore a national ‘Golden Age’.9 
Geopolitical concerns, therefore, are intimately linked to this process of narrative 
construction. This is exemplified by the fact that the four parties’ idealised histories are 
connected to an ‘organic’ continental balance, with the groups deciding whether or not 
Russia is ‘ideologically’ disrupting this order according to their own subjective national 
circumstances. 
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Of course, the study’s sample has shown a somewhat predictable tendency to forge positive 
narratives, which are influenced by neo-Eurasianism. Casting the Moscow-friendly policies 
of national ‘heroes’ such as De Gaulle and Bismarck as embodying a glorious past, these 
coinciding outlooks appear to be motivated by troubles that have arisen due to the imposition 
of ‘ideological’ Euro-Atlantic norms. As a result, Western, or specifically American, power 
is believed to have overstepped its bounds in a ‘diverse’ Europe, with the Russian 
“Heartland” viewed as the only power capable of restoring a continental harmony conducive 
to modern-era national interests. Jobbik’s surprising rebuke of these more conventional 
conclusions, however, offers a narrative that is especially novel. This storyline now sees 
Russia characterised as the postmodern imperialist ‘villain’, which exerts undue control over 
the country in an ‘ideological’ manner akin to the Soviet era. It could be argued that this 
contrasting stance originates within Hungary’s sensitive legacies regarding “Bolshevism”, 
which still retain emotional power today.10 Due to this, it seems that the radical right’s 
aversion to a normative, post-sovereign ‘status-quo’ translates into a ‘grass is always greener’ 
approach on the European geopolitical stage, with the subjective, opportunistic narratives that 
drive these beliefs characterising the four groups as much as “emotional vampires” as 
defenders of the national will.11  
 
Whilst this incorporation of ‘chronopolitics’ has proven effective in bringing to life the 
radical right’s geopolitical visions, it is worth reflecting on how the findings’ deficiencies 
may be improved by further research. In keeping with the theme of time, it is clear that 
interviews with party spokesmen would help add rigour to the data following the 
unprecedented difficulties of research in the current period. With reference to this study’s 
findings, however, there is a pressing need to corroborate the Hungarian radical right’s 
newfound animosity towards the Russian-Eurasian “Heartland”. Such an issue seems to be 
the result of the investigation’s criteria regarding party choice. This was mainly focused on 
investigating parties that are emblematic of the “perfect storm” of factors that gripped the 
 
10 Paul Lendvai, One day that shook the communist world: the 1956 Hungarian uprising and its legacy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 241 
“This is sticky-fingered Bolshevism”, Jobbik, 26th October 2018 - 
https://www.jobbik.com/this_is_sticky_fingered_bolshevism [accessed 8th May 2020] 
11 Hakkı Taş, The chronopolitics of national populism, p. 5 
 99 
continent across various geopolitical divides over the past decade.12 It is perhaps rather 
appropriate, then, that the outcome of a study based on narrative has concluded that there is 
now a growing need to appreciate the radical right beyond its historical rise. Of course, the 
very idea of connections between the radical right and Russia appeared as a topic of interest 
precisely due to the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis. This is exemplified by Laruelle’s 
aforementioned belief that the seeming ‘failures’ of Western norms may lead to the radical 
right’s embrace of neo-Eurasianism.13 Overall, this theory has been proven correct by this 
investigation. However, it is now necessary to appreciate the political tradition as an 
established part of Europe’s wider political eco-system, with national norms and traditions 
creating a variety of tailored geopolitical outlooks. 
 
In relation to the language used to negatively describe Russia’s geopolitical resurgence, it 
could be suggested that further research may find it useful to focus on countries which have 
experienced communist rule in their recent histories. This is due to the impressive amount of 
discussion related to Russia’s Soviet legacies within the four parties’ literature and 
subsequent narratives. It is striking that such issues are even mentioned by this 
investigation’s more pro-Russia parties, who have felt the need to explicitly obscure the era’s 
history in their ‘stories’. Given the political tradition’s militant adherence to dichotomous 
politics, it appears that subjective decisions to actively subject these legacies to 
“periodization” may serve as a crucial juncture for parties who potentially embrace this 
relatively unexplored Atlanticism.14 Countries that may prove profitable to explore therefore 
include Estonia and Poland. In light of this study’s discussion of the importance of popular 
national tradition, it seems that any radical right formation in these countries would find it 
very difficult to achieve their aims by adopting a pro-Russia strategy.15 This contrasts with 
the countries found in this investigation, with Jobbik’s unanticipated volte-face seemingly 
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resulting from a rare ability to ‘choose’ due to Hungary’s relatively liberal historical 
experiences of “Goulash communism”.16 An investigation focusing on the two 
aforementioned states may therefore strengthen the findings of this research in a number of 
ways. For example, it may allow for an understanding as to how radical right parties 
manipulate geopolitical narratives to fit new-found governmental positions.17 This may prove 
enlightening with regards to the ways in which these parties rhetorically define the much-
loathed political present. Simultaneously, research building on this study may be able to 
explain the growing tendency of radical right groups in these countries to define themselves 
as representing “True Europe”.18 Indeed, this rhetorical practice may serve as a means of 
obscuring potentially difficult questions surrounding an Atlanticist stance in much the same 
way that the Eurasianist radical right manipulate narrative in order to avoid prolonged 
discussions of the Soviet era.  
 
Due to this, it may be said that whilst this investigation has aimed to participate in debate 
directly related to the European radical right, it may also offer a small contribution to 
ongoing discussions surrounding the very concept of ‘Europe’. Of course, due to this study’s 
international perspective, it is hard to ignore the extraordinary rise of international 
conservative alignments, which now aim to ‘restore’ the continent to its ‘traditional’ state.19 
This rather ironic development has placed the political tradition at the forefront of 
cooperation across bodies such as the European Union, with the European Parliament’s 
‘Identity and Democracy’ (ID) bloc now challenging norms at the institution’s heart.20 In 
relation to the importance of narrative, it could be argued that the success of this group may 
ultimately depend on how willing parties are to sacrifice their own “specific” geopolitical 
stories in relation to a greater ‘schematic narrative template’. Of course, it would prove 
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impossible to accommodate all of this study’s grand ‘Selfs’ at the same time, with Russia’s 
involvement in a new yet traditional Europe potentially causing friction. Certainly, the 
Kremlin remains a frontline issue for the bloc, which was made evident during Le Pen’s 2019 
visit to sceptical ID colleagues in Estonia.21 As such, it will be important to follow these 
developments and adapt research accordingly, with the French politician recently declaring in 
Milan that in spite of its ‘existential’ difficulties, the political present now represents “a 
moment, in which united in heart and spirit, we will give the whole of Europe the signal of 
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